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Abstract 
Imaginary companions (ICs) have been discussed in psychological literature for 
centuries. Over the last decade, researchers have begun investigating how having an IC 
relates to children’s development, but they have focused on a narrow range of social-
cognitive abilities. This thesis expands upon previous studies, investigating whether 
having an IC relates to children’s understanding of self and others.  
The first study focused on whether IC status related to children’s ability to cite 
themselves versus an adult as the best judge of their interior self-knowledge (e.g., 
whether they were hungry, ill, angry, etc.) in a sample of 82 4- to 7-year-olds. Findings 
indicated that children with ICs tended to designate less knowledge about their inner 
states to adults compared with children with no imaginary companion (NIC), with a non-
significant trend for IC-group children also to designate more knowledge about their own 
inner states to themselves. The results of Study 1 showed that performance on the self-
knowledge task was unrelated to children’s theory of mind (ToM) abilities, and that IC 
status did not relate to children’s ToM performance. 
Study 2 addressed the relation between IC status and the extent to which children 
invoked internal states when describing their best friend in a sample of 144 5-year-olds. 
Findings confirmed that children with ICs are more likely to spontaneously use more 
mental states when describing a friend than their NIC peers. This relation was 
independent of verbal ability, gender, ToM understanding, and overall verbosity. Study 2 
found no relation between IC status and either previous or concurrent ToM performance. 
Study 3 investigated the IC-related differences in the use of self-directed or 
private speech during free play in the same sample of 5-year-olds who had participated in 
Study 2. Findings indicated that children with ICs produced more overall private speech 
vi 
than did NIC children. Specifically, IC-group children produced more covert, partially-
internalised private speech (unintelligible muttering, whispering, verbal lip movements) 
compared with their NIC counterparts, although there was no difference between the IC 
and NIC groups with respect to the content of their private speech. Findings are discussed 
with reference to how engaging with an IC provides the child with an enriched social 
environment that helps to hone their skills of distinguishing between the mental 
orientations of themselves and others, and also with reference to the social origins of 
private speech.  
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1 
______________________________________________________ 
Chapter 1 
Imaginary Companions and Their Role in Socio-cognitive 
Development 
______________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 Background 
When Sonia began preschool, she met Lucy. Her mother was excited to have her 
new friend over to play. According to Sonia, Lucy had light skin and crazy curly hair, 
and a brother named Martin. The thing that Sonia had neglected to elaborate on was that 
her friend Lucy was invisible. Lucy was an imaginary friend of Sonia’s creation. 
 Imagination is a function that is prevalent in typically developing human beings. 
Imaginative play begins in a child’s life around 18- to 24-months and has been reported 
in younger children as well (Friedman & Leslie, 2007). Pretending seems to be more 
widespread in humans, as it is rarely seen in non-human primates (Gómez, 2008), and on 
the rare occasions when it is observed in non-humans, the play is at a developmentally 
slower pace and involves scaffolding (Lyn, Greenfield, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 2006). 
Vygotsky (1931/1997a) asserted that “the difference between animal and man is lack of 
imagination” (p. 224). It is clear that imagination is an integral part of typical human 
development. One of the earliest outward manifestations of a child’s imagination is the 
ability to pretend. 
Pretend play has been argued to facilitate children’s development by creating a 
safe environment to assimilate or represent reality while simultaneously serving as a 
strategy to make sense of the world (Harris, 2000). The ability to explore through play 
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gives the child an outlet for investigating different scenarios while maintaining the 
authority to manipulate the outcome of the imagined situations (Bouldin, 2006). Sonia’s 
story, and those of other children with an imaginary companion (IC), are good 
demonstrations of the way children use imagination and pretend play as an exploratory 
outlet. At an early age, children are already engaging with pretend play to provide 
themselves with a stage of their own creation where anything can happen as they perform 
a scene, simultaneously taking on the role of the actor, director, and audience. 
An IC is described by Svendsen (1934) as “an invisible character named and 
referred to in conversation with other persons or played with directly for a period of time, 
at least several months, having an air of reality for the child, but no apparent objective 
basis. This excludes the type of imaginary play where an object is personified or which 
the child takes on the role of a character” (p. 988). Studies on ICs are sparse in 
comparison to other facets of imagination and pretend play. Although research interest in 
ICs has increased over the last decade, there are still many unanswered questions (Taylor, 
Carlson, Maring, Gerow, & Charley, 2004) resulting in little information being known 
about what kinds of children create ICs, where they fit into a child’s developmental 
trajectory, and when and why they disappear (Taylor, 1999). The overall significance and 
function of the IC in children’s development remain poorly understood (Gupta & Desai 
2006). In short, ICs remain an important, yet under-researched manifestation of the 
developing child’s active imagination. 
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1.2 Prevalence 
ICs are often represented in popular culture. Throughout the years these entities 
have been depicted in books (Mark Twain’s The Mysterious Stranger features a boy with 
a friend named Satan who is invisible), movies (the Oscar winning 1950s hit Harvey 
starring James Stewart as a mild-mannered man with an IC in the form of a six-foot 
rabbit), television programmes (the American children’s programme Sesame Street 
starred Big Bird’s imaginary friend Snuffleupagus), and even comic strips (Calvin and 
Hobbes tells the story of Calvin, an imaginative boy who plays with his stuffed tiger 
Hobbes who is very much alive to the boy). The four ICs above are all examples of how 
vastly different these entities can be both when represented in popular culture and when 
created by real children. ICs are as different and unique as the children who create them.  
Estimates of the incidence of children having an IC at some point during 
childhood have ranged from 10% (Bouldin & Pratt, 1999) to 65% (Taylor et al., 2004). 
Generally, prevalence rates rest around 20–50% in children (Carlson & Taylor, 2005; 
Gleason, 2005; Gleason & Hohmann, 2006; Pearson, Rouse, Doswell, Ainsworth, 
Dawson, Simms, Edwards, & Faulconbridge, 2001).  
Two main issues arise when interpreting IC prevalence rates: (a) the suggestibility 
of the child being interviewed, and (b) the inclusion criteria used by the researcher. With 
regard to suggestibility, the fact that the IC is a private phenomenon which occurs inside 
the child creator and cannot be physically seen becomes problematic to researchers 
because, to know whether a child has created an IC, an experimenter must inquire about 
it directly. In the first IC studies, researchers often asked children if they had an IC or not, 
and used the children’s yes or no answers as the basis for assigning IC status, 
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disregarding the suggestibility of the child or their desire to please the interviewer 
(Hurlock & Burstein, 1932; Pearson, Burrow, Fitzgerald, Green, Lee, & Wise, 2001; 
Pearson et al., 2001). More current research is beginning to take into account how 
children’s personality and disposition may affect their tendency to report an IC 
(Fernyhough, Bland, Meins, & Coltheart, 2007; Gleason, 2004a; Hepworth, 2007).  It has 
been theorised that children who are more suggestible could be more likely to report an 
IC during interview without actually meeting the criterion for being an IC creator, due to 
the child’s desire to answer the researcher’s questions “correctly”. However, to date no 
research has been done to test this theory. Of course, this type of researcher effect is a 
phenomenon which has to be addressed and taken into account in any interview setting 
involving children (Breakwell, Hammond, & Fife-Schaw, 2000).   
In an attempt to rule out researcher effects and children’s suggestibility, a 
corroborated parental questionnaire has been constructed enabling researchers to back up 
child report with parental confirmation of the IC’s existence. A parent is, in effect, an 
expert on their child, so it should follow that they would know most about their child’s 
fantasy lives. Evidence for the corroborated questionnaire measure can be seen in 
Gleason’s (2004a) study on parents as IC reporters. The findings in this study showed 
that parents of children with ICs were found to corroborate their children’s reports of 
involvement in fantasy play more accurately than parents of children with no imaginary 
companion (NIC). In short, this study suggests that parents of IC children should provide 
reliable testimony about their children’s fantasy play behaviour and their IC.  
The second issue influencing discrepant findings in IC prevalence rating is the 
inclusion criteria that investigators use in order to identify a child’s IC status. Svendsen’s 
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(1934) definition of an IC excludes imaginary play where, “an object is personified or 
where a child takes on the role of a character” (p. 988). However, ‘personified objects’ 
and character role-play involve distinct imaginative capacities. When a child 
impersonates a character (e.g., pretending to be Superman) it is qualitatively different 
from the creation of an IC. The child is simply acting as if they were a character whose 
attributes are already familiar to them. On the other hand, personified object (PO) play 
incorporates play that is much closer to IC play in terms of imaginative predisposition. A 
PO is classified by Carlson and Taylor (2005) as any “doll or stuffed animal who is 
treated as though they have a stable personality” (p. 95). Children endow these objects 
with human qualities and build fantasy around the PO. In this respect, the IC and PO 
embody two forms of imaginative play which do not differ in regard to use of 
imagination (Taylor, 1999).  
As ICs have gained popularity in research domains, experimenters have used 
different justifications in order to examine POs separately from ICs (Bouldin, 2006; 
Gleason & Hohmann, 2006; Gleason, Sebanc, & Hartup, 2000), or to treat these entities 
as equivalent (Carlson & Taylor, 2005; Fernyhough et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2004). 
Gleason (2004b) argues that ICs may perform a different social function than POs, 
observing that children’s social relationships with POs are vertical in nature, resulting in 
a hierarchical relationship where the child is the competent partner. Gleason further 
asserts that this type of hierarchical relationship may generalise to the children’s 
interactions with peers, “meaning that their concepts of friendship may also not be as 
structurally egalitarian” (p. 208) as those children with ICs who may create more 
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horizontal relationships. For these reasons Gleason suggests that it is important to treat 
ICs and POs as separate categories.  
However, more recent research into the form and function of the IC counters this 
argument. According to some researchers, ICs can function in both horizontal and 
vertical relationships with the child depending on how long the child has played with the 
IC as well as how “real” the IC is to the child (Hoff, 2005; Taylor, Carlson, & Shawber, 
2007). Taylor (1999) asserts that the IC is entwined with the stuffed animal, arguing that 
POs are provided by parents who respond to children’s interest in fantasy characters, or 
stories. The parent therefore creates a physical outlet for the fantasy to be acted out, 
whereas it would have been acted out in the absence of the PO as well. The arguments are 
both valid as there is no doubt that the IC and the PO are different entities; however, 
because the PO has a stable personality and identity to the child, the PO can also act as a 
type of IC indicating that a child is using their imagination in a similar way to the use that 
ensues when playing with an IC. It is important for research to standardise clearly what 
phenomena are being defined as constituting an IC, and to report their inclusion criteria 
for deciding a child’s (or any participant’s) IC status. 
 
1.3 Variables Relating to the Creation of Imaginary Companions  
Although it has been established that between 20 and 50% of a given child 
population create an IC (Gleason & Hohmann, 2006; Gleason, 2005; Carlson & Taylor, 
2005), certain factors make their creation more likely. Age is a key variable to examine 
within the population of IC reporters. Knowing the age range at which IC creation is at its 
peak is important because there is much benefit in getting an accurate account of the 
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phenomenon while it is occurring. By interviewing children while they are interacting 
with their IC on a day to day basis, the experimenter receives the most precise and vivid 
descriptions of what the IC reporter is experiencing. A retrospective account of an IC 
may not be as rich a source of information as an account of an IC being experienced in 
the present. Children are also likely to forget that they had ICs as time goes on and 
therefore deny their existence at later ages.  
Children aged 3- to 6-years are most likely to create ICs (Singer & Singer, 1990), 
however they have been reported in older pre-teens and adolescents (Seiffge-Krenke, 
2001; Seiffge-Krenke, 1997), and even adults (Gupta & Desai, 2006). Some researchers 
argue that adult fiction authors create characters that are akin to ICs because even though 
the author’s behaviour differs in the fact that he/she does not physically play with the 
character, once created, characters in novels have personalities and minds of their own 
(Taylor, Hodges, & Kohanyi, 2003). However, research on ICs in older children and 
adults is at an early stage, and the vast majority of studies have been conducted on young 
children who are at the prime age to create these beings. 
Gender is another variable that is known to relate to children’s IC status. Girls are 
more likely to create ICs than boys (Pearson et al., 2001; Carlson & Taylor, 2005; 
Gleason & Hohmann, 2006). Even early on in IC research, Vostrovsky (1894) observed 
that “boys seem much less susceptible to these fancies than girls” (p. 394), concluding 
that the discrepancy was because boys had a more active lifestyle than did girls. Boone, 
Canetti, Bachar, De-Nour, and Shaley (1999) examined sex differences in children who 
create ICs and discovered that 17.6% more girls than boys reported ICs. Carlson and 
Taylor (2005) looked more broadly at sex differences in fantasy play, and suggested that 
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predisposition to fantasy does not differ between the sexes but, rather, the way it is 
expressed changes as a function of the child’s sex in the pre-school years. Carlson and 
Taylor also suggested that parents respond in more positive ways to girls’ ICs than to 
boys’ ICs, concluding that it may be more acceptable for girls to have and report ICs.  
Moreover, it may be more acceptable for a boy to impersonate a character (say Batman) 
who is tough and may embody a more typically masculine disposition. In support of this 
suggestion, Harter and Chao (1992) found gender differences in the type of IC that 
children created, reporting that boys were more likely to create super-competent ICs 
possessing physical prowess, whereas girls created ICs whom they could nurture and care 
for. Thus it seems that gender differences are seen not only in the tendency to have an IC, 
but also in the type of IC created.  
Birth order is a third variable which is associated with IC creation. First-born 
children are more likely to create ICs than their siblings (Bouldin & Pratt, 1999; 
Manosevitz, Prentice, Wilson, 1973). Bouldin and Pratt (1999) suggest that this may 
reveal that one function of the IC could be to ameliorate loneliness. First-born children 
are often left to play on their own without a social outlet, and may create an IC in order to 
compensate for the lack of social opportunities available with peers. Hoff (2004) pointed 
out that there are multiple functions that an IC can fulfil for a child. The first-born child 
may initially utilise the IC as a tool to fight loneliness, however as other children are 
added to a burgeoning family, the IC could either become obsolete, or continue serving 
other functions (these will be elaborated on further in Section 1.6).  
By taking into account age, gender, and birth order, experimenters can get a better 
idea of what children to focus on when they are investigating ICs; but what other 
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variables are predictive of children possessing ICs? Researchers have related the 
differences between children who do and do not have ICs to individual differences in 
fantasy disposition (Bouldin, 2006; Bouldin & Pratt, 2001; Gleason, Jarudi, & Cheek, 
2003; Hoff, 2005). Children who have ICs are more likely to score higher on fantasy 
measures (Gleason et al., 2003; Singer & Singer, 1990; Taylor, Cartwright, & Carlson, 
1993). For example, Taylor et al. (1993) found that children possessing ICs were 
significantly more engaged in pretence than NIC children, while they were also more 
willing to participate in fantasy play with the IC. However, the willingness to engage may 
have been the nature of the friend being inherently imagined, rather than the actual 
child’s disposition. IC children are also able to create more vivid mental images, while 
interacting at a higher level of pretence and spontaneous play than NIC youngsters 
(Bouldin, 2006), and children with high fantasy orientation are more likely to revert to 
magical explanations more often than non-fantasy-oriented individuals (Woolley, 
Boerger, & Markman, 2004).  
Other evidence for IC children’s predisposition toward play comes in the form of 
self-initiated play. Manosevitz et al. (1973) reported that 97% of children with ICs were 
described as children whose play was self-initiated, compared with 86% of NIC children. 
However, when viewing the creation of an IC within a developmental framework, one 
could argue that the child who creates an IC is also providing themselves with more 
opportunities to engage in pretend play, making the direction of cause and effect between 
the creation and ICs and greater active engagement in fantasy play difficult to establish. 
As Vygotsky (1931/1993) stated, “The very idea of practical application of play would be 
impossible if the development of personality were a passive unfolding of innate primary 
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abilities” (p. 161). IC play is an example of how the child is actively using imagination in 
creating a tool on the road toward the development of both the personality and higher 
cognitive functions. This trajectory is not a passive act where the child sits back and 
watches, but rather on the IC stage the child is entertaining, viewing, learning, and 
growing all through their own fantasy.  
 
1.4 The Developmental Significance of Imaginary Companions  
Even after much investigation into the prevalence of ICs and the variables which 
influence IC status, few solid predictions can be made about the children who will be 
more likely to create these entities, and the psychological differences between IC and 
NIC children. To determine a more accurate future picture of IC creation and how a 
child’s IC influences their development, it is important to look back at past studies to see 
how IC research has evolved, as well as to address the question of what variables may 
predispose certain children to create ICs (Gupta & Desai, 2006; Shapiro, Prince, Ireland 
& Stein, 2006; Taylor, 1999).  
Researchers like Vostrovsky (1894), Hurlock and Burstein (1932), and Svendsen 
(1934) investigated children with ICs in a scientific manner for the first time. Early 
research tended to assume that ICs were indicative of abnormal development (Gleason, 
2004b; Seiffge-Krenke, 1997). Describing a small girl playing with her IC, Vostrovsky 
(1894) wrote, “We fear…the shadow people. We fear she may dream too long” (p. 393). 
In addition to the fear that children may be destined to live forever in the fantasy world 
that they create, Vostroysky also predicted that there was an association between nervous 
temperament in children and the existence of an IC.  
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A cohort of past studies has focused on ICs in children who are already exhibiting 
abnormal behaviour. Some of the most recent studies examining atypically developing 
children have related ICs to dissociative personality disorders (McLewin & Muller, 
2006), while others have reported case studies of children and adults with ICs who are 
emotionally disturbed; examples include, a socially withdrawn girl with behavioural 
problems, who states that her imaginary friend, Richard, wants to get her in trouble at 
school, as well as an older adult who has developed schizophrenia after his IC persisted 
into adulthood (Gupta & Desai, 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006). Each study has 
acknowledged that the majority of children with ICs develop typically. Importantly, this 
research has highlighted how children and even adults suffering pathology are usually 
confused about whether the IC is real or imaginary.  
Although the general consensus is that ICs are not an accurate indicator of 
pathology (Bonne et. al, 1999; Gupta & Dessai, 2006; Pearson et al, 2001; Singer & 
Singer, 1990), some findings suggest that the possession of an IC is associated with 
certain types of pathology. Bouldin and Pratt (2002) assert that anxiety levels in children 
with ICs are significantly higher than in NIC children. However, the anxiety scores of the 
IC group children were still within the normal range, and these findings should thus not 
be taken to suggest that ICs are related to clinically significant levels of anxiety. Bouldin 
and Pratt reported that children who create ICs are similar to NIC children in terms of 
temperament and the frequency with which they experience specific fears. Healthy 
adolescents who report ICs have been shown to exhibit immature modes of tension-relief 
and higher levels of psychological distress than adolescents without fantasy friends 
(Bonne et al., 1999). However, this was a retrospective study, so it is possible that some 
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adolescents did have an IC but forgot in later years, and social desirability effects may 
have come into play since self-report questionnaires were used to assess psychological 
distress and coping strategies. Contrary to the studies above, Seiffge-Krenke (2001) 
reported that adolescents who have ICs utilise more active coping styles. These teenagers 
also used their IC not as a substitute for friends, but as an entirely different entity in itself.  
Others have argued that ICs can be a potential indicator of future pathology, 
specifically, dissociative identity disorder (DID) (McLewin & Muller, 2006). In a 
retrospective study, McLewin and Muller found that children who eventually develop 
DID, a personality disorder characterised by the presence of two or more distinct 
personalities which recurrently take control of the person’s behaviour (DSM-IV-TR, 
2000), are more likely to create ICs in childhood than those in the general population. 
The authors argue that this may be because IC play is inherently dissociative in the way 
that it is a disruption to normal consciousness, identity, and perception. Although there is 
a potential connection between ICs and DID, it is important to note that most children 
with ICs do not develop DID, and there are many other developmental factors that 
predispose children to DID. For example, DID is more common in children who have 
experienced maltreatment. Researchers have found that pathologies such as DID are 
related to the existence of ICs only if (a) the IC persists and is relied upon into adulthood, 
(b) the child does not recognise that the IC is an imaginary being, or (c) the child 
possesses a large number of ICs (McLewin, & Muller, 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, some therapists believe that ICs can be a positive therapy tool for a patient 
with DID, helping them to communicate and support the growth of the psychotherapeutic 
process (Sawa, Oae, Abiru, Ogawa, & Takahashi, 2004).   
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Questions have been raised as to whether ICs are a hallucination-like experience 
possibly occupying a position on a developmental continuum of hallucination-like 
experiences from childhood to adulthood (Davis, 2006; Fernyhough et al., 2007; Pearson 
et al., 2001a). In non-clinical populations, children with ICs have been more likely to 
report hearing words in an ambiguous auditory stimulus (thought to increase 
susceptibility to auditory hallucination-like experiences) as well as scoring higher on a 
hallucination scale (Pearson et al., 2001a). Pearson and colleagues (2001a) were the first 
to investigate the link between IC status and susceptibility to hallucination-like 
experiences. Pearson et al. incorporated the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS), in 
conjunction with children’s creation of an IC as a measure of high susceptibility to 
hallucination. They looked at 210 children aged between 9- to 11-years placing them in 
low and high susceptibility groups. They also incorporated an ambiguous voice stimulus, 
(a professional recording of a human voice spliced into 1-s sound bites, and randomly 
mixed and then played backwards) playing it for the children and asking them to write 
down any words that were heard on the tape. Children who reported ICs and were high 
scorers on the hallucination scale were more likely to report hearing words on the 
jumbled speech task.  
The Pearson et al. (2001a) study suffers from a number of methodological 
shortcomings. The first methodological issue was that parental report was not 
incorporated into the IC report measure. This could have influenced the IC status 
variable, because many children are known to make up ICs on the spot (Taylor, 1999), or 
forget that they had an IC. The second issue was the participating children’s age. 
Children are more likely to create ICs between the ages of 3 and 6, whereas Pearson and 
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colleagues examined children who ranged between the ages of 9 and 11. The third issue 
was that children were played the ambiguous voice stimuli as a group. This may have 
influenced child response because of peer pressure to hear words. These shortcomings 
were addressed in studies by Fernyhough et al. (2007) and Davis (2006). Both studies 
found that young children with parentally corroborated ICs were significantly more likely 
than children with NIC to hear words in the ambiguous voice stimuli when tested 
individually. These studies support the notion that children with ICs have a general 
susceptibility to imaginary verbal experiences.   
The finding that imaginary verbal experiences are more likely to be experienced 
by children with ICs has been explained by commonalities in the cognitive processes 
involved in interacting with an IC and hearing words in ambiguous voice-like stimuli. It 
may be true that ICs are a form of hallucination; however, these imaginary verbal 
experiences are unlike hallucinations that are indicative of pathology, because they do not 
engender feelings of anxiety or distress associated with other types of hallucination. 
Furthermore, Fernyhough et al. (2007) suggest that these studies bring to light the impact 
of development on the continuum of hallucinatory experiences, warning that, “Claims for 
continuity in the clinical significance of imaginary verbal experiences between childhood 
and adulthood should be treated with caution. That is, a healthy feature of childhood may 
only have pathological significance if it persists into adulthood” (p. 1100).  
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1.5 Fantasy and Reality 
At present, experimenters recognise that ICs should not be conceptualised as a 
phenomenon that only exists in atypical populations. In fact, children who create ICs are 
most likely to be typically developing children. So, the question of being able to 
distinguish fantasy from reality has arisen in IC and fantasy research (Woolley, 2003). 
Experimenters have investigated how children ascertain the reality status of novel entities 
by using strategies incorporating contextual cues as well as verbal cues (Woolley & Ma, 
2009; Woolley & Van Reet, 2006), revealing that children have the ability to evaluate 
whether something is fantastic or real in a critical way, using context and new 
information about novel entities in order to make inferences and draw conclusions about 
these entities (Woolley & Van Reet, 2006). Children acquire the ability to distinguish 
fantasy from reality in the preschool years (e.g., Golomb & Galasso, 1995); and often 
they can even take this distinction further and make a fantasy-fantasy distinction 
exhibiting knowledge that different imaginary characters may not know each other 
because they are from different make believe worlds (Skolnick, & Bloom, 2006). 
However, when it comes to everyday fantasy, they are given mixed signals that are 
enriched by social culture. For example, belief in Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, and the 
Easter Bunny is widespread in the western world. The views that these individuals exist 
are perpetuated and reinforced by television, literature, and parents. Arguably with all of 
the cultural support, it may be hard for a child to ascertain whether these entities are in 
fact legitimate beings.  
Woolley et al. (2004) found that children do not passively accept everything that 
they are told about fantastical beings. Both age and fantasy orientation relate to children’s 
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conception of imaginary beings’ existence and possession of human attributes. Sharon 
and Woolley (2004) also found that children with high fantasy orientation (one measure 
of fantasy orientation included the presence of an IC) were more accurate in recognising 
and reporting reality attributes, ability, or property differences regardless of whether they 
knew for certain that the entity was imaginary or real. Sharon and Woolley concluded 
that children who are more fantasy-oriented accrued more knowledge about imagination 
that in turn gives them an upper hand at distinguishing imaginary versus real beings.  
Despite the ability to correctly categorise the reality status of certain entities, when asked 
to choose – real, imaginary, or not sure – both high and low fantasy-oriented children 
used the “not sure” choice extensively, acknowledging their uncertainty about the reality 
status. So although children who were highly fantasy-oriented were more accurate at 
categorisation, these children were also able to acknowledge their uncertainty, which 
arguably could prove just as useful a tool.  
More recent studies have brought to light some issues in the wording of fantasy-
reality distinction questioning style. Bunce and Harris (2008) found that children’s 
everyday uses of the words real, really, and pretend do reflect both the notion of 
authenticity and existence. However, both 2- to 3-year-olds and 4- to 7-year-olds used 
these words to consider authenticity and rarely used them to discuss existence. These 
results imply that, “children may be biased towards interpreting real in relation to the 
notion of authenticity” (p. 453). This bias could mean that fantasy-reality study results 
like those of Sharon and Woolley (2004), and Woolley and colleagues (2004) could be 
misleading, because researchers’ wording intends to focus on the question of existence 
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and not authenticity. This could be especially true for children with ICs who constantly 
have to reinforce the notion of the authenticity of their friend.  
 After much investigation on children’s ability to distinguish fantasy from reality, 
it is clear that typically developing children are, for the most part, able to critically 
evaluate the fantasy status of novel entities. IC children may even be more adept at this 
skill than NIC children because of their immersion in fantasy play. There are still 
questions as to how children with ICs conceptualise their own ICs’ fantasy status. 
Typically developing IC children are aware of the fact that ICs are imaginary, and they 
differentiate between social provisions for friendship with their IC and those of real 
friends or parents (Gleason, 2002). Gleason (2002) argues that this is because pretend 
play elaborates on real experiences, so even though a child may become emotionally 
invested in their ICs, they would still be able to recognise that their relationship with their 
IC is distinct in comparison to a relationship with a parent or friend. Taylor (1999) 
discusses IC children’s understanding of the fantasy-reality distinction, explaining that 
although the majority of children tested in her studies claimed that their IC was visible to 
others, this did not seem to be a result of confusion about the reality of the IC; rather, the 
child was engaging in and controlling the content of their own pretence. Their behaviour 
therefore did not suggest confusion about the reality status of their IC. Furthermore, 
children studied by Taylor and by Davis (2006) were known to make statements while 
being interviewed trying to “keep the record straight” by telling the experimenter that the 
IC was just pretend. For example, one of the children in Davis’ (2006) study made sure to 
inform the researcher that she was aware that her IC, a huge bird who wore a 
cheerleading outfit, was imaginary even though it was real to her.  
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Children with ICs thus do not seem to have any trouble distinguishing fantasy 
from reality, and as Gopnik (2009a) notes, the problem may lie not in the child’s 
confusion between fantasy and reality, but in adults’ inability to understand the child’s 
viewpoint. Children, in Gopnik’s opinion, are creating counterfactuals and hypotheticals. 
They do not confuse these with actuals. Children with ICs may not only possess the 
ability to distinguish fantasy from reality, but they also may be more fluid in their 
understanding of fantasy and reality, which may in turn facilitate certain aspects of 
development.   
1.6 Depth of Imaginary Companion and Other Functions 
It is clear that the IC can fulfil multiple functions that are helpful to the child in 
their social and mental life (Harter & Chao, 1992; Hoff, 2004; Hoff, 2005). These 
functions come with a wide range of benefits for the child. A good example of one of the 
benefits is the child’s use of their IC as a coping mechanism for alleviating loneliness, as 
evidenced by first-born and single children being more likely to create ICs than children 
with older siblings (Bouldin & Pratt, 1999; Manosevitz, et al., 1973; Taylor, 1999; 
Trionfi & Reese, 2009). Another common function for an IC is scapegoating. In the study 
performed by Davis (2006), a child and her mother reported the child’s IC, Dessa, to have 
been responsible for much inappropriate behaviour. On the other side of the spectrum, 
ICs can also function in the child’s development toward autonomy (Hoff, 2004). Hoff 
(2004) asserts that the IC gives the child an opportunity to feel autonomous by creating 
make-believe worlds which he or she has control over. Some children will even use ICs 
as communication devices. For example, when Jean Piaget’s daughter was angry with 
him, she would talk to her IC about the IC’s father in order to communicate her feeling of 
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anger toward her own father (in Bloom, 2004). According to Vygotsky (1934/1978), who 
looked at play as a tool that changes with a child’s growing and maturing needs, a child is 
able to fulfil certain needs by playing. These needs can range from the conscious pleasure 
derived from imagining, and the fulfilment of the desire to experience unrealised 
tendencies (e.g., wanting to take on the role of a mother), to the unconscious delaying of 
gratification and imagining themselves “out” of a situation. No matter what function the 
IC serves, their creation seems to depend on what the child has a need for at that time in 
their life.  
Another variable that may influence the potential functions of the IC is the extent 
to which the IC is perceived by their creator to be autonomous, better known as the IC’s 
depth. Recent research has assessed depth of IC (determining whether the IC has a life 
separate from its creator or is an extension of the child) and suggested that the depth of an 
IC (e.g., compliant as opposed to non-compliant) may provide different avenues for 
growth in many cognitive domains and within the youngster’s social world (Taylor, et al., 
2007; Hepworth, 2007). ICs’ personalities and the degree to which they are independent 
beings in the child’s social world vary considerably across different children (Hoff, 
2004). According to Hoff (2004), this variation can be seen as a function of age, 
individual differences in fantasy or imaginary play, even how long the IC existed in the 
child’s life. Taylor et al. (2007) found that some children report that their ICs have 
thoughts and ideas of their own. These ICs would be able to teach their creator things as 
well as disagree with the creator’s thoughts, while other ICs are more or less mirror 
images or extensions of their creator. The independence created by the child could affect 
how the child conceptualises the way that others think. Children with “deeper” ICs may 
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perform differently on tasks than those who have ICs that are for the most part compliant 
or extensions of themselves. 
Children are most likely unaware that ICs are enhancing their social and cognitive 
lives in these various ways. However, because an IC is of the child’s creation, no matter 
what function it is fulfilling or how real it is to the child, the IC is a testament to how a 
child can influence the many domains within their life without being fully aware of the 
implications. To look at this paradigm in a Vygotskian (1934/1998) context, ICs are 
examples of play as a zone of proximal development (ZPD), foreshadowing what 
cognitive functions and social tools the child will be utilising in later development.  
 
1.7 Theory of Mind and its Links to Imaginary Companion Status 
It has been established that children’s ICs are a phenomenon involving 
imagination and pretend play. These entities fulfil different functions and some 
researchers suggest they enhance children’s socio-cognitive development. One of the 
only socio-cognitive domains which has been concentrated on extensively by researchers 
examining ICs is theory of mind (ToM). ToM is the ability to see things from another’s 
perspective by being able to infer what the other person is thinking or feeling and 
recognise that others may have thoughts and feelings that differ from one’s own. In other 
words, having a ToM entails being able to impute mental states to oneself and to others 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This ability to explain others’ behaviour by perspective-
taking is an important milestone in the development of mind and social cognition.  
Children’s ToM understanding goes through drastic changes from the ages of 3- 
to 5-years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004). However, despite 
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age-related development in ToM understanding, there are also considerable individual 
differences (Flynn, 2006). Children’s understanding of ToM has been shown to be 
closely related to variables including verbal ability (Astington & Baird, 2005), executive 
function (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004), 
mental state talk at home (Hughes, Fujisawa, Ensor, Lecce, & Marfleet, 2006; 
Youngblade & Dunn, 1995), peer acceptance (Slaughter, Dennis, Pritchard, 2002), and 
pretend play (Taylor & Carlson, 1997). ToM is typically measured using false belief 
paradigms (Wellman et al., 2001); however, recently researchers have begun to 
incorporate a battery of tasks arguing that children’s developing ToM includes the 
understanding of multiple concepts (e.g., intentions, emotions, knowledge, and desires), 
and suggesting the scaling of ToM tasks (Hughes et al., 2000; Wellman & Liu, 2004). By 
taking into account both the correlates and the concepts that are related to ToM, its 
assessment has certainly changed since the concept was first examined by Premack and 
Woodruff (1978).  
Of the variables that relate to ToM, pretend play is one that the child has active 
control over. Both ToM and pretend play are essentially social in nature, and the period 
of time when children are maximally engaging in play with their ICs coincides directly 
with ToM development (Taylor, 1999; Wellman & Liu, 2004; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
Rakoczy (2008) asserts that play reflects a collective ‘we’ intentionality which cannot be 
reduced to individual intentional attitudes, thus its social origin is solidified. It should 
follow that ToM and proclivity for pretence (an act which is inherently social in origin) 
should be related because of their common social origins. Evidence for this link comes 
from findings that high levels of pretend play, and particularly having an IC, are related 
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to superior ToM skills (Bouldin, 2006; Garner, Curenton & Taylor, 2005; Mitchell & 
Neal, 2005; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2006; Schwebel, Rosen, & Singer, 1999, 
Taylor & Carlson, 1997).  
Pretend play is thought to relate to ToM not only because these two abilities are 
social, but also because both pretend play and ToM are ‘meta-representational’ in nature. 
The concept of meta-representation requires the child to represent their own or another’s 
representation of a counterfactual state of affairs (Leslie, 1994). For example, if two 
children are engaged in pretence, one could pick up a banana and put their ear to the fruit 
to simulate talking on the phone. If the child were to hand the same banana to their 
partner afterwards, the savvy partner would be expected to take the banana and have a 
“chat” of their own, thus recognising the counterfactual representation of the banana as a 
telephone. Both in pretending themselves that the banana is a telephone, and observing a 
partner playing, children are engaging in the act of meta-representation. They are doing 
so by possessing insight into the mental state of “pretending.” According to Leslie 
(1994), this representation is a primitive form of the adult version of pretence 
conceptualised by children as, “someone is pretending of the banana that [it is a 
telephone]” (p. 212). ToM’s meta-representational link with pretend play can be clearly 
seen when observing false belief paradigms where children must recognise another’s 
representational false belief.  
Other cognitive behavioural theories that do not incorporate the meta-
representational view have been proposed to explain the mechanisms that underlie the 
capacity for pretend play. These theories incorporate concepts that would influence ToM; 
however, the meta-representational account provides a broad account of play where other 
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accounts fail to explain certain types of pretence (Friedman & Leslie, 2007; Rakoczy, 
2008; Rakoczy et al., 2006). For example, pretending has been explained by Nichols and 
Stitch (2000) as a mentalistic concept where a child engages in pretence as a cognitive 
process. Nichols and Stitch assert that play scenarios are represented in “possible 
worlds,” so to continue with the banana/phone scenario, in a possible world, the banana 
would act as a telephone. Children decouple the scenario “pretend” (P) where the banana 
is a telephone, so that they do not actually believe that the scenario P is true; instead the 
scenario is placed in their “possible worlds” box. Subsequently, they behave in a way that 
would be appropriate if the scenario were true, or they behave-as-if it were true (Nichols 
& Stitch, 2000). However, this cognitive theory fails to account for instances when a 
child may misinterpret non-pretend behaviours to be pretence (Rakoczy, 2008). 
There are still other accounts of the underlying mechanisms creating the capacity 
for pretend play; however, the meta-representational and possible-worlds paradigms 
continue to stand at the head of research done on pretend play (Harris, 2000; Rakoczy, 
2008). A child’s creation of an IC would take this type of meta-representational play a 
step further. Being able to practise meta-representation in the absence of a partner entails 
the child becoming familiar with representing their own play representations as well as 
their imagined playmate’s representations. Engaging with this playmate as if they have a 
mind of their own should be even more taxing on the representational imagination.   
Taylor and Carlson (1997) were the first to investigate the relation between ICs, 
pretend play, and ToM. In their study, ToM was assessed using appearance-reality, false 
belief, and representational change tasks. Experimenters not only used IC interviews to 
assess children’s imaginative ability, but also incorporated fantasy orientation interviews 
24 
and behavioural measures, such as giving the child a choice of a reality-oriented or 
fantasy-oriented toy. Taylor and Carlson reported that high fantasy groups achieved 
higher scores on ToM tasks than did low fantasy groups. These authors concluded that 
ICs are an effective means of improving ToM because having an IC provides the child 
with greater opportunities to practise representing others’ internal states. This is thought 
to occur because children with ICs have created an environment where they can practise 
imagining what others are potentially thinking. Repetition is important to this theory 
because it has also been shown that children improve upon ToM tasks with practice 
(Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983; Flynn, 2006). However, it seems that the practice 
needed regarding children’s pretend play must entail the correct form of play, especially 
for those children who impersonate others, because Taylor and Carlson found that 
children who impersonate things that are non-human objects (e.g., machines) did not 
excel like children impersonating those who have minds (e.g., humans). Therefore, the 
children who engage in pretend play with an IC when they do not have another playmate 
will allow themselves more opportunity to imagine others’ perspectives and 
representations, and thus hone the skills required for passing ToM tasks.  
 Gleason (2002) further considered the higher order cognitive functions that are 
enhanced with a child’s possession of an IC, asserting that IC children are more aware of 
their own thoughts moment to moment and are therefore more attuned to acknowledge 
others’ perspectives, thus predisposing them to better ToM performance. In addition to 
being aware of their thoughts, IC children are also thought to create more vivid mental 
images compared with NIC children (Bouldin, 2006). Their vivid imaginations enable 
them to better place, or imagine themselves from different people’s points of view, and 
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the time spent engaged in fantasy gives them first hand knowledge of the imagination 
itself and its limits (Sharon & Woolley, 2004). Further evidence for IC children’s 
superior ToM abilities is provided by the research on joint pretend play and its ability to 
consistently predict higher scores on appearance-reality tasks (Schwebel et al., 1999). 
Schwebel et al. (1999) argued that not only does engagement in pretence aid developing 
ToM, but it also may help to expedite this process. Hence, children with ICs may not 
only have better ToM, but also acquire this understanding faster than NIC children.  
When investigating cognitive function, it is often important to examine children 
who lack these capabilities in order to gain insight into the specific trajectories that 
development can follow. For example, children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
share a triad of impairments in social interaction, communication, and imagination. 
Children with ASD have marked deficits in exhibiting imagination or pretend play (Wing 
& Gould, 1979). In conjunction with the deficits in imagination, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
and Frith (1985) discovered that 75% of children with autism fail to infer others’ false 
beliefs. This is an ability that is easily within the reach of typically developing 4-year-
olds as well as children with Down’s syndrome of equivalent mental age. This inability to 
pass ToM tests of both changed location and misleading appearance typically continues 
into ASD individuals’ teenage and adult life, and at mental ages well beyond 4 years 
(Peterson & Siegal, 2000).  
Since ToM and pretend play are closely connected by meta-representation, 
imagination, and the ability to engage in social thought, it should prove harder for a child 
with ASD to ascertain that others may have different thoughts and feelings to their own. 
Where one deficit is seen in atypical development, the other will show up as well. These 
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deficits of imagination paired with the inability to pass ToM tasks in populations with 
ASD have been proven to be robust (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Repacholi & Slaughter, 
2003; Wing & Gould, 1979), and support the notion that early imagination and pretence 
may facilitate children’s understanding of other minds. As mentioned above, there are 
many other variables associated with ToM. Little is known about the process that drives 
the developmental shift toward better ToM understanding, but this process does occur at 
a time when the child can no longer rely upon reality as an accurate indicator of why 
behaviour occurs (Flynn, 2006). The ability to look at imagination, and specifically ICs, 
and be able to partial out some of the other variables in reference to ToM, may highlight 
the importance of the imagination to a child’s developing higher order cognitive 
functioning.  
1.8 Themes of the Thesis  
The phenomenon of ICs has been discussed in the psychological literature for 
centuries, but the potential impact that the rich fantasy life accompanying ICs may have 
on subsequent development has been investigated only with reference to a narrow range 
of cognitive abilities. However, as the preceding sections of this chapter show, having an 
IC may influence core aspects of the child’s understanding of both self and other. The 
main hypothesis to be tested is whether having an IC conveys benefits to the child in 
terms of greater understanding of self and other. Specifically, the aim of this thesis is to 
investigate whether having an IC relates to the way in which children represent 
themselves and others, their tendency spontaneously to use internal-state knowledge to 
describe others and explain their behaviour, and the extent to which they rely on self 
versus other to regulate their behaviour. In meeting this aim, this thesis will go beyond 
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previous research on ICs that has focused almost exclusively on pretend play and theory 
of mind.  
The first empirical study investigated whether having an IC relates to children 
having greater awareness of or confidence in themselves as being a better judge than a 
parent or teacher about aspects of self that cannot be directly observed (e.g., whether you 
are having fun or feel ill). As discussed above, Hoff (2004) argued that ICs aid children’s 
development of autonomy, and Gleason (2002) maintained that ICs enable children to 
become more aware of their own thoughts. However, no study has yet empirically tested 
these claims. Study 1 therefore sought to establish whether children with ICs were more 
likely than their NIC peers to assert that they were the best authority on aspects of 
themselves that could not be overtly observed. 
The second empirical study addressed the competence–performance gap in ToM 
that has been a focus of recent research (e.g., Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Meins, 
Fernyhough, Johnson, & Lidstone, 2006). Taylor and Carlson (1997) argued that children 
with ICs may out-perform their NIC peers on ToM tasks because having an IC provides 
children with greater practice in representing others’ internal states. If this is the case, one 
would predict that children with an IC will be more likely spontaneously to invoke 
internal states to describe other people and to explain their behaviour. To test this 
hypothesis, Study 2 investigated the relation between IC status and the extent to which 
children invoked internal states when describing their best friend.  
The final empirical study further investigated the relation between IC status and self by 
considering whether children with ICs use more sophisticated self-directed speech 
compared with NIC children. Clearly, having an IC involves children talking to 
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themselves as they converse with the IC or voice the IC’s thoughts, intentions, desires, 
and so on. Such self-directed talk is termed private speech (Flavell, 1966), and plays an 
important role in Vygotksy’s theory, being the mechanism via which social speech is 
internalised to form inner speech or verbal thought. Study 3 tested the hypothesis that the 
private speech of IC children will be more internalised than that of NIC children due to 
the fact that having an IC is likely to involve the child engaging more frequently in self-
directed speech and imagined conversations with the IC. 
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______________________________________________________ 
Chapter 2 
Imaginary Companions and Self-knowledge 
______________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the ability to recognize oneself is acquired relatively early in 
development, with the vast majority of 2-year-olds passing Amsterdam’s (1972) ‘rouge 
test’, self-knowledge judgment has a prolonged developmental course. As the self 
concept develops, children begin to exhibit self-conscious emotions, and can imagine 
themselves as the object of another person’s emotional attitude (Repacholi & Meltzoff, 
2005). This understanding results in children’s ability to take a third person perspective 
on the self (Moore, 2007). Despite these early advances in understanding of self, children 
experience problems when making judgments about who knows best about their personal 
characteristics and feelings well into middle childhood.  
Schoeneman (1981) argued that there are two types of self-knowledge – interior 
and exterior. Interior self-knowledge is knowledge that an external observer may not be 
able to ascertain about an individual unless they are told (e.g., if a person has a headache, 
or is hungry). Meanwhile, exterior self-knowledge is knowledge about a person which an 
external observer may glean without being told (e.g., how high someone can jump, 
whether someone excels in school).  
Typically, adults assume that they know best about interior self-knowledge. This 
seems intuitive because they are, of course, the owner and interpreter of those states, so it 
should follow that they are a more accurate judge than an outsider. Children, on the other 
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hand, do not recognise that they are the principal authority on their interior self-
knowledge. The developmental shift from viewing an adult as knowing more about them 
to seeing themselves as the authority on their knowledge was previously thought to occur 
surprisingly late in development. Rosenberg (1979) interviewed children aged 8- to 19-
years about their locus of interior self-knowledge, asking them “Who do you feel really 
understands you best? I mean, who knows best what you really feel and think deep down 
inside?” (p. 245)?  He found that in both interior and exterior self-knowledge younger 
children tended to regard others (such as parents or teachers) as knowing more about 
them, suggesting that younger children believe the old adage, “mother knows best”, when 
engaging in tasks of self-knowledge. This trend in citing adults as the epistemic authority 
decreases with age and is eventually replaced by an increasing reliance on friends, 
siblings, and the self (Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Brosh, 1991; Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, & 
Houminer, 1990a; Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Peleg, 1990b).  
In order to explore children’s developing self-knowledge in greater detail, Burton 
and Mitchell (2003) investigated whether children aged 5- to 10-years are able to 
distinguish between interior and exterior self-knowledge. Children were asked to judge 
“who knows best” about interior aspects of self-knowledge (e.g., whether you are hungry 
or tired) and exterior aspects of self-knowledge (e.g., how fast you can run). Children 
made a forced choice between themselves and an adult (either their parent or their 
teacher) for each self-knowledge question, and they were also asked to make the same 
judgements about the knowledge of a peer versus the peer’s teacher. Thus, children were 
given pictures of themselves, their teacher, the experimenter, a boy (Tommy) about the 
same age as the child, a girl (Beth) about the same age as the child, Tommy’s teacher, 
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and Beth’s teacher. The concrete nature of this task was employed so that it would relieve 
demands on the child’s memory. The children were asked 28 forced choice questions 
asking “who knows best?” In 24 of these questions, the appropriate answer would be to 
say that the subject knows best (self, or Tommy/ Beth), whereas it would be acceptable to 
cite the teacher knowing best in the remaining 4 questions about school. Each question 
was posed to the child, once with themselves as the subject and once with another child 
(Tommy or Beth). Burton and Mitchell found that the children in the two younger groups 
(5-year-olds and 7-year-olds) often made errors in judgement by ascribing more 
epistemic knowledge about their internal states to an adult than to themselves, whereas 
the group of 10-year olds were able to judge more accurately who knew best about 
interior self-knowledge. Interestingly, Burton and Mitchell reported that 4- to 7-year-olds 
were just as likely to cite an adult as knowing best about interior self-knowledge states 
regardless of whether the question was posed about themselves or about a peer, 
suggesting that they believe such states to be transparent to figures in authority.  
Burton and Mitchell’s (2003) findings show that children appear to make accurate 
judgements about who is the authority on self-knowledge at much younger ages than 
Rosenberg (1979) suggested. In order to explore the discrepant findings further, Burton 
and Mitchell incorporated parents and friends as options for holding epistemic self-
knowledge in their second study, as well as adding two more global self-knowledge 
questions that Rosenberg used. Again, older participants gave more “subject” responses 
than younger ones, replicating the results from their first study. However, when asked the 
global self-knowledge question, 10-year-olds often judged adults as knowing best, 
replicating Rosenberg’s results. Together the results from these studies highlight how 10-
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year olds’ responses to questions about whether they are the best authority on specific 
aspects of self-knowledge may not concord with their more general opinion on who they 
feel “really understands them best”.  
In their third study, Burton and Mitchell (2003) investigated whether children 
aged 5- to 7-years showed a propensity for discriminating between different types of self-
knowledge, being more likely to cite themselves as the authority for judgements about 
interior self-knowledge than for those regarding exterior self-knowledge. Not only were 
children aged 5- to 7- years able to cite themselves as the authority for interior self-
knowledge, but there was also an age trend from age 5 to 7 showing an increase in 
sensitivity to types of knowledge, acknowledging that the self has privileged access to 
certain internal states, whereas a teacher or parent may be a better judge of other self-
related phenomena. Although the results of Burton and Mitchell (2003) considerably 
advance our understanding of children’s self-knowledge development, the questioning 
style used in their studies gave the participant no chance to cite both themselves and the 
adult as being knowledgeable. More recently, the original questioning style was changed 
from the forced-choice format to mutually exclusive judgement scales for self and other 
knowledge, with children being asked “How well does the adult know?” as well as “How 
well do you know?” This questioning format thus allows for the child to ascribe authority 
to self versus other in a more fine-grained fashion. Bennett, Downie, and Murray (2007) 
reported that, over both the original and new question formats, older children were more 
likely to cite themselves as an authority than were the younger participants. Using the 
new questioning format, Mitchell, Teucher, Bennett, Ziegler, and Wyton (2009b) found 
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that children as young as age 5 assigned relatively more interior self-knowledge to 
themselves than to an adult. 
One reason for maintaining that others are good judges of interior self-knowledge 
may be the “illusion of transparency”, which is the tendency for people (not just children) 
to overestimate the extent to which others can discern their internal states (Gilovich, 
Medvec, Savitsky, 1998; Mitchell, Bennett, & Teucher, 2009a). Gilovich et al. (1998) 
found that participants overestimated others’ ability to detect their deception, disgust, and 
concern, concluding that “people often mistakenly believe that their internal states ‘leak 
out’ more than they really do” (p. 332). If the illusion of transparency can explain 
children’s self-knowledge errors, children should cite all external observers as knowing 
equally well about their self-knowledge. However, research suggests that this is not the 
case. Children were found to be more likely to cite an adult rather than a peer as knowing 
more about their self-knowledge (Burton & Mitchell, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2009b; 
Rosenberg, 1979), indicating that children believe figures in authority have more 
authority in making judgements about their internal characteristics.  
While adults often rely on self observation rather than social feedback to obtain 
self-knowledge (Schoeneman, 1981), children gain knowledge about the self and others 
through their parents in the early phases of childhood. As they grow, so does the 
likelihood that they will attend to their peers and themselves as epistemic knowledge 
holders (Raviv et al.,1990a; Raviv et al., 1990b). Consequently, recent research has 
investigated how individual differences in the child’s social environment relate to their 
ascription of self-knowledge.  
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Mitchell, Teucher, Kikuno, and Bennett (2010) investigated self-knowledge 
development in Japanese and British children aged 7, 9, and 11 years to explore the 
potential impact of culture on children’s tendency to ascribe self-knowledge to self versus 
other. Japanese culture is a collectivist culture in which the focus rests less on the 
individual and more on contexts and relationships between people (Nisbett, 2003). In a 
collectivist culture, the emphasis is on interdependence among individuals and the 
importance of interlocking responsibilities within those groups of people (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), whereas the British culture is individualistic, placing emphasis on 
autonomy, privacy, and the attainment of one’s personal goals (Hofstede, 1980). This 
contrast between group-oriented reliance seen in collectivist culture and self-reliance as 
seen in individualistic cultures presented researchers with the opportunity to investigate 
whether Japanese children may have more of a sense of belonging to a “shared mind” 
than children growing up in an individualistic culture like Britain. Mitchell et al. argued 
that children in individualist cultures have the unique opportunity to be able to judge the 
quality of their own emotional experience because of the emphasis on individual 
experiences. Furthermore, Fivush and Wang (2005) examined differences in the way that 
mothers converse with their children in individualistic and collectivist cultures, finding 
that mothers in the individualistic culture of the USA converse with their children in a 
way that recognises the child’s independent emotional experience, as well as the fact that 
they have privileged access to these inner states. Mothers in collectivist cultures were 
found to converse differently with their children. Mothers in collectivist cultures spoke as 
if their children did not have privileged access to their own emotions, indicating that the 
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mothers assumed as much authority on their children’s internal states as the children 
themselves.  
Mitchell et al. (2010) reported that Japanese children assigned more interior self-
knowledge to their parents in comparison to children in the UK. This is thought to be 
because Japanese culture places more importance on context rather than the individual, 
creating a developmental pathway that does not emphasise the honing of self-knowledge 
skills. The most notable difference was seen in the youngest group of 7 year olds; 
however, the developmental trend for children to designate decreasing amounts of 
knowledge to a significant adult as they get older was still observed in the Japanese 
children, suggesting that this shift is universal but occurs at somewhat different ages 
depending on the child’s cultural context. 
Although there is a growing body of research on self-knowledge in children, little 
is known about its ontogeny, with a tendency to focus on when children become accurate 
judges on their self-knowledge rather than why children make characteristic errors in 
judgement. Recent research has investigated how global aspects of the environment such 
as culture relate to individual differences in children’s self-knowledge, but research has 
not yet focused on whether specific child-related characteristics are systematically related 
to self-knowledge. This was the aim of the study reported in this chapter. The first child-
related characteristic considered was whether or not the child had an IC. There are 
several reasons to expect IC status to relate to children’s self-knowledge. Typical IC 
creators are aware that others cannot see their IC (Taylor, 1999). The child who creates 
an IC must let peers and adults know that the IC is in existence by either telling them, or 
behaving as if the IC is in the room. Hence, IC children are more likely to be familiar 
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with the knowledge that one’s thoughts and feelings are private and will not “leak out,” 
as Gilovich et al. (1998) proposed. Second, according to Singer and Singer (1990), “ICs 
engender the opportunity for the child to practice imagery and conversation in the 
absence of external stimulation” (p. 100). These experiences of IC children may thus 
make them more adept at self-knowledge because having an IC will help the child to 
recognise that their knowledge is privileged, thus leading to greater insight into the fact 
that they themselves will be the authority on interior self-knowledge.  
A third reason to predict that children with ICs will have superior self-knowledge 
comes from the fact that children with ICs are likely to have more opportunities to 
practise making judgements about knowledge states and therefore may be better able to 
discern who may know more about what they are thinking or feeling. Gleason, et al.’s 
(2003) findings that exceptionally fantasy-oriented children (such as those with ICs) 
scored higher in their ability to monitor their own emotional states is in line with the 
hypothesised positive association between having an IC and self-knowledge.  
Self-knowledge acquisition may not relate only to the child’s IC status, but also to the 
independence or depth of the child’s IC. As discussed in Chapter 1, ICs’ personalities and 
the degree to which they are independent beings in the child’s social world vary 
considerably across different children (Hoff, 2004), and Taylor et al. (2007) found that 
about one third of children who have an IC report that their ICs have thoughts and ideas 
of their own. Taylor et al. suggested various explanations for why certain children create 
a non-compliant IC. The first explanation is “emotive,” in that a non-compliant IC is 
reflecting a child’s preoccupation with thoughts of disobedience or related aspects of bad 
behaviour, and that these are just some of the emotive themes that come out in children’s 
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play. The second explanation is that children are experiencing the illusion of independent 
agency which is when “a fictional character is experienced by the person who created it 
as having independent thoughts, words, desires, and/or actions” (p. 92). This illusion is 
much like adult fiction writers who report merely observing their characters instead of 
feeling completely in control of their own writing (Taylor et al., 2003). Along the same 
lines as the illusion of independent agency, the third explanation suggests that children 
who have high levels of activation of automatic unconscious thought processes, paired 
with relatively low inhibition levels may experience difficulty consciously controlling the 
products of their imagination. Carlson, Taylor, and Maring’s (2004) results support this 
proposal, in that children with non-compliant ICs as opposed to compliant ICs performed 
more poorly on inhibitory control measures, even though children with ICs as a whole 
showed greater inhibitory control than those with NIC.  
Having an IC with greater depth will certainly require different behaviours and 
interactions on the child creator’s part. For example, a child with an IC that is not as 
competent may not tell their IC about their own thoughts, feelings, and ideas; whereas 
individual traits and behaviours in the non-compliant IC might differ from the child’s 
own characteristics, therefore aiding the child in knowing that different individuals will 
not always know things about their internal mental states. One would therefore predict 
that depth of IC will relate to children ascribing self-knowledge more accurately. An 
assessment of IC independence was thus included in Study 1. 
The other child-related characteristic that was assessed in Study 1 was children’s 
ToM. Given that self-knowledge tasks assess the extent to which children can understand 
the opacity of internal states and other people’s knowledge states, it is surprising that 
38 
previous research has not investigated whether understanding of ToM and self-
knowledge are related. One alternative is that children’s concurrent performance on ToM 
and self-knowledge tasks will be positively related due to their underlying commonalities 
in representing internal states. The findings of a study by Mitchell and O’Keefe (2008) 
investigating self-knowledge in typically developing children and children with Autistic 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are in line with this suggestion. In comparison to the typically 
developing group, the ASD participants did not exhibit as much of an appreciation of 
their privileged access to knowledge states. Typically developing participants credited 
themselves with relatively more self-knowledge compared with a comparison individual, 
while the ASD group assigned about the same amount of knowledge to themselves as the 
comparison individual (Mitchell & O’Keefe, 2008) Other recent studies have also 
examined self-knowledge in ASD individuals. Williams, Lind, and Happé (2009) showed 
that participants with ASD were unique in finding self test questions harder than other-
person questions in a false belief scenario. Given the characteristic deficits in ToM 
associated with ASD (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), the findings of this study, along 
with others showing that ASD individuals exhibit marked differences in understanding 
and referring to themselves (Hobson, Chidambi, Lee, & Meyer, 2006; Lombardo, Barnes, 
Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007), are a further indication that self-knowledge and 
ToM may be related.  
However, accurate ascription of self-knowledge involves additional steps in the 
understanding of internal states than does more basic ToM. In order to pass a ToM task, 
the child merely has to impute mental states accurately to another person. In contrast, 
accurate reporting of self-knowledge requires a number of steps involving representing 
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and comparing internal states. For example, if asked, “Who knows best if you are 
angry?” the child must understand that (1) an onlooker has their own mind, and hence 
appreciates the internal state of anger because they have a conception of anger 
themselves, (2) this knowledge of anger can be used to make judgements about whether 
outward behavioural cues are consistent with this particular internal state (e.g., yelling, 
characteristic angry facial expression), and (3) that individuals can sometimes hide their 
true feelings. If children appreciate internal states at this level of complexity, they will 
know that they are the only accurate judge of interior self-knowledge. Thus, basic ToM 
abilities may be necessary but not sufficient for self-knowledge understanding. The study 
reported in this chapter thus investigated concurrent relations between performance on 
ToM and self-knowledge tasks. 
ToM is known to correlate with children’s verbal ability and verbal precocity has 
been argued to play a fundamental role in ToM acquisition (Astington & Baird, 2005; 
Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Flynn, 2006). Furthermore, it has been found that language 
ability can predict both concurrent and later ToM (Astington & Baird, 2005; Flynn, 
2006). In order to control for any relations between ToM and verbal IQ, children were 
tested on their receptive verbal aptitude using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale a 
standardised measure of receptive verbal IQ. This measure also enabled researchers to 
control for relations between IC status and verbal ability because IC status may also 
relate to certain aspects of verbal aptitude (Bouldin, et al., 2002; Roby & Kidd, 2008; 
Taylor, 1999; Trionfli & Reese, 2009). Other forms of IQ were excluded because many 
findings do not indicate that IQ relates to IC status or play in any way (Manosevitz, et al., 
1973; Taylor, 1999; Tizard, Philps, & Plewis, 1976). A good example of verbal IQ as a 
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variable relating to IC status is seen in a study by Mauro (1991). Children with ICs in 
Mauro’s study were able to gain better scores on the verbal section of the WISC-R 
intelligence measure, but no differences were seen in scores on the block design subtest 
of spatial abilities. For these reasons other IQ measures were not included. 
In summary, the aim of Study 1 was to investigate how children’s self-knowledge 
related to IC status and ToM performance. We expected to replicate Burton and 
Mitchell’s (2003) finding that young children in general ascribed more interior self-
knowledge to themselves versus an adult, but hypothesised that (a) children with an IC 
would be more likely than their NIC peers to recognise that they are the best authority on 
their interior self-knowledge, and (b) depth of IC would be positively associated with 
ascribing authority to self for interior self-knowledge. Relations between performance on 
ToM and self-knowledge tasks were also explored, although no directional hypotheses 
were made. Finally, we expected to replicate previous findings for positive associations 
between IC status, depth, and ToM performance. The results of this study should show 
whether children’s IC status is statistically related to the development of their cognition 
in terms of their self understanding; or if there is in fact no correlation between self-
knowledge (which is a facet of self understanding) and IC status. Results should also give 
researchers an idea of how children with and without ICs represent themselves as well as 
others.    
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 82 children (45 boys and 37 girls) aged from 52–94 months 
(mean age 70 months). The children were drawn from five schools, a Rainbows group 
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affiliated with a school, and one after-school group in the North-East of England. 
Children originated from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds. Five of the schools 
had 5% or less of the total children attending participating in the free school lunch 
programme; 62% of the students in one school participated in the free school lunch 
programme, and the after-school programme was for children of lower income families. 
Children’s ethnicity was predominately White; one child was Black, and two were Asian. 
Eighty children had English as their first language, 2 were equally proficient in English 
and another language. One child was excluded from the analysis because of speech and 
language difficulties. A second child was excluded because of time constraints. 
Participants were treated in accordance with the British Psychological Society’s ethical 
code of conduct. Parental informed consent was obtained for all participants, and children 
were free to withdraw at any time. No child refused to participate.  
 
2.2.2 Procedure and Materials 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet space away from other children. The 
testing session lasted between 25 and 35 minutes. The sessions were presented to each 
child in an invariant order so that the researcher would be blind to which children had ICs 
throughout administering as many test measures as possible. The British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale was presented last as to avoid possible effects of boredom, as children 
often become bored with this measure. Each session began with the self-knowledge 
inventory (Mitchell et al., 2009b), and ToM battery (Hughes et al., 2001; Wellman & Liu, 
2004), after which the child participated in the IC interview (Hepworth, 2007; Taylor & 
Carlson, 1997). Finally, children completed the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, 
Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997) to measure their receptive verbal ability.  
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Self-Knowledge Inventory 
An adaptation of Mitchell, et al.’s (2009b) self-knowledge inventory was used in 
order to assess the extent to which children recognise that they are the authority on their 
own self-knowledge. Mitchell, et al. used a ten count system where a child was asked to 
place markers in a Perspex tube to represent the amount of knowledge that the child 
wished to assign an individual, whereas the present study employed a three box system 
for this representation. This three box system was used because after piloting with the ten 
count system, the younger children were more fixated on the ten count marker task than 
the questions they were asked about self-knowledge. The child was directed to write their 
name, their parents’ name (children typically chose the mother), and their teacher’s name 
on an index card representing those people. All of the children were capable of writing 
their names, their parent’s names, and the teacher’s title and surname initial. The child 
was then shown three different sized boxes representing how much someone knows. The 
children were told: “The big one means the person knows a lot, the medium one means 
they know a little, and the small one means they don’t know anything. Your job is to 
decide how much the person knows and to put that person’s card in the box that you think 
matches”.  
The child was then asked to show the researcher what they would do if they 
wanted to show that (a) they know a lot, (b) mum knows some, (c) teacher doesn’t know, 
and finally (d) if mum and they both know a lot. These practice questions were to ensure 
that the child understood the meaning of the cards as well as the boxes and furthermore 
that two people’s cards could occupy the same box. No child failed to understand the 
directions. After practising, the child was asked 6 questions about how much they know 
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about a particular feeling or event in contrast to how much their elders know (these 
questions were about being ill, having fun, dreaming, thinking, hunger, anger). In three of 
the questions, the child compared his/her own knowledge with that of the designated 
parent; in the remainder, the child compared own knowledge with that of their teacher. 
For the parent questions the child was asked about being ill, dreaming, and hunger. The 
procedure was the same for all six items, and is illustrated using the being ill question in 
the parent first condition. 
 For each question, the child was asked:  
(a) Sometimes people feel ill. Do you feel ill sometimes? 
(b) What happens to you when you are ill? What does it feel like? 
 (c) What about your mum, when you are ill does she notice about it? When you 
are ill, how well does your mum know about you being ill? (Child showed this by 
placing mother card in desired box) 
(d) How about you? How well do you know about your feeling of being ill? 
(Child showed this by placing their card in desired box) 
 
The questions were counterbalanced to ensure that children were not biased by the 
order of questioning about adult/child, and scores were calculated on a scale of 1–3. If the 
child placed the index card in the smallest box representing no knowledge, the score 
would be 1 for that question. If they ascribed some knowledge by placing the card in the 
mid-sized box the score would be 2, and placing the card in the large box representing the 
most knowledge would result in a score of 3. These scores were recorded and compiled 
resulting in single adult and child scores for each question as well as a composite score 
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representing overall knowledge ascribed to self versus other. More detailed descriptions 
of the knowledge questions themselves can be found in Appendix 1.  
ToM Battery 
ToM was measured using a battery based on Hughes et al. (2000) and Wellman 
and Liu (2004). The battery consisted of 6 tasks used in the field extensively and which 
are proven to be a robust indicator of ToM ability (Hughes et al., 2001; Wellman & Liu, 
2004). The tasks consist of scenarios where the child is given information which is not 
initially apparent to either the subject or the protagonist. In order to pass the tasks the 
child must displace what they know and adopt the protagonist’s perspective. Reality/ 
Memory controls were in place to ensure that the child is not only paying attention to the 
story, but that they have not forgotten the original information presented by the 
experimenter. For a child to pass the task, the reality/memory control questions must be 
answered correctly, as well as the target ToM question.  
The tasks selected were based on Wellman and Liu (2004). These tasks were:  
(a) Diverse Beliefs (Wellman & Liu, 2004): the child is told that the protagonist, 
Sara wants to find his/her cat, who may be hiding in the bushes or in the garage. The 
child is then asked where he/she thinks the cat is hiding. The experimenter then tells the 
child that the protagonist thinks the cat is in the other location (i.e., the one the child did 
not mention). The child is asked where the protagonist will look for the cat. 
(b) Knowledge Access (Wellman & Liu, 2004): the child is asked to predict what 
is in a box. The true contents are then revealed before the box is closed again. The child 
is asked whether a protagonist, Ellie, new to the scene knows what is in the box. As a 
reality/memory check question the child was asked, “did Ellie see inside the box?” 
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(c) Contents False Belief-Other (Wellman & Liu, 2004): the child is shown a box 
of Pringles crisps and asked what he/she thinks the box contains. Its true contents (a 
plastic pig) are revealed. The child is then asked what a protagonist, Jack, new to the 
scene thinks is in the box. As a reality/memory check question the child was asked if Jack 
has seen inside the box.  
(d) Contents False Belief-Self (Hughes et al., 2001): the child is shown a tube of 
Smarties and asked what he/she thinks the tube contains. Its true contents (a pencil) are 
revealed. The child is then asked what he/she thought was in the Smarties tube before 
he/she saw inside. As a reality/memory check question the child was asked what is really 
inside the tube. 
(e) Explicit False Belief (Wellman & Liu, 2004): the child is told that the 
protagonist, Simon want to find his/her gloves which might be in one of two locations. 
The child is then told that the gloves are really in the backpack, but that the protagonist 
thinks that the gloves are in the wardrobe. The child was asked where Simon will look for 
the gloves.  
(f) Unexpected Transfer Task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983): the protagonist, Andy 
puts an apple into a bag before leaving the scene to play. In his/her absence, another 
character moves the apple to a different location. The protagonist returns and the child is 
asked where he/she will look for the apple. As a reality/memory check question the child 
was asked, “Where is the apple really,” and then, “Where did Andy put the apple first of 
all?” 
The order in which the stories were presented was randomised. For each task that 
is passed the child receives 1 point, resulting in total possible scores ranging from 0-6 
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points. Full details on the protocol for administering the ToM battery are given in 
Appendix 2. 
Imaginary Companion Interview  
In order to assess the existence of an IC or PO, the imaginary companion 
interview developed by Taylor and Carlson (1997) and adapted by Hepworth (2007) was 
employed. Children were asked by the researcher about their pretend friends. The 
researcher began, “Now I am going to ask you some questions about friends. Some 
friends are real, like the kids who live on your street, the ones you play with. And some 
friends are pretend friends. Pretend friends are ones that are make-believe that you 
pretend are real. Do you understand?” When the child indicated understanding the 
researcher went on to ask if the child had a pretend friend or remembered ever having 
one. Parents had completed a questionnaire similar to the child IC interview in order to 
provide parental corroboration of the IC. This procedure has been used successfully to 
identify those children who have ICs (Gleason, 2004a; Taylor, 1999). Only children 
whose reports of ICs or POs were corroborated by parental report were designated as 
having an IC or PO. 
If the child indicated the existence of an IC or PO by responding affirmatively to 
the question, they were asked the following: 
 (a) Its name 
 (b) Whether it is a toy or completely pretend 
 (c) Its gender, age, and physical appearance 
 (d) What the child likes and dislikes about the friend 
 (e) Where the friend lives and sleeps 
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(f) The extent to which the IC shows independent thoughts, emotions, and/or 
behaviour 
 
Children’s answers to these further questions were used to assess the depth of the 
IC, using Hepworth’s (2007) procedure that was based upon Taylor et al.’s (2007) 
definition of independent agency in the IC. Taylor et al.’s study defined IC independence 
as: “When an IC is experienced by a child who created it as having independent thought, 
words, desires, and/or actions (i.e. having a mind and will of its own)” (p. 92). The full 
interview can be found in Appendix 3.  
Each interview was transcribed, with children’s answers to the final question 
(extent to which IC shows independent thoughts, emotions and behaviour) awarded 1 
point for each independent characteristic mentioned. Each child obtained a frequency 
score for depth of IC. Examples of independent behaviours used to index IC depth are 
shown in Table 2.1.  
Depth of IC was coded by a researcher blind to IC status and all other measures, 
with a randomly selected 30% of sessions being coded by a second blind researcher. 
Based on coding individual children’s reports of their ICs independent thoughts, 
emotions and behaviour, Inter-rater agreement was κ = 1.0. 
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Table 2-1 Depth of Imaginary Companion Examples 
 
Type of IC Examples of Independence from Various ICs and Pos 
IC The IC is disliked because he is naughty.  
The child does not like the trousers that the IC always wears. 
The IC doesn’t follow the rules. 
The IC smashed up a flower bed and the child had to fix it. 
The IC bosses the child around and sometimes chases the child. When the child 
tries to fight back, he decides that he can’t because his hand goes through the IC’s 
stomach.  
The IC does not like it when they play boys’ games. 
The IC has his own friends and relatives.  
The child will bump into the IC when they haven’t organised to play together. 
The IC makes the child jump with surprise because it pops out of the ceiling when 
the child doesn’t expect it.  
PO The PO shows the child where to go when they are playing.  
The PO will try to boss the child around and argues with the child about Pringles 
crisps (which the PO likes).  
The PO is the decision maker when it comes to when he and the child meet up.  
The PO has its own friends who it plays with when the child is not around. 
 
Receptive Verbal Ability 
Children’s receptive verbal ability was assessed using the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997) to control for any relations between verbal 
ability, children’s self-knowledge, and ToM performance. Recpetive verbal ability was 
assessed rather than IQ due to the fact that the interior self-knowledge task and IC 
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interview are dependent on the child’s verbal processing abilities, and given well-
established associations between children’s verbal ability and ToM performance (e.g., 
Astington & Baird, 2005; Astington & Jenkins, 1999). 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and preliminary analysis 
Data were first analysed by dividing the children into IC, PO, and NIC groups. 
There were 65 children with NIC, while 10 had created ICs, and 5 had POs. Because 
there were only 5 children in the PO group, IC and PO children were pooled to increase 
power and help meet statistical assumptions of power and minimums (Field, 2005). 
Relations between children’s IC status and gender were investigated using a 2 (IC status) 
× 2 (child gender) chi square test. Of the 15 children in the IC group, 8 were boys; of the 
65 children in the NIC group, 36 were boys. There was no association between IC status 
and gender, χ² (1) = 0.02, p= .886, n.s., w = 0.02. Neither was gender related to children’s 
scores on any of the self-knowledge questions, ts < 1.35, p < .801, n.s., ds < 0.31. Gender 
is thus not considered further in the analyses reported below. 
Table 2.2 shows the mean scores for children’s age in months and BPVS 
performance. Box plots showed no significant outliers. 
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Table 2-2 Means and Standard Deviations for Preliminary Variables  
 
  Means 
Age in Months 
NIC 69.51 (9.58) 
IC 70.27 (7.19) 
BPVS  
NIC 98.68 (9.26) 
IC 103.80 (9.01) 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses 
Independent samples t tests show that there was no difference between the IC and 
NIC groups with respect to age t(79) =  0.29, p = .771, d = .09, but children in the IC 
group obtained marginally higher receptive verbal ability scores than did those in the NIC 
group, t(79) = 1.94 , p = .052, d = .56.  
Of the 15 children in the IC group, mean score for depth of IC was 3.93, SD 3.04, 
range 0–10. Depth scores were normally distributed, D(15) = 0.9, p= .390 n.s.. Boys’ 
mean depth score was 5.13, SD 3.64, and girls’ mean was 2.57, SD 1.40, t(13) = 1.74, p = 
.099, d = 1.02, suggesting that boys’ ICs showed greater depth than did those of girls. IC 
depth was not related to BPVS scores, r(13) = -.12, p = .682 n.s. 
Scores for all adult and child self-knowledge questions and for ToM were non-
normally distributed. The F test is robust against violations of normality as long as there 
are at least 20 degrees of freedom (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Non-parametric analyses 
yielded the same pattern of findings as did parametric tests; parametric analyses are 
therefore reported below. 
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2.3.2 Attribution of Knowledge to Self versus Adult  
 Table 2.3 shows the mean scores for amount of knowledge attributed to self 
versus adult for the six questions for the group as a whole. It also shows the group 
differences in means. Differences between the self and adult scores for each question 
were investigated using paired t tests, with alpha adjusted to .008 (.05/6) for multiple 
tests. As shown in Table 2.3, children attributed more knowledge to self than to adult for 
five out of six questions, with no difference in self versus other scores for the question 
relating to feeling ill. 
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Table 2-3 Means, Standard Deviations, and t-test Scores for Child-Adult Knowledge Paired t-tests 
 
 Knowledge 
Attribution Means 
Paired Differences 
Means 
t (sig.) 
Pair 1: Ill 
Q.1 Child score- 
Q.1 Adult score 
 
 
2.25 (0.76) 
2.48 (0.75) 
-0.23 (1.18) -1.70 (<.05) 
Pair 2: Fun 
Q.2 Child score- 
Q.2 Adult score 
 
 
2.75 (0.49) 
2.23 (0.80) 
0.53 (0.11) 4.73 (<.001) 
Pair 3: Dream 
Q.3 Child score- 
Q.3 Adult score 
 
 
2.46 (0.73) 
1.81 (0.86) 
0.65 (1.20) 4.84 (<.001) 
Pair 4: Think 
Q.4 Child score- 
Q.4 Adult score 
 
 
2.46 (0.69) 
1.81 0.86) 
0.41 (1.25) 2.95 (<.001) 
Pair 5: Hungry  
Q.5 Child score- 
Q.5 Adult score 
 
 
2.81 (0.42) 
2.20 (0.80) 
0.61 (0.92) 5.95 (<.001) 
Pair 6: Angry 
Q.6 Child score- 
Q.6 Adult score 
 
2.55 (0.75) 
1.89 (0.86) 
0.66 (1.17) 5.07 (<.001) 
 
2.3.3 The Relation Between Imaginary Companion Status and Children’s 
Self-Knowledge 
Table 2.4 shows the mean scores for the self-knowledge task in the adult 
knowledge condition as a function of children’s IC status. Relations between children’s 
imaginary companion status and performance on the self-knowledge task were explored 
using MANCOVA. In the first MANCOVA, scores for the six questions relating to 
amount of knowledge ascribed to the adult were the dependent variables, with 
dichotomous IC status as a fixed factor, and chronological age and BPVS scores added as 
covariates. The structure of the second MANCOVA was identical, but the scores for the 
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six questions relating to amount of knowledge ascribed to self were the dependent 
variables. 
 For performance on the question relating to the reported amount of knowledge for 
the adult, there was a main effect of IC status, F(6, 71) = 2.63, p < .025, η² = .18. Post-
hoc t tests indicated that children with ICs attributed less knowledge to adults on the ‘ill’ 
compared to NIC children, t(76) = 11.38, p < .001, d = .86, and ‘dream’, t(76) = 5.66, p < 
.025, d = .60, question. Children with ICs thus attributed less knowledge to adults than 
did the NIC children specifically regarding their feelings relating to being ill and 
dreaming than did their NIC peers. 
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Table 2-4Means and Standard Deviations for Self-Knowledge Task: Adult Condition 
 
  Means 
Q.1: Ill Adult 
NIC 2.60 (0.66) 
IC 1.94 (0.85) 
Q.2: Fun Adult 
NIC 2.24 (0.78) 
IC 2.25 (0.86) 
Q.3: Dream Adult 
NIC 1.92 (0.86) 
IC 1.44 (0.73) 
Q.4: Think Adult 
NIC 2.11 (0.92) 
IC 2.00 (0.89) 
Q.5: Hungry Adult 
NIC 2.20 (0.80) 
IC 2.25 (0.78) 
Q.6: Angry Adult 
NIC 1.90 (0.88) 
IC 1.94 (0.85) 
 
Table 2.5 shows the mean scores for the self-knowledge task in the child 
knowledge condition as a function of children’s IC status. For performance on the 
questions relating to the reported amount of knowledge for the child, the main effect of 
IC status approached significance, F(6, 71) = 2.01, p = .075, n.s., η² = .15, with children 
in the IC group ascribing more knowledge to themselves across all questions compared 
with their NIC group peers. We have adopted the convention that anything between .05 
and .10 to be described as a non-significant trend. Post-hoc analyses indicated that 
children with ICs attributed more knowledge to themselves on the ‘fun’ question, t(76) = 
5.80, p < .025, d = 1.14. There was also a non-significant trend for IC children to attribute 
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more knowledge to themselves on the ‘hungry’ question, t(76) = 3.52, p = .064, d = 1.00, 
with a large effect (Cohen, 1988) for this relation. It should be noted that children in the 
IC group were at ceiling on both of these questions, all attributing a maximum score of 3 
to themselves. 
 
Table 2-5 Means and Standard Deviations for Self-Knowledge Task: Child Condition 
 
  Means 
Q.1: Ill Child 
NIC 2.20 (0.77) 
IC 2.50 (0.73) 
Q.2: Fun Child  
NIC 2.68 (0.56) 
IC 3.00 (0.00) 
Q.3: Dream Child  
NIC 2.54 (0.69) 
IC 2.38 (0.81) 
Q.4: Think Child 
NIC 2.45 (0.71) 
IC 2.69 (0.48) 
Q.5: Hungry Child  
NIC 2.75 (0.50) 
IC 3.00 (0.00) 
Q.6: Angry Child 
NIC 2.52 (0.77) 
IC 2.56 (0.73) 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses 
2.3.4 The Relation Between Imaginary Companion Depth and Children’s 
Self-Knowledge 
 Given that there were only 15 children in the IC group, the analyses investigating 
relations between IC depth and children’s self-knowledge ascription are necessarily 
exploratory. To increase power, only correlations between IC depth and overall scores 
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across the six questions for amount of knowledge ascribed to self versus adult were 
explored. Overall scores for self and adult knowledge ascription were normally 
distributed, thus parametric correlations were used.  
There was a non-significant trend for positive correlation between depth of IC and 
amount of knowledge ascribed to self, r(13) = .47, p = .079, n.s., but the negative 
correlation between IC depth and knowledge ascribed to adult was not significant, r(13) = 
-.40, p = .138 n.s. These correlations were virtually unchanged when age and BPVS 
scores were partialled out: for the relation between IC depth and self-knowledge score, 
r(11) = .48, p = .094, n.s., for the relation between IC depth and adult-knowledge score, 
r(11) = -.38, p = .199, n.s.. The effect sizes for the relation between IC depth and 
ascription of knowledge to self approached large effects (Cohen, 1988). There was thus 
some evidence that greater depth in the IC created was positively associated with children 
ascribing more knowledge to themselves across the range of interior self-knowledge 
questions. 
2.3.5 The Relations Between Theory of Mind and Self-knowledge 
 
Table 2.6 shows the bivariate and partial (controlling for child age and BPVS 
scores) correlations between children’s ToM performance and the children’s scores for 
attribution of knowledge to themselves on the different questions from the self-
knowledge task. Alpha was adjusted to .008 (.05/6) for multiple comparisons. As shown 
in Table 2.6, attribution of knowledge to self on the ‘angry’ question was positively 
correlated with children’s ToM score, but this relation was no longer significant when 
age and BPVS scores were partialled out. 
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Table 2-6 Bivariate (Pearson’s r) and Partial Correlations for Child’s Performance on Theory of 
Mind Tasks and Self-knowledge Scores Relating to Child Knowledge 
 
Question and Child Self-knowledge  
Score 
Theory of Mind Composite  
Score 
 
Q.1: Ill 0.11 (0.14) 
Q.2: Fun 0.08 (0.10) 
Q.3: Dream -0.03 (0.03) 
Q.4: Think 0.13 (0.12) 
Q.5: Hungry 0.23 (0.19) 
Q.6: Angry 0.31*(0.23) 
* p < .01. Partial correlations are in parentheses  
  
Table 2.7 shows the correlations between children’s ToM performance and the 
children’s scores for adult attribution of knowledge on the different questions from the 
self-knowledge task. Once again, alpha was adjusted to .008 for multiple comparisons. 
As shown in Table 2.7, there were no associations between ascription of knowledge to 
adult and children’s ToM scores. 
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Table 2-7 Bivariate (Pearson’s r) and Partial Correlations for Child’s Performance on Theory of 
Mind Tasks and Self-knowledge Scores Relating to Adult Knowledge 
 
Question and Adult Self-knowledge  
Score 
Theory of Mind Composite  
Score 
Q.1: Ill 0.16 (0.13) 
Q.2: Fun -0.08 (-0.08) 
Q.3: Dream -0.24 (-0.22) 
Q.4: Think -0.06 (-0.08) 
Q.5: Hungry -0.08 (-0.12) 
Q.6: Angry -0.17 (-0.17) 
Partial correlations in parentheses 
 
2.3.6 The Relations Between Imaginary Companion Status and Depth and 
Theory of Mind 
 The mean ToM score for the IC group was 4.93, SD 1.03, compared with a mean 
of 4.45, SD 1.53 for the NIC group. The relation between IC status and ToM was 
investigated using ANCOVA, with IC status entered as a fixed variable and age and 
BPVS score added as covariates. IC status was not related to ToM performance, F(1, 76) 
= 0.44, p= .509, n.s., IC depth and ToM score were unrelated, r(13) = .16, n.s. 
2.4 Discussion  
The aim of Study 1 was to investigate individual differences in children’s 
ascription of interior self-knowledge to an adult versus self, exploring the potential 
contributions made by children’s creation of an IC and their ToM abilities. Given Burton 
and Mitchell’s (2003) findings, it was expected that children would ascribe more interior 
knowledge to self than to an adult, but we predicted that IC status would also relate to 
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children’s knowledge ascriptions. Burton and Mitchell’s findings were replicated, and as 
hypothesised, children in the IC group were more likely than their peers in the NIC group 
to assign less interior self-knowledge to an adult, with a non-significant trend for IC 
group children also to assign more self-knowledge to themselves. With regard to specific 
types of interior knowledge, children with ICs attributed less knowledge to adults than 
did those in the NIC group about whether they felt ill or had been dreaming, and assigned 
more knowledge to themselves compared with their NIC peers on judgements about 
whether they were having fun or were hungry. 
Preliminary results on depth of IC in the 15 children who had parentally-
corroborated ICs also suggested that depth may relate to children’s judgements about 
interior self-knowledge. The results pointed to children with deeper ICs, ascribing more 
knowledge to themselves across the six questions relating to a range of interior self-
knowledge, although findings failed to reach significance. Despite the lack of significant 
findings, the effect size for these results were medium to large, indicating that a lack of 
power is likely to have prevented the differences achieving statistical significance. Thus, 
IC creation, both in terms of having an IC of any sort and possibly with respect to how 
fully the IC was characterised as an independent being, seemed to relate to children 
having a more adult-like opinion on who is the best judge of interior aspects of the self. 
In contrast to the positive associations between the IC-related variables and 
children’s self-knowledge judgements, the tendency to attribute interior self-knowledge 
to an adult or self was unrelated to children’s concurrent performance on a battery of 
ToM tasks. Study 1 also failed to replicate Taylor and Carlson’s (1997) findings of 
positive associations between children’s creation of an IC and their ToM. Rather, they are 
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in line with Fernyhough et al.’s (2007) null findings on relations between IC status and 
ToM. However, neither of the two studies reported in Fernyhough et al. (2007) assessed 
mentalising abilities in terms of children’s performance on standard tasks involving false 
belief. Study 1 is thus the first non-replication using a standard battery of tests to assess 
ToM performance. Finally, IC-group children were found to have marginally higher 
BPVS scores than their NIC counterparts, although the group differences reported above 
controlled for BPVS scores. Past studies have found no relation between IC status and 
receptive verbal ability on a standardised measure (Davis, 2006; Fernyhough et al., 2007; 
Manosevitz et al., 1977; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Trionfi & Reese, 2009).  
This discussion will address possible reasons why we failed to find a relation 
between IC status and children’s basic ToM understanding. The most obvious 
explanation lies in methodological differences between Taylor and Carlson’s (1997) 
study and Study 1. Taylor and Carlson (1997) assessed children’s ToM performance 
using a battery consisting of trials of three tasks: (a) appearance–reality, (b) contents false 
belief, and (c) informational access, which is a measure where the child is shown a 
picture which is later covered so that only small parts of it can be seen. The child is then 
introduced to a puppet that can only see the covered pictures and is asked, “Do you think 
that the puppet knows there is a ____in the picture?” In contrast, Study 1 did not include 
appearance–reality or informational access tasks, and instead employed a battery of six 
ToM tasks (one diverse beliefs task, one knowledge access task, two contents false belief 
tasks, one explicit false belief task, and one unexpected transfer task) that were given in 
randomised order to each child. These ToM tasks were chosen because past studies have 
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shown that these tasks are the best indicators of developing ToM (Hughes et al., 2000; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004).  
Compared with the classic unexpected transfer and contents false belief tasks, 
informational access tasks, and in particular the appearance–reality paradigm, focus on 
aspects of ToM that are much more clearly linked to fantasy versus reality and 
understanding the world from different people’s perspectives. One would therefore 
predict that the former ToM assessments will be more strongly related to children’s IC 
status compared with the latter type of ToM measure. Unfortunately, Taylor and Carlson 
(1997) did not report relations between IC status and performance on the individual ToM 
measures, but the fact that different ToM measures were used in their study compared to 
the present study is a plausible explanation for the discrepant findings. Future research on 
the IC–ToM link should incorporate a variety of appearance–reality, informational 
access, false belief, and representational change paradigms.  
Furthermore, tasks incorporating counterfactual reasoning or reasoning about 
events that are ‘counter to reality’ (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004) could also be added 
to a battery of ToM tasks. Counterfactual reasoning has been argued to involve similar 
processes to ToM (Perner, 2000). For example, Perner (2000) asserts that both ToM and 
counterfactual reasoning tasks require children to reference real world points (locations, 
events) that are counter to reality. IC children may excel in counterfactual reasoning tasks 
because they are adept at creating what Gopnik (2009) would term a “counterfactual 
being.” She views children’s play as a form of counterfactual thinking, or “imagining the 
way things might be different” (p. 27), and children’s IC play as, “the ways that people 
might be and ways they might act” (pp. 44-55). If Taylor and Carlson’s (1997) group of 
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IC children were able to excel in appearance-reality tasks which are ToM tasks more 
closely related to fantasy and viewing the world as it might be different, IC children may 
therefore also excel in counterfactual reasoning tasks because the type of pretence they 
have created involves consideration of a counterfactual state of affairs. It would be 
interesting to examine what specific aspects of children’s understanding of mind are 
related to IC status. Adding counterfactual reasoning tasks may help researchers to 
pinpoint what specific parts of ToM may be influenced by high fantasy orientation.   
 However, there are alternative explanations for our failure to replicate the 
previously observed IC-related differences in children’s ToM performance. Throughout 
the wide body of previous literature on pretence and ToM, there are many accounts that 
maintain that play facilitates the development of children’s ToM abilities. Researchers 
argue that the ability to pretend is cognitively similar to the ability to recognise false 
belief (e.g., Leslie, 1987) and the difference between appearance and reality (Flavell, 
Flavell, & Green, 1987). These authors posit that distinguishing between mental 
representations (e.g., Maxi believing that the chocolate is in cupboard A) and the real 
world (e.g., the chocolate really being in cupboard B) is no different from distinguishing 
between what a peer is pretending to do (e.g., fly through the air) and what that peer is 
actually doing (e.g., reaching her hands out in front of her and running around). Even as 
early as Vygotsky (1967), the potential role of fantasy play in facilitating representational 
capacities was acknowledged, highlighting how fantasy play teaches children “to sever 
thought…from object” (p. 12) thus providing a means for developing abstract thought. 
Furthermore, when Perner, Ruffman, and Leekam (1994) found that children’s ToM was 
positively influenced by the number of siblings, one of their hypotheses as to why this 
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occurred focused on siblings’ availability as play partners, and the increased co-
operational play that children engage in with older peers. These views on the 
metarepresentational nature of fantasy play continue to provide a rich account as to why 
greater fantasy-orientation in play is positively associated with performance on ToM 
tasks (Freidman & Leslie, 2007; Rakoczy, 2008; Rakoczy et al., 2006). Taylor and 
Carlson’s (1997) findings that ToM was in fact negatively related to children’s 
impersonation play involving pretending that they are machines (i.e. have no mind) also 
provide support for this metarepresentational view of play.  
 In contrast to the view that fantasy play is a precursor of ToM ability, others 
maintain that pretend play consists less of the child honing their understanding of mental 
states and is more about grasping the behaviour of pretence (Lillard, 1993a; Nichols & 
Stitch, 2000). Lillard (1993a) argued that children simply think of pretending as acting in 
a certain way, understanding pretence as action and failing to understand its mental 
component. An example of this understanding of action can be seen in a study performed 
by Lillard (1993b) where children were shown a toy troll ‘Moe’ hopping like a rabbit. 
They were told that Moe comes from the land of trolls and does not know how rabbits 
hop although he is hopping around like a rabbit. Children were then asked three 
questions: (1) “Is he hopping like a rabbit?” (2) “Does he know that rabbits hop like 
that?” (3) “Would you say he is pretending to be a rabbit, or he is not pretending to be a 
rabbit?” Although children correctly answered yes to the first question and no to the 
second, over 60% of 4-year-olds claimed on at least three of the four trials that Moe was 
pretending to be a rabbit. Lillard interprets these results as children understanding 
pretence as action only, rather than recognising its mental representational dimension.  
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According to Lillard, although children’s sociodramatic play may appear to entail 
representing others’ mental representations, in reality it may only involve acting out 
scripted routines and understanding pretence as action. Other behaviourally-driven 
researchers believe that play is not motivated from a “pretend desire” but rather from a 
real desire to act in a way that fits the description of what they have constructed to 
pretend. Pretend play is not the ability of the child to interpret another’s mental state of 
“pretend”; rather, it is the ability to respond to others who are acting-as-if they are 
something else (Nichols & Stitch, 2000).  
 In short, some argue that pretend play and fantasy orientation afford the child the 
opportunity to increase their proficiency in the understanding of mental states (making 
pretence a potential precursor to ToM), while others believe that pretend play has been 
given a special status that it does not deserve, and it is merely an understanding of action 
and not a conceptualisation of mental activity. The null findings on the relation between 
IC status and ToM performance in Study 1 thus add support to the latter view.  
 Another interpretation that still allows for a metarepresentational view of play is 
that having an IC relates not to children’s basic ToM competence, but to their tendency to 
use their ToM abilities. Fodor (1992) theorises about the reasons for older children’s 
ability to pass ToM tests, stating that, “A child’s ToM, as such, undergoes no alteration; 
what changes is only his ability to exploit what he knows to make behavioural 
predictions” (p. 248). Thus, IC status might impact on the ability to use one’s mentalising 
abilities rather than on these abilities per se.  
The first prediction of Study 1 was that children’s IC status would relate to their 
conceptualisation of who the authority is on their self-knowledge. Specifically, we 
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predicted that children with ICs would be more likely to understand that they are the 
authority on their self-knowledge. The finding that IC creation is positively associated 
with understanding of interior self-knowledge supports the proposal that having an IC 
provides children with more opportunity for self-examination and self-insight because of 
their time spent judging how much the IC knows about themselves and how to react to 
their IC. There are several accounts of IC children practising this type of judgement by 
comparing themselves with their IC. In the study performed by Davis (2006), one girl 
stated that her IC shared her dislike for Korean food, while another child was reported as 
blaming her misdeeds on her IC, claiming that the IC didn’t know that what he was doing 
was bad while she had that knowledge.  
Other studies have reported ICs helping children gain insight into their own 
negative traits by teaching their IC how be an ideal friend (Hoff, 2004). Having an 
invisible friend that others cannot see should also enable the child to establish the extent 
to which behavioural cues are accurate indicators of internal states. The child must 
behave in a way that lets others understand the existence and characteristics of a being 
that is essentially known only to the creator. These results are in line with Gleason et al.’s 
(2003) study that people with ICs in childhood showed significantly higher scores on the 
monitoring of others’ and their own emotions. They also concord with Hoff’s (2004) 
work on the numerous functions of ICs, and Gopnik’s (2009) theory that children with 
ICs are creating counterfactual people who aid in children’s conception of how people 
might act toward them in certain situations.   
It has already been established that children are able to make distinctions between 
interior self-knowledge and exterior self-knowledge from around 6 years of age (Burton 
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& Mitchell, 2003), but the children in Study 1 seemed to have more insight when it came 
to specific kinds of interior self-knowledge. Even though there were group differences 
between the IC and NIC group when analysing self-knowledge across all six questions, 
specific self-knowledge questions contributed to the main effects of IC status . Children 
with ICs attributed to themselves significantly more knowledge than NIC children about 
whether they felt ill or had been dreaming, while attributing less knowledge to adults 
when the kind of self-knowledge was about whether they were having fun or feeling 
hungry. Thus, the specific items on which the IC and NIC groups differed suggest that 
IC-group children believe themselves to be the authority on aspects of self that are 
undeniably interior (dreaming), and those which adults may feel they can accurately 
judge (feeling ill or hungry, having fun). The observed heterogeneity across the 
individual self-knowledge questions is in line with the results of a recent study by 
Teucher, Mitchell, and Reamer (2009). These researchers found that children 5-13-years 
of age excelled at certain self-knowledge types, and found others harder to master. For 
example, children did not seem to understand the think question until they were 9-years-
old. This trend was seen across cultures in both English and Cree children. Teucher et al. 
(2009) argue that this effect of type of self-knowledge question is an indicator that self-
knowledge may not be a single domain, but rather can be conceptualised as an umbrella 
concept composed of many smaller domains.   
One issue worthy of further discussion is that, despite differences between the IC 
and NIC groups in their attribution of various aspects of interior self-knowledge, no 
group differences were found on attributions relating to perhaps the most obvious type of 
interior self-knowledge: thinking. There are a number of potential explanations for the 
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lack of observed group differences in self-knowledge attributions about thinking. First, 
thinking is the only aspect of interior self-knowledge in Study 1 that is not accompanied 
by obvious outward manifestations. As proposed in the Introduction to Study 1, having to 
convey to others the IC’s presence and state is likely to help children with ICs gain 
insight into the outward manifestations of inner states, but not necessarily aid in the 
development of introspection on thought, as there are typically not outward 
manifestations when one is thinking. Whereas being ill, hungry, angry, having fun, and 
dreaming may all be accompanied by various physical indicators (e.g., coughing, 
stomach growl, fists clenching, laughing, and sleeping).   
A second reason why IC status did not relate to children’s self-knowledge about 
“thinking” could be that distinguishing between states and traits rests on different 
developmental trajectories. This suggestion is in line with Mitchell et al. (2007) who 
postulated that states (which are typically ephemeral and different from constant 
processes like thinking, because of their fleeting nature) are more salient for the child, 
while traits are stable and presumably more difficult to detect through introspection. 
Furthermore, according to Mitchell et al., children may be more likely to be told about 
their traits than their states, which in turn would give the impression that others know 
more about this type of self-knowledge than the child. It could be that both children with 
and without ICs have not reached a stage in their development when they are able to 
ponder on the thinking mind to this extent. For example, Flavell, Flavell, and Green 
(2001) found that 5-year-old children were seldom able to explain sudden changes in 
emotion with no apparent external cause by appealing to the occurrence of a thought. 
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According to Flavell et al. (2001), this was a result of young children’s inability to link 
thoughts with the feelings that they produce and to understand the stream of conscious.  
In summary, Study 1 provided evidence that ICs may help young children gain insight 
into the qualities of their internal existence and how they have privileged access to their 
own interior experiences, and highlighted how richly ICs can be described and 
characterised by their creators. It seems that having an IC does relate positively to 
children’s understanding of certain aspects of interior self-knowledge. The aim of the 
study reported in Chapter 3 was to investigate whether IC status relates to how children 
represent their real-world friends, investigating IC-related differences in children’s 
spontaneous descriptions of their best friend. 
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____________________________________________________ 
Chapter 3 
The Relation Between Imaginary Companion Status and 
Children’s Mentalistic Descriptions of their  
Best Friends 
______________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The results of Study 1 suggest that having an IC may facilitate children’s 
understanding that they have privileged knowledge about their internal states. It has been 
argued throughout this thesis that IC status relates to this understanding because having 
an IC provides the child with more opportunities for contrasting own versus others’ 
cognitions and emotions. This argument is based on the assumption that children 
represent their IC’s internal states (Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Taylor et al., 2007). If IC 
status does entail the child focusing more on the IC’s internal states, then one would 
predict that children with ICs will show a similar focus on cognitions and emotions in 
describing their real friends. Investigating this possibility was the main aim of Study 2.  
Previous studies have examined children’s interactions with their real friends in 
reference to variables like peer acceptance (Gleason, 2004b), concepts of real and 
imaginary friendships (Gleason & Hohmann, 2006; Seiffge-Krenke, 2001), and stability 
of descriptions between IC and real friendships (Taylor et al., 1993). However, studies 
have not investigated whether IC status relates to children’s descriptions of their 
interactions with real friends, or their descriptions of friends’ internal states. This is 
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surprising, considering that a child’s interaction with their IC should increase the amount 
of practice that a child receives in representing others’ internal states, therefore increasing 
the likelihood that children will invoke mental states when describing friends. Gleason 
(2002) used a social contrast interview to explore how having an IC related to children’s 
concepts of different types of relationship (e.g., with a parent versus a friend). Gleason 
found that children with ICs may have more practice conceptualising friends and 
distinguishing between different types of social relationship based on differences in 
social provision or, “the way that relationships are specialised according to the nature of 
interaction they provide” (p. 979). For example, parents were seen by all children as 
sources of instrumental help, however IC children were able to differentiate siblings and 
friends as sources of conflict and nurturance whereas NIC children nominated parents for 
every social provision. 
Friendship is a central aspect of life not just in childhood, but into the adolescent 
years (Berndt, 2004; Dunn, Cutting, & Fisher, 2002). When asking an adolescent to 
describe a friend, it is easy to envisage what they would cite as important characteristics . 
For example, one would expect an adolescent or adult to cite shared values and ideas as 
important traits that define a friendship, both concepts that are abstract and 
psychologically oriented. There is a developmental shift from concrete to abstract self-
description which has been observed between childhood and adolescence (Montemayor 
& Eisen, 1977). Montemayor and Eisen (1977) reported that adolescents are more likely 
to refer to the self using abstract, psychological, and interpersonal characteristics 
compared with younger children. If this change occurs in self-description, it should 
follow that it will occur in children’s descriptions of others. This chapter asks, what 
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characteristics do younger children use to represent their friends, and how does their 
social and mental state understanding shape these descriptions?  
In contrast to the considerable literature investigating children’s internal-state 
understanding in the context of ToM tasks, there is little research on children’s tendency 
to use their knowledge of cognitions and feelings in more everyday settings. Brown, 
Donelan-McCall, and Dunn (1996) investigated how 4-year-olds’ references to mental 
states varied as a function of the social partner with whom they were interacting. Brown 
et al. (1996) reported that the highest frequency of conversational turns involving mental 
state references occurred in interaction between the child and a friend (13.4 turns), with 
such references being noticeably less common in the child’s conversations with a sibling 
(5.1 turns) or the mother (2.8 turns). Children’s narratives to describe the events in a 
wordless picture book have also been used to index their spontaneous use of internal-state 
language (Charman & Shmueli-Goetz, 1998; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995). 
Interestingly, both of these studies found that children’s use of internal-state language 
during picture-book narration was unrelated to their performance on standard ToM tasks. 
Meins et al. (2006) investigated individual differences in 7- to 9-year olds’ 
internal-state language in the context of their descriptions of a best friend. Specifically, 
Meins et al. were interested in the extent to which children would describe a best friend 
with reference to mentalistic characteristics (e.g., references to the friend’s mental life, 
intellect, or emotions). Considerable variation was found in children’s mentalistic 
descriptions of friends, with some children failing to mention any mental characteristics. 
Meins et al. reported that children’s mentalistic descriptions of their best friend were 
highly positively correlated with their use of internal-state language while narrating a 
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wordless picture book, suggesting stability in children’s tendency to invoke internal states 
either when describing a friend or explaining and interpreting the events in a book. In 
contrast, internal-state language use on neither task related to children’s performance on 
an age-appropriate ToM task (Happé, 1994), replicating and extending previous null 
findings (Charman & Shmueli-Goetz, 1998; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995). Meins et 
al. thus argued that having a ToM was different from using one’s knowledge of internal 
states to inform how one represents and interprets other people and their behaviour. 
Study 2 addressed whether having an IC related to children’s tendency to describe 
a best friend with reference to mentalistic characteristics. It was predicted that children 
with an IC would be more likely to invoke thoughts, desires, beliefs, and emotions in 
describing a friend because of the greater opportunities in representing and considering 
internal states afforded to them by engaging with their IC.  
Study 2 also investigated a further potential determinant of children’s mentalistic 
descriptions of a best friend: their previous ToM performance. As discussed above, 
previous research on relations between children’s spontaneous use of internal-state 
language and their performance on standard ToM tasks has only considered concurrent 
relations, reporting null findings (Charman & Shmueli-Goetz, 1998; Meins et al., 2006; 
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995). However, none of these studies focused on previous 
ToM and how it may potentially impact later use of mental state commentary. It may be 
that any relation between ToM performance and spontaneous use of internal-state 
language is predictive rather than concurrent. For example, a child who at time 1 shows 
good understanding of false belief and how internal states govern behaviour may be more 
likely to begin to focus on such internal states during everyday interactions with friends 
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earlier than children with less advanced understanding of mind. Thus, this initial focus 
could result in these children being more likely to describe their best friend with 
reference to mentalistic characteristics at time 2. For these reasons it was hypothesised 
that previous but not concurrent ToM will be positively associated with children’s 
mentalistic descriptions of their best friends.   
In summary, Study 2 investigated how children’s mentalistic descriptions of a 
best friend related to IC status and to their earlier and concurrent performance on a 
battery of ToM tasks. While Study 1 focused on how children with ICs represent the self 
in reference to others, Study 2 focused on how having an IC relates to children’s 
representations of others’ mental lives. It was hypothesised that mentalistic descriptions 
of friends would be (a) positively associated with having an IC; (b) positively associated 
with earlier ToM performance, and (c) unrelated to concurrent performance on ToM 
tasks.  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Participants were a socially diverse sample of 140 mother–child dyads (73 girls) 
from the Tees Valley area of North-East England. Children were aged between 50 and 53 
months (mean age 51.5 months) at Time 1 and 59 and 64 months (mean age 61.3 months) 
at Time 2. Parents signed letters of informed consent at each testing phase. Participating 
dyads were part of an ongoing longitudinal study funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council with Dr Elizabeth Meins as Principal Investigator. The author worked 
in a voluntary capacity as a casual research assistant on this grant during her Master’s 
year at Durham, and has continued to be involved in the project. Although the author was 
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not responsible for collecting the data reported in Study 2, she was solely responsible for 
transcribing, coding and analysing all of the IC interviews and friend descriptions.  
3.2.2 Procedure and Materials 
 At 50 months, a female experimenter administered the ToM battery as part of a 
longer testing session in the developmental laboratories at the University. At 61 months, 
children were tested individually by a female experimenter in a quiet area in their school. 
The session began with the ToM battery, followed by the ‘describe a friend’ task, and 
then the IC interview.  
Theory of Mind Performance 
A battery of ToM tasks was administered to each child at 50 and 61 months. 
Details on the battery can be found in section 2.2.2, and full details on the protocol for 
administering the ToM battery are given in Appendix 2. 
Descriptions of Best Friend 
Children’s descriptions of their best friend were assessed using the protocol 
described by Meins et al. (2006). The experimenter first asked the child if he/she had a 
best friend. No child reported that he/she did not have a best friend. After the child named 
their best friend, he/she was asked, Can you describe [friend’s name] for me? When the 
child finished the description the experimenter asked, Is there anything else you would 
like to tell me about [friend’s name]?  
 Children were audio-taped while describing their best friend, and the recordings 
were later used to transcribe the descriptions verbatim. The transcripts were then coded to 
establish the extent to which children described their best friend with reference to 
mentalistic characteristics. The descriptions were divided into discrete descriptions that 
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could be single words, phrases, or sentences. Each description was placed into one of 
Meins et al.’s (2006) exclusive and exhaustive categories:  
1. Mentalistic: references to the friend’s desires, emotions, cognitions, and the friend’s 
responses to the child’s own internal states (e.g., ‘He’s kind when I hurt myself’).  
2. Behavioural: references to activities or interactions that could be interpreted on a 
purely behavioural level (e.g., ‘She rides a bicycle’, ‘He plays with me’). 
3. Physical: references to physical characteristics, age, or position in the family (e.g., ‘He 
has light brown hair’, ‘She’s got a sister called Kate’). 
4. General: any comment that did not fit into the categories above (e.g., ‘He’s got a big 
garage’). Describing the friend as ‘nice’ was included in the general category if no other 
information was provided to qualify how to characterise being ‘nice’.  
Inter-rater reliability 
A randomly selected 30% of the transcripts was coded by a second researcher, 
and inter-rater reliability was κ = .75.  
Imaginary Companion Interview 
In order to assess the existence of an IC or PO, the imaginary companion 
interview developed by Taylor and Carlson (1997) was used. Children were asked by the 
researcher about their pretend friends. The researcher began, “Now I am going to ask you 
some questions about friends. Some friends are real, like the kids who live on your street, 
the ones you play with. And some friends are pretend friends. Pretend friends are ones 
that are make-believe that you pretend are real. Do you understand?” When the child 
indicated understanding the researcher went on to ask if the child had a pretend friend or 
remembered ever having one.  
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If the child indicated the existence of an IC or PO by responding affirmatively to 
the question, they were asked the following: 
 (a) Its name 
 (b) Whether it is a toy or completely pretend 
 (c) Its gender, age, and physical appearance 
 (d) What the child likes and dislikes about the friend 
 (e) Where the friend lives and sleeps 
 
The children’s mothers separately completed a parental questionnaire on whether 
or not their child had an IC or PO, giving a description of the IC or PO as for the child 
interview if they indicated the existence of an IC or PO. Children were only credited with 
having an IC or PO if its existence was corroborated by the mothers. Of the children who 
participated in Study 2, 20 were reported to have an IC, and 11 to have a PO. To increase 
statistical power, ICs and POs were combined into a single group (termed IC group).  
Maternal Education 
Mothers completed a questionnaire indicating their highest educational 
qualification. Maternal education level was measured on a scale from 1–7: 1, No 
examinations; 2, CSEs; 3, GCSEs or O-Levels; 4, A-Levels; 5, Further qualification, not 
to degree level (e.g., nursing); 6, undergraduate degree; and 7, postgraduate 
qualifications. 
Receptive Verbal Ability 
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Children’s receptive verbal ability was assessed at 51 months using the BPVS 
(Dunn et al., 1997) to control for any relations between verbal ability and children’s 
narrative descriptions of their best friend, and ToM performance.  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis 
 
There were 20 children who possessed ICs and were backed up by parental report 
and 11 children with POs. The children in the IC and PO categories were pooled in order 
to increase statistical power. On average, children produced 4.81 (SD = 2.47) descriptions 
of their best friend, with a range of 1–14 descriptions. With respect to the number of 
mentalistic descriptions, the mean score was 1.04 (SD = 1.53), with scores ranging 
between 0 and 7. However, 75 of the 140 children (54.3%) did not include a mentalistic 
description of their best friend, with a further 46 children (32.8%) using 1 or 2 mentalistic 
descriptions. Although regression analysis does not require the dependent variable to be 
normally distributed, the high number of zero scores is potentially problematic in 
interpreting the results of regression investigating predictors of children’s total number of 
mentalistic descriptions. Thus, as well as treating mentalistic descriptions as a continuous 
variable (frequency score), a dichotomous category was created, with children divided 
into two groups: mentalistic present versus mentalistic absent.  
Children’s ToM scores at 51 and 61 months were positively correlated, r(133) = 
0.52, p < .001. BPVS scores were positively correlated with ToM at both 51 months, 
r(132) = 0.38, p < .001, and 61 months, r(128) = 0.40, p < .001. 
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Table 3.1 shows the mean ToM scores at 51 and 61 months as a function of IC 
status. IC status was unrelated to ToM performance at 51 months, t(135) = 0.33, p = 
.744, n.s., d = 0.07, and to ToM performance at 61 months, t(134) = 0.40, p = .691, n.s., d 
= 0.08. Table 3.1 also shows maternal educational level as a function of children’s IC 
status. Children in the IC group had more highly educated mothers compared with those 
in the NIC group, t(138) = 3.00, p < .005, d = 0.61. 
The total number of friend descriptions for the IC and NIC groups are also shown 
in Table 3.1. Children with an IC produced more overall descriptions of their best friends 
compared to their NIC counterparts, t(138) = 2.79, p < .01, d = 0.53.  
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Table 3-1 Mean Theory of Mind, Friend Description, Receptive Verbal Ability, and Maternal 
Education Scores as a Function of Imaginary Companion Status 
 
  Mean score 
ToM at 50 months 
NIC 3.05 (1.79) 
IC 3.17 (1.70) 
ToM at 61 months 
NIC 4.07 (1.64) 
IC 4.21 (1.73) 
Total number of friend 
descriptions 
NIC 4.50 (2.26) 
IC 5.87 (2.87) 
Total number of mentalistic 
friend descriptions 
NIC 0.87 (1.32) 
IC 1.61 (2.03) 
BPVS receptive verbal ability 
NIC 103.66 (11.34) 
IC 102.17 (17.51) 
Maternal Education 
NIC 4.54 (1.27) 
IC 5.32 (1.30) 
3.3.2 Predictors of Children’s Mentalistic Descriptions of Their Best Friend  
Table 3.1 shows the mean scores for friend descriptions as a function of IC status. 
Predictors of the total number of mentalistic characteristics children used to describe their 
best friend were investigated using hierarchical linear regression. At the first step, child 
gender, maternal educational level, and BPVS scores were entered. At the second step, IC 
status and ToM scores at 51 and 61 months were entered. At the final step, total number 
of non-mentalistic friend descriptions was entered to establish whether any observed 
relations were independent of children’s general verbosity. Table 3.2 summarises the 
results of the regression analysis.  
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Table 3-2 Summary of Hierarchical Regression for Predictors of Children’s Mentalistic Descriptions 
of Friends (N=140) 
Predictor B SE B β 
Step 1    
Maternal education level 0.69 0.10 -0.11 
BPVS 0.01 0.01 0.05 
Child gender -0.37 0.26 -0.13 
              
Step 2    
Maternal education level -0.09 0.10 -0.84 
BPVS 0.01 0.01 0.05 
Child gender -0.47 0.26 -0.16 
IC status  0.93 0.33 0.26* 
ToM at 51 mo. 0.07 0.09 0.09 
ToM at 61 mo. 0.01 0.09 0.01 
              
Step 3    
Maternal education level -0.10 0.10 -0.09 
BPVS 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Child gender -0.42 0.26 -0.14 
IC status 0.94 0.32 0.26* 
ToM at 51 mo. 0.06 0.09 0.07 
ToM at 61 mo 0.01 0.09 0.01 
Non-mentalistic friend descriptions -0.10 0.06 -0.15 
p < .005 
Note. R² = .02 for step 1; ∆R² = .07 for step 2; ∆R² = .18 for step 3 (p <.001) 
 
As shown in Table 3.2, with all variables entered into the regression equation, the 
only predictor of children’s mentalistic descriptions was IC status. Post-hoc analyses 
81 
showed that children with an IC described their best friend using more mentalistic 
characteristics than did their NIC peers, t(138) = 2.42, p < .025, d = 0.44.  
Next, predictors of children’s dichotomous inclusion of mentalistic descriptions 
were investigated using binary logistic regression, with child gender, maternal 
educational level, and BPVS scores entered at the first step, and IC status and ToM 
scores at 51 and 61 months at the second. Table 3.3 summarises the results of the logistic 
regression. 
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3-3 Summary of Binary Logistic Regression Analysis for Children's use of Mentalistic Friend 
Descriptions Dichotomously (N=140) 
 
Predictor Wald SE B Exp β 
Step 1    
Maternal education level  0.62 0.14 1.12 
BPVS 0.44 0.01 1.01 
Child gender  0.39 0.36 0.80 
Step 2    
Maternal education level  0.01 0.15 1.01 
BPVS 0.00 0.02 1.00 
Child gender  1.76 0.39 0.60 
IC status  4.47* 0.49 2.83 
ToM at 51 mo. 5.03* 0.13 1.33 
ToM at 61 mo. 0.00 0.14 1.00 
Step 3    
Maternal education level 0.02 0.02 1.00 
BPVS 0.01 0.15 1.01 
Child gender 1.44 0.39 0.62 
IC status 4.65* 0.50 2.93 
ToM at 51 mo. 4.67* 0.13 1.32 
ToM at 61 mo 0.01 0.14 1.01 
Non-mentalistic friend descriptions 1.40 0.09 0.66 
p < .05 
 
Note. Nagelkerke R² = .02 for step 1; Nagelkerke R² = .13 for step 2 (p <.025); 
Nagelkerke R² = .01 for step 3. 
 
As shown in Table 3.3, with all variables entered into the regression equation, IC 
status and children’s ToM scores at 51 months independently predicted their 
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dichotomous use of mentalistic description of their best friend. Post-hoc tests showed 
that, of the 31 children in the IC group, 19 included at least one mentalistic description, 
compared with 46 of the 109 children in the NIC group, χ
2
(1) = 3.54, p = .05, w = 0.16. 
There was a non-significant trend for children who included at least one mentalistic 
description to obtain higher 51-month ToM scores (M = 3.37, SD = 1.75) than their peers 
who failed to include a mentalistic description (M = 2.81, SD = 1.76), t(135) = 1.88, p = 
.062, n.s., d = 0.32. 
3.4 Discussion 
The results of Study 2 show that children with ICs are more likely than their NIC 
peers to describe their best friend with reference to mentalistic characteristics, suggesting 
that children with ICs are not only more likely to employ mental state terms when 
describing a friend, but also are more likely to use a greater number of mental state 
references than their NIC peers. This relation between IC status and mentalistic 
descriptions was independent of children’s verbal ability, gender, ToM understanding, 
and overall verbosity, and their mothers’ educational level. These findings are in line 
with the notion that having an IC entails that the child focuses on the IC’s cognitions and 
emotions, but these findings are unique in showing that this focus on internal states 
appears to generalise to how children represent their real friends.  
The second aim of Study 2 was to investigate whether children’s ToM 
performance predicts a child’s tendency to describe their best friend with reference to 
mentalistic characteristics. Although ToM performance was not related to children’s 
frequency scores for mentalistic descriptions, ToM at 51 months independently predicted 
children’s dichotomous inclusion of mentalistic characteristics when describing their best 
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friend 10 months later. In contrast, concurrent ToM performance was unrelated to 
children’s mentalistic descriptions of their best friend, replicating the findings of Meins et 
al. (2006). 
Finally, Study 2 found no relation between IC status and children’s previous or 
concurrent ToM performance, replicating the null findings of Study 1, Fernyhough et al. 
(2007), and Hepworth (2006). Given the relatively large sample, the null findings of 
Study 2 are noteworthy; they also uniquely demonstrate that children’s earlier ToM 
abilities, as well as their concurrent ToM performance, were unrelated to IC status. 
Further discussion of the potential reasons for the observed lack of consistency in 
findings regarding the relation between IC status and ToM can be found in Section 2.5. 
The first prediction presented in Study 2 was that children’s inclusion of mental 
state descriptions of their friends would be positively associated with having an IC. The 
positive association was predicted because children with ICs should be providing 
themselves with more opportunities to contrast their own as well as others’ cognitions 
and emotions by interacting with their IC. The regression analyses confirmed that IC 
status predicted unique variance in children’s tendency to describe their best friend with 
reference to mental qualities and characteristics. These results are in line with Gopnik’s 
(2009) claim that ICs can be one way that children learn about others’ minds and 
behaviour, and Gleason’s (2002) statement that children with ICs may be more sensitive 
to relationship dynamics and concepts of relationships. In fact, Gleason and Hohmann 
(2006) found that children with ICs do not tend to draw a sharp distinction between real 
and pretend friendships, which supports Study 2’s claim that having an IC will enable 
children to practise thinking about the inner lives of people in general. Broadly, the 
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findings of Study 2 also support the view that imagination and pretend play are associated 
with child mental-state talk (Hughes & Dunn, 1997; Hughes et al. 2006). Having an IC is 
an indicator of high imaginative capacity, and the fact that children with ICs were more 
likely than their NIC peers to use internal-state attributes when describing a friend points 
to imagination as one potential facilitator of this ability. 
There are numerous examples in Study 2 of this type of concentration on a 
friend’s inner lives and traits from both IC and NIC children. One child who had an IC 
was able to provide the experimenter not only with her real friend’s internal attribute, but 
was also able to provide a well thought out example. She stated, “Ellie’s really funny. 
When we were going swimming she sat down and she had a towel on and she went 
around and I said what are you doing and she said, ‘I forgot I was pretending to be 
batman today’.” While a child with NIC described her friend as kind, citing that every 
time she fell down her friend would help her up and hug her. Finally, a third child 
explained that her friend was nice because she shared her toys and lipstick.  
  Partial support was obtained for the prediction that mentalistic descriptions 
would be associated with children’s earlier ToM abilities but would not relate to 
concurrent performance on ToM tasks. ToM performance at 51 months was found to 
predict unique variance in children’s tendency to include at least one mentalistic 
description, but ToM at 51 months did not predict the number of mentalistic descriptions 
used. Study 2’s finding that children’s spontaneous use of mental state terms to describe 
their best friend did not relate to their current ToM ability concurs with studies on 
children’s ToM performance and internal-state language in non-interactional contexts 
(Charman & Shmueli-Goetz, 1998; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995). The findings 
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reported here also replicate those of Meins et al. (2006), who reported null relations 
between mentalistic descriptions of friends and ToM performance in children aged 7 to 9 
years.  
The results of Study 2 support the notion that the “tendency to focus on internal 
states taps into different underlying capacities to those that determine ToM performance” 
(Meins et al., 2006, p. 193), but also have the potential to refine our understanding of the 
relation between children’s basic ToM performance and their tendency to use this 
understanding when representing people and their behaviour. It was proposed that the 
initial focus on mental states would result in children being more likely to focus on 
people’s mental qualities as important determinants of their behaviour. Advanced 
understanding of mind at an age when children are only just beginning to acquire a 
representational ToM (i.e., 51 months) may result in children naturally tending to focus 
on people’s mental qualities. Thus, it may be precocity in children’s ToM understanding 
that determines the extent to which children represent and describe people with reference 
to their mental characteristics. In support of this suggestion, Ruffman et al. (2002) 
reported that it was only children’s early use of internal-state talk (at mean age 3) that 
predicted their later emotion understanding: later internal state talk (at age 3 ½) had no 
such facilitatory effect.  
The results of Study 2 lead to the question, “why might having an IC relate to 
children’s ability to exploit their knowledge of internal states?” One reason may lie in the 
facility to deal with unseen traits that having an IC requires. Because children with ICs 
are familiar with friends that are unseen and that must be described to their peers or 
parents, this could steer the focus of descriptions toward more salient unseen 
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characteristics. For example, many of the children in Study 1 were able to describe things 
that they liked about their IC as well as things that they did not like. One child liked her 
IC because she could talk to it about everything and so this gave her an outlet for 
emotional expression, while another child did not like his IC because he was naughty and 
smashed up a flower bed. This ability spontaneously to focus on inner traits and to 
describe the IC in terms of their unseen characteristics may be one of the results of 
possessing an IC. If this is the case, one might predict that children with POs will be 
more likely than those with ICs to focus on describing their POs in terms of inner traits 
because others are able to see what the PO looks like, so the child does not have to 
explain their outer appearance. This tendency to focus on the PO’s internal states may 
then generalise to describing real friends in terms of their mentalistic characteristics. 
Future research should investigate this possibility by recruiting sufficiently large samples 
of children with POs and ICs, and establishing whether they differ in the extent to which 
they spontaneously describe both their imaginary and real-life friends with reference to 
their internal states. 
The second reason that IC children could be more adept at spontaneously focusing 
on friend’s internal states in their descriptions could lie in their superior communication 
and narrative abilities (Bouldin, et al., 2002; Roby & Kidd, 2008; Trionfi & Reese, 2009). 
Although (contrary to Study 1’s finding that there was a marginal relationship between 
IC status and BPVS score) IC children’s receptive vocabulary does not differ from NIC 
children’s, IC-group children appear better able to utilise their language skills to provide 
richer narrative accounts (Trionfi & Reese, 2009) and to convey crucial information to 
the listener in a referential communication paradigm (Roby & Kidd, 2008). Providing 
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information on the best friend’s mentalistic characteristics may thus be a function of the 
IC-group children’s general tendency to provide richer descriptions rather than a 
tendency to favour mentalistic qualities per se. The fact that the results of Study 2 showed 
that children with ICs provided more overall descriptions of their best friends than did 
their NIC-group peers is in line with this suggestion. However, the relation between IC 
status and mentalistic descriptions of best friends still held once the number of non-
mentalistic descriptions had been controlled for.  
It would thus be interesting for future research to investigate whether IC status 
related to children’s specific use of mentalistic language in other contexts (e.g., book 
narration), and to explore whether children who are more likely to describe friends in 
terms of their mentalistic characteristics show superior communication skills in the 
referential paradigm used by Roby and Kidd (2008). Such studies would help tease apart 
the potential effects of IC-status versus superior narrative and communication skills on 
children’s mentalistic descriptions of friends.   
 
  
89 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
Chapter 4 
Imaginary Companions: 
Private Speech: Were you Talking to Me? 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Toward the end of the second year of life, children go through a developmental 
process which enables them to socialise in a completely new way. Vygotsky (1931/1978) 
described this time as follows: 
“The most significant moment in the course of intellectual development, which 
gives birth to the purely human forms of practical and abstract intelligence, occurs 
when speech and practical activity, two previously completely independent lines 
of development, converge” (p. 24).  
Vygotsky is referring to children’s ability use language as a psychological tool, an ability 
that is unique to humans and important in enabling the child to participate in social and 
cultural activities (Vygotsky, 1931/1978).  
With the development of speech, children also begin to generate spontaneous 
utterances which are overtly vocalised and sometimes partially covert (e.g., inaudible 
muttering or whispers), but appear to have no communicative purpose. This type of 
speech was first observed and analysed by Piaget (1926) in two 6-year-olds in a 
classroom setting. Piaget called these utterances egocentric speech, and theorised that this 
type of speech was further evidence of preoperational children’s inability to take the 
90 
perspective of another. Egocentric speech was conceptualised by Piaget as manifesting 
undirected or “autistic” thought, and thus playing no essential role in child development, 
being merely speech for the child’s sake, which is incomprehensible to others and closer 
to a verbal dream than a conscious activity. Furthermore he commented on the way that, 
in this type of speech, the mind is “allowed to float about at the mercy of free association 
until two propositions are brought together which originally had nothing in common” 
(Piaget, 1926/1959, p.158). In a simplistic sense, Piaget conceptualised egocentric speech 
as preparation for social language. With development, a child would replace egocentric 
speech with fully mature and effective social speech. Piaget comments: “An adult thinks 
socially even when he is alone, the child under 7 thinks egocentrically, even in the 
society of others” (Piaget, 1926/1959, p.40).  
Vygotsky took issue with Piaget’s position, asserting that there was in fact a 
developmental purpose for this type of self-directed speech (Vygotsky, 1931/1997b). In 
Vygotsky’s view, thought, language, and behaviour are inextricably related. Vygotsky 
distinguished between elementary mental functions (cognitive processes, such as non-
mediated memory and non-voluntary attention, that humans share with other species) and 
higher mental functions (cognitive processes exclusive to humans, such as mediated 
memory). Unlike elementary mental functions, higher mental functions are semiotically 
mediated, primarily by language. Vygotsky saw egocentric speech as originating from the 
social world (rather than the child’s mind) and becoming internalised to form symbolic 
inner speech or verbal thought. Consequently, Vygotsky maintained that egocentric 
speech was the mediational mechanism via which higher mental functions developed in 
early childhood, and was the way station between social speech and one’s own symbolic, 
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condensed inner speech. Thus, like Piaget, Vygotsky argued that the incidence of 
egocentric speech will peak in the preoperational years and disappear by middle 
childhood. However, while Piaget attributed its disappearance to the child overcoming 
their egocentrism and replacing this immature form of speech with social conversation, 
Vygotsky (1931/1986) proposed that egocentric speech did not disappear, but instead was 
internalised to form inner speech. 
Although Vygotsky disagreed with Piaget on the developmental role of self-
directed speech, he maintained Piaget’s term egocentric speech. It was not until 1966 that 
Flavell coined the term psychologists now use to describe this form of child self-talk: 
private speech. Modern research on private speech has found strong support for the 
curvilinear inverted-U shaped developmental trajectory (e.g., Berk & Garvin, 1984; 
Winsler & Naglieri, 2003), and for Vygotsky’s contention that private speech is 
internalised to form inner speech (Diaz & Berk, 1992; Montero, 2006). Indeed, the 
degree of internalisation of private speech has been formalised into a three-level coding 
scheme (Diaz & Berk, 1992), going from task-irrelevant speech through overt task-
relevant, self-guiding comments to more covert whispering and lip movements. 
Moreover, there is good evidence that private speech is used universally to regulate 
behaviour, regardless of the child’s socio-cultural context (Al-Namlah et al., 2006; Berk 
& Garvin, 1984; Diaz, Neal, & Vachio, 1991), with evidence that developmental 
disorders such as ADHD merely delay the internalisation of private speech rather than 
prevent children from using such speech to regulate their behaviour (Berk & Landau, 
1993, Berk & Potts, 1991; Winsler, Manfra, & Diaz, 2007). However, research has 
highlighted how private speech continues to be used as an aid to behavioural regulation 
92 
into adolescence (e.g., Kronk, 1994) and adulthood (e.g., Duncan & Cheyne, 2002; John-
Steiner, 1992; Sánchez & de la Mata, 2006). Adults self-report the use of private speech 
for different functions, but use private speech in ways similar to children when engaging 
in cognitively challenging tasks (Duncan & Cheyne, 1999; Sánchez & de la Mata, 2006).  
Despite evidence for the universality of private speech, there are individual 
differences in its use which have been linked to various social-environmental factors. 
Given that Vygotsky highlighted the social origin of private speech, a richer social 
environment would be expected to relate to more advanced private speech. Higher 
incidence of advanced private speech use in children has been found to be associated with 
(a) authoritative parenting style (Behrend & Rosengren, 1992; Winsler, Feder, Way, & 
Manfra, 2006), (b) higher socioeconomic status (Berk & Garvin, 1984), and (c) higher 
education level of the participant (Sánchez & de la Mata, 2006). Conversely, delays in 
private speech development have been reported in children whose early social 
experiences have been restricted. For example, children being brought up in low-income 
Appalachian families, a culture where adult–child verbal communication is restricted, 
show delays in private speech (Berk & Garvin, 1984), as do children from low-income 
families with a history of abuse (Diaz et al., 1991). There is also evidence of poverty of 
private and inner speech in individuals with autism (Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994), a 
disorder associated with characteristic impairments in social interaction and language.  
These findings all clearly support Vygotsky’s argument for the social origin of 
private speech, but individual differences in private speech development have only been 
investigated with reference to developmental disorder or broad-based social and 
environmental factors, with more fine-grained differences between children being largely 
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ignored. The main aim of the study reported in this chapter was to investigate how 
enrichment of the child’s social environment in the form of having an IC related to the 
sophistication and content of children’s private speech. If Vygotsky’s argument that 
private speech develops out of social speech is correct, having an IC would be expected 
to be positively associated with private speech due to the fact that children with ICs will 
engage in social interaction with their IC over and above interaction with caregivers and 
peers. 
There are a number of additional reasons for proposing that ICs will relate to 
children’s private speech. First, ICs and private speech have both been associated with 
children’s ToM performance. As discussed in Chapter 1, in comparison with their NIC 
peers, there is evidence that children with ICs perform better on ToM tasks (Taylor et al., 
1997, although see Fernyhough et al., 2007, for non-replication). As noted by Astington 
and Baird (2005), researchers have for many years discussed the implications of 
children’s conversational engagement for their ToM development. The empirical work of 
Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, and Youngblade (1991), and the theoretical 
perspective of Harris (1996, 1999), highlight conversational pragmatics as the driving 
force for children developing an awareness of people’s different epistemic states. In 
contrast, de Villiers and de Villiers (2000) argued that conversational language facilitates 
ToM understanding because both complex syntax and ToM require a grasp of 
complementation.  
Given these historical links between conversational language and ToM, it is 
surprising that only one empirical study has investigated links between children’s own 
tendency spontaneously to talk in the form of private speech and its relation with ToM 
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performance. Fernyhough and Meins (2009) examined the fluid and dynamic link 
between these two variables in a study involving three age groups of children. High 
levels of overt self-regulatory private speech in young children will equate to more 
advanced private speech development, whereas the same high levels in older children 
will indicate less advanced private speech development given that private speech 
becomes internalised over the course of development. Fernyhough and Meins found the 
relation between private speech and ToM to change as a function of the child’s age. Self-
regulatory private speech was positively associated with ToM performance in 3- to 4-
year-olds, but there was no association between these variables in 4- to 5-year-olds, and a 
negative association in 5- to 6-year-olds. These results suggest that precocious 
development of private speech relates to superior understanding of mind.  
A developed ToM alone is not enough to explain why private speech should be 
qualitatively different in an exceptionally imaginative child. Linguistic practice in the 
form of dialogic narrative between the child and the IC should also impact on private 
speech differently in a child who engages in communication during fantasy play. Studies 
analysing language skills in IC children have shown them to have more mature language 
(although they do not excel in basic vocabulary) (Trionfi & Reese, 2009), enhanced 
socio-cognitive (Bouldin, et al., 2002), and referential communication (Roby & Kidd, 
2008) skills. Trionfi and Reese (2009) reported that IC and NIC children did not differ in 
their receptive (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-IIIB; Dunn et al., 1997) or expressive 
(Expressive Vocabulary Test; Williams, 1997) vocabularies (although these results are 
inconsistent with Study 1’s finding that there was a marginal relationship between 
receptive vocabulary and children’s IC status), but IC children produced richer narrative 
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accounts than their NIC peers both when telling a story and when narrating a personally-
experienced past event. In particular, IC children were more likely to use dialogue in their 
stories, and more likely to use temporal-locative-causal markers in their past event 
narratives compared with children in the NIC group. Similarly, Bouldin et al. (2002) 
found that children with ICs used more compound sentences, relative clauses, and 
adverbial clauses in their narratives.  
Roby and Kidd (2008) investigated relations between IC status and children’s 
language use using an experimental referential communication paradigm (Camaioni, 
Ercolani, & Lloyd, 1995), which assessed the child’s ability both to convey and to 
process linguistic information. The stimuli in each trial consisted of pictures of the same 
object varying on two or more dimensions, for example pictures of the same clown with a 
red or green collar, and wearing each of two different hats. In the speaker condition, the 
child was required to describe a particular picture identified by a red border in order for 
the experimenter (who was behind a barrier) to select the correct picture. In the listening 
condition, children had to select the picture when they were given either an ambiguous or 
unambiguous description. Roby and Kidd found no IC-related differences in children’s 
performance on the listening condition, but IC children were better able than their NIC 
peers to identify a specific referent (e.g., the green collar) and to avoid describing 
redundant features in the speaker condition. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that IC children may have a better 
understanding of the informational requirements of conversation. If private speech 
develops from social speech, the increased sophistication and conversational competence 
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of IC children’s social speech thus provide further grounds for hypothesising that the 
private speech of children with ICs will differ from that of their NIC counterparts.  
 
How might these differences in private speech use best be characterised? It may 
be that the presence of an IC and the greater opportunities for dialogic self-talk that an IC 
affords will facilitate the internalisation of private speech. One would thus hypothesise 
that children with ICs will engage in more sophisticated forms of private speech, 
indicating greater internalisation than their NIC peers. In addition, IC status may relate to 
the content and structure of the child’s private speech. For example, engaging in dialogue 
with and about their ICs may improve children’s narrative abilities or relate to a tendency 
to include more fantasy-related talk in their private speech. These alternatives raise the 
issue of the context in which private speech is observed. 
Private speech has typically been elicited and examined in two main contexts. 
First, it is common for experimenters to use cognitive tasks to elicit private speech in the 
classroom or developmental laboratory. For example, Fernyhough and Fradley (2005) 
reported that 89% of the children in their sample used private speech while engaged in 
solving problems on the Tower of London (an executive planning task that can be varied 
in difficulty), and found that children were most likely to use private speech while 
completing moderately difficult tasks. Observing private speech during challenging 
cognitive tasks is ideal for investigating children’s use of task-related private speech, and 
the extent to which such speech relates to task success. 
Private speech can also be observed in more naturalistic play settings. In a study 
performed by Winsler et al. (2006), parents reported more private speech occurring in 
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children’s fantasy play than during problem-solving activities. Kraft and Berk (1998) 
suggest that while play may not be as strictly goal-directed as cognitive tasks, it may be 
more fluid in its ability to produce private speech, because in effect, the goal is 
determined by the child and can be changed according to what the child wants the 
outcome to entail. Private speech may differ in play situations, not just according to what 
goals children set for themselves, but also with the presence or absence of a toy, which 
can provide a physical outlet for the imagination of the child (Olszewski & Fuson, 1982). 
For this reason, the content as well as the function of private speech may differ when the 
child moves between problem-solving and play contexts. Private speech during play is 
well suited to investigations into the content and fantasy-orientation of spontaneously 
occurring speech. Consequently, we chose to observe private speech during free play in 
order to explore how children’s IC status related both to the content of their private 
speech and its level of internalisation.  Focusing on private speech in a play context 
enabled us to investigate whether the tendency for IC children to include dialogue and 
more complicated linguistic utterances observed in narrative tasks (Bouldin et al., 2002; 
Trionfi & Reese, 2009) was also evident in their spontaneous private speech. 
In summary, the aim of the study reported in this chapter was to investigate how a 
child’s creation of an IC related to their private speech in terms of (a) production, (b) 
degree of internalisation or structure, and (c) content. It was hypothesised that having an 
IC would be associated with verbosity, greater internalisation of private speech, more 
sophisicated narrative structure, and more fantasy content. Study 3 will continue to 
address the issue of how children’s IC status may impact upon the development of  their 
cognitions as well as the development of self and other knowledge through children’s self 
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talk. Conclusions will be drawn about how children with and without ICs may represent 
themselves and others.  
 
4.2  Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
 Participants were 148 children (74 girls) aged between 59 and 64 months 
(mean age 61.3 months), the majority of whom had participated in Study 2. The 
additional children in Study 3 were those who had not completed the friend description 
task used in Study 2. As in Study 2, the author was not responsible for data collection 
given that the testing sessions were part of an ESRC-funded project, but transcribed, 
coded, and analysed the private speech data used in Study 3. 
4.2.2 Procedure and Materials 
Children’s private speech was assessed from a free play session at the 
University’s developmental laboratories. The private speech assessment formed part of a 
2-hour testing session involving the child and mother. The IC interview was conducted in 
a separate testing session in a quiet area in the child’s school as described in Study 2 (see 
p. 65). 
Children’s Private Speech Production 
To assess children’s production and content of private speech, children were 
observed while involved in free play. Past studies have utilised naturalistic observation of 
play aimed at elicitation of private speech, and found that this method works well in 
observing children’s production of private speech (Kraft & Berk, 1998; Olszewski, 1987; 
Olszewski & Fuson, 1982; Winsler, Carlton, & Barry, 2000).  
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The private speech assessment immediately followed on from an imaginative 
narrative co-construction task which involved both the mother and child. In this task, the 
mother was provided with a basic script that focused on the opening of an ice-cream 
shop, and the dyad’s task was to engage in joint pretence, elaborating on the basic script. 
A range of toys and props were provided to facilitate the joint pretence:  
(a) Plastic ice cream in different colours and in different clear plastic containers 
(b) Ice cream scoop, cups, spoons, napkins, and a mix of metal and plastic containers that 
would have sprinkles and sauces inside  
(c) Wooden shop front with flavours written on the front 
(d) A till which made sound effects and had paper money and plastic coins inside 
(e) A stuffed teddy and a dog 
(f) A table and chairs 
Other toys available to the children included: 
(g) A builder’s tool set with a hard hat 
(h) A set of Lego blocks 
The joint pretence task varied in length, and ended when the mother and child 
indicated that they were finished. The experimenter then gave the mother a booklet of 
questionnaires to complete, and directed her to sit on a chair in the corner of the testing 
room. The experimenter then told the child that they could continue playing with the toys 
so that their mother could complete the questionnaires. If the child was reluctant to 
continue playing, the experimenter would encourage them by asking if she could be a 
customer at the shop, and asked if she could have an ice-cream. When the child agreed, 
the experimenter sat in the corner near the mother and had minimal interaction with the 
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child. The session ended when the mother finished filling out the questionnaire. Because 
mothers varied in the length of time it took them to complete the questionnaire, the time 
taken to observe each child (the observation time) varied. Children were filmed 
throughout the session by two remote-control cameras mounted on opposite walls of the 
testing room. The cameras provided a clear view of the child’s face throughout the 
session. The average observation time was 306 seconds, with times ranging from 120 to 
840 seconds. 
Children’s speech during the session was first divided into discrete utterances. An 
utterance was defined as a unit of speech containing no temporal or semantic 
discontinuities. A temporal discontinuity was defined as a pause of at least 2 seconds, 
while a semantic discontinuity was defined as a change in content regardless of whether it 
was preceded by a pause. Each utterance was first coded as social or private using criteria 
outlined by Winsler, Fernyhough, McClaren, and Way (2004) in the Private Speech 
Coding Manual. This manual is used extensively in the field and works as a living 
manual in which new and up to date research on private speech coding can be included 
with proper scientific justification.  
Social utterances: These are utterances which are addressed to a social partner (the 
mother or experimenter) as indicated by the following markers: 
Eye Contact - Child shows sustained eye contact with mother or experimenter 
during exchange. 
Behavioural - Child’s behaviour involves the experimenter or mother through 
gaze direction or physical contact, or if mother or experimenter’s behaviour 
involves the child within two seconds of the utterance. 
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Content markers - The child’s utterance had the same topic as the mother’s or 
experimenter’s preceding utterance, or if the child addressed the mother or 
experimenter by using their name in a question. 
Temporal Contiguity - the utterance occurred less than 2 seconds after any other 
social utterance. 
 
Private utterances: These were any utterances that did not meet any of the above criteria 
for social utterances. Children’s private speech utterances were transcribed verbatim, and 
each child was given a score for the total frequency of private speech utterances. 
Each private speech utterance was then further coded using a scheme that can be 
found in the Private Speech Coding Manual using criteria previously described by 
Winsler, De Leon, Wallace, Carlton, & Willson-Quayle (2003), adapted from Diaz, 
Winsler, Atencio, & Harbers (1992) and Winsler (1998). This scheme is a standard 
measure used in private speech coding and has shown high inter-rater reliability (Winsler, 
et al., 2003). This scheme defines 11 mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. The 
categories are: 
1) Exclamations - Typically one word expressions of affect or expletives (e.g., ‘Oh!’ 
‘Oops!’ ‘Ha!’ ‘Woah!’). 
2) Non-words - Sound effects, wordplay, humming (e.g., ‘Hmmm,’ ‘Vroom,’ explosion 
noises). 
3) Descriptions of the Self - Statements about the child’s state or behaviour (e.g., ‘I’m 
looking for blue,’ ‘I found a fish,’ ‘I’m hungry,’ ‘I want the strawberry,’ ‘Silly me,’ ‘I 
like this!’).  
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4) Descriptions of the Environment/Task - Statements about the child’s surroundings or 
the task (e.g., ‘They’re the same colour,’ ‘A blue one,’ ‘It’s hot in here,’ ‘It’s all done,’ 
counting items). 
5) Evaluative or Motivational Statements - Statements about the child’s ability, 
performance, or motivation; self-reinforcement or deprecation; evaluation of the task 
(e.g., ‘I did it,’ ‘I’m good at this,’ ‘Good,’ ‘This is easy’). 
6) Plans/Hypothetical Reasoning - Planning or future-oriented statements; if-then 
constructions (e.g., ‘I need a purple one,’ ‘I’ll do this first,’ ‘If I put this here‘). 
7) Commands to the Self - Explicit instructions to the self with imperative verb 
constructions (e.g., ‘Pick them up,’ ‘Don’t put that one,’ ‘Get one more’). 
8) Questions/Answers - Questions addressed to the self or clear answers to one’s own 
questions (e.g., ‘Which one should I put next?’ ‘This one,’ ‘Where’s the blue?’ ‘Is that 
right?’).  
9) Transitional Statements - reflective utterances which had to do with ending one 
activity and starting another (e.g., ‘So,’ ‘Then,’ ‘Next,’ ‘OK,’ ‘There’). 
10) Fantasy Related/Dialogue - Any statements with a fantasy theme (e.g. ‘Yum, Yum,’ 
‘I’m going to be rich, this is going to be great!’ ‘Teddy wants an ice cream,’ ‘We’re 
opening the shop’); any dialogue in which the child addressed the stuffed animals or 
other toys or spoke on behalf of the animals or toys (e.g., ‘What do you want teddy?’, 
‘I’d like strawberry please’) or spoke in a different voice. 
11) Private Speech on its way to Internalisation - Whispering, lip movements, and 
unintelligible speech. This category was not coded for content given that it was 
impossible to discern what children were saying.  
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 Children received a frequency score for the number of private speech utterances 
falling into each of the 11 categories. 
 Private speech content was coded by a researcher blind to IC status and all other 
measures, with a randomly selected 20% of sessions being coded by a second blind 
researcher. Inter-rater agreement was κ = 0.92. 
Theory of Mind Performance 
A battery of ToM tasks was administered to each child at 50 and 61 months. 
Details on the battery can be found in section 2.2.2, and full details on the protocol for 
administering the ToM battery are given in Appendix 2. 
Imaginary Companion Interview 
The IC interview was described in detail in Study 2 (see pp. 65, 67-68). The 
interview was run at 61 months in the children’s school. There were an additional 4 
children who participated in Study 3 who had a parentally-corroborated IC, making a 
total of 35 children in the IC group. 
Maternal Education 
Mothers completed a questionnaire indicating their highest educational 
qualification. Maternal education level was measured on a scale from 1–7: 1, No 
examinations; 2, CSEs; 3, GCSEs or O-Levels; 4, A-Levels; 5, Further qualification, not 
to degree level (e.g., nursing); 6, undergraduate degree; and 7, postgraduate 
qualifications. 
Receptive Verbal Ability 
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Children’s receptive verbal ability was assessed at 51 months using the BPVS 
(Dunn et al., 1997) to control for any relations between verbal ability and children’s 
private speech.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses 
Of the 148 children, in total 35 stated that they had an IC that was corroborated by 
their parent; 13 in the IC group were POs; 18 children (16 of whom were in the NIC 
group) failed to use any private speech during the observation. Table 4.1 shows the 
means scores for all variables. 
  
105 
 
Table 4-1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for All Variables  
 
 Range Means 
Total Private Speech Utterances  86 11.48 (13.72) 
Exclamations 10 0.77 (1.43) 
Non-Words 37 1.99 (3.99) 
Descriptions of the Self 6 0.58 (1.20) 
Descriptions of the Environment/Task 12 1.48 (2.37) 
Evaluative/Motivational Statements 6 0.41 (1.02) 
Plans/Hypothetical reasoning 16 0.76 (1.78) 
Commands to the Self 8 0.54 (1.26) 
Questions/Answers 4 0.33 (0.72) 
Transitional Statements 5 0.43 (0.94) 
Fantasy Related 44 2.32 (5.00) 
Lip Movements or Unintelligible  24 1.81 (3.46) 
BPVS Standardised Score at 50 months 43-166 103.64 (14.71) 
Maternal Education 1-7 4.73 (1.31) 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses  
All private speech ranges minimums are 0  
 
As shown in Table 4.1, several of the sub-types of private speech occurred at low 
frequencies. Consequently, sub-types assessing similar aspects of private speech were 
amalgamated as follows: (a) Exclamations and Non-words were summed; (b) 
Descriptions of self, Evaluative/motivational statements, Plans/hypothetical reasoning, 
Commands to self, and Questions/answers were summed to form a Self-related private 
speech category; and (c) Descriptions of the environment/task and Transitional 
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statements were summed to form an Other-related private speech category. Data for all 
private speech categories were non-normally distributed. 
 Spearman’s rho correlations showed that scores for overall amount of private 
speech and all private speech categories were unrelated to (a) children’s BPVS scores, ρs 
< .12, p >.560, n.s, and (b) mothers’ educational level, ρs < .12, p > .326, n.s.. Parametric 
analyses were used below since the F test is robust against violations of normality as long 
as there are at least 20 degrees of freedom (Tabachnick & Fidel, 2007). 
IC status was unrelated to children’s BPVS scores (see Table 4.2 for the relevant 
mean scores), t(125) = 0.62, p = .534, n.s., d = 0.04, replicating Trionfi and Reese’s 
(2009) findings. 
4.3.2 Imaginary Companion Status and Private Speech 
Table 4.2 shows the mean scores for the private speech categories as a function of 
IC status and gender. 
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Table 4-2 Means and Standard Deviations for Private Speech Categories as a Function of Imaginary 
Companion Status and Gender 
 IC 
Overall 
IC Girls IC Boys NIC 
Overall 
NIC 
Girls 
NIC 
Boys 
Overall Private Speech 18.29  
 
(20.09) 
14.78 
 
 (16.34) 
22.00 
 
 (23.35) 
9.37  
 
(10.28) 
9.46  
 
(10.81) 
9.28 
 
 (9.83) 
 
Non-Words 3.86  
 
(6.87) 
1.39 
 
 (1.58) 
6.47 
 
 (9.15) 
2.42 
 
 (3.41) 
2.52 
 
 (3.84) 
2.32 
 
 (2.97) 
 
Self Private Speech 3.88  
 
(4.36) 
3.83 
 
 (4.00) 
3.94 
 
 (4.84) 
2.22  
 
(3.85) 
2.11 
 
 (4.23) 
2.33 
 
 (3.48) 
 
Other Private Speech 2.14 
 
 (3.54) 
2.00 
 
 (3.16) 
2.29  
 
(4.00) 
1.83 
 
 (2.68) 
1.82 
 
 (2.34) 
1.84 
 
 (2.99) 
 
Fantasy Related 3.71 
 
 (8.46) 
2.06 
 
 (5.83) 
5.47  
 
(10.47) 
1.89 
 
 (3.20) 
1.84 
 
 (3.28) 
1.95 
 
 (3.15) 
 
Lip 
Movement/Unintelligible  
4.57 
 
 (5.76) 
5.22 
 
 (6.52) 
3.88  
 
(4.92) 
0.96 
 
 (1.60) 
1.09 
 
 (1.78) 
0.82  
 
(1.40) 
BPVS Standardised Score 
at 50 Months 
104.06 
 
 (17.06) 
98.83  
 
(19.86) 
110.33 
 
 (10.45) 
103.50 
 
 (14.00) 
104.10 
 
 (16.03) 
102.95 
 
 (11.89) 
Maternal Education  5.48 
 
 (1.18) 
5.44 
 
 (1.46) 
5.54 
 
 (0.78) 
4.51 
 
 (5.48) 
4.37 
 
 (1.22) 
4.67 
 
 (1.32) 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses  
 
First, the relation between IC status and children’s overall amount of private 
speech was investigated using a 2(IC, NIC) × 2(male, female) one-way ANCOVA, with 
observation time, maternal educational level, and BPVS scores entered as covariates. 
There was a main effect of IC status, F(1, 119) = 4.76, p < .05, η
2
 = .040, but no effect of 
gender, F(1, 119) = 0.41, p = .522, n.s., η
2
 = .003, and no IC status × gender interaction, 
F(1, 119) = 0.21, p = .648, n.s., η
2
 = .002. In support of our first hypothesis, a post-hoc 
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one-way ANCOVA (controlling for observation time) showed that children in the IC 
group engaged in more private speech than did their counterparts in the NIC group, F(1, 
144) = 8.66, p < .005. 
 The relation between IC status and the sub-types of children’s private speech was 
investigated using a 2(IC, NIC) × 2(male, female) MANCOVA, with the five private 
speech categories (non-words/exclamations, self-related, other-related, fantasy-oriented, 
unintelligible) as the dependent variables and observation time, maternal educational 
level, and BPVS scores entered as covariates. There was a main effect of IC status, F(1, 
115) = 5.18, p < .001, a marginally significant trend for a main effect of gender, F(1, 115) 
= 2.12, p = .068, and no IC status × gender interaction, F(1, 115) = 1.88, p = .103, n.s.. 
Looking at the separate categories of private speech, main effects of IC status, F(1, 119) 
= 23.78, p < .001, η
2
 = .144, and gender, F(1, 119) = 5.09, p < .05, η
2
 = .031 were seen 
specifically for the covert private speech category. 
Post hoc one-way ANCOVAs (controlling for observation time) further explored 
these group differences in covert private speech. Children in the IC group were found to 
engage in more covert private speech than their NIC-group counterparts, F(1, 144) = 
36.36, p < .001, η
2
 = .252, but girls (M=2.09, SD=3.94) and boys  (M=1.53, SD=2.92) did 
not differ in their use of covert private speech F(1, 144) = 1.01, p = .316, n.s., η
2
 = .007. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
The aim of the study reported in this chapter was to assess the extent to which 
private speech production, internalisation, and content related to children’s IC status. As 
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hypothesised, compared with NIC-group children, those who had an IC engaged in more 
overall private speech, and in more covert private speech (indicative of greater 
internalisation). However, IC status was not found to relate to the extent to which 
children engaged in fantasy-oriented private speech.  The observed relations between IC 
status and private speech were independent of gender, maternal education, and children’s 
receptive verbal abilities. 
The main prediction of Study 3 was that IC status would relate to differences in 
private speech in three areas: production, structure and internalisation, and content. 
Children’s overall production of private speech was indeed related to their IC status, with 
IC-group children engaging in more private speech than their NIC peers during free play. 
There was a large effect (Cohen, 1988) for the relation between IC status and children’s 
engagement in covert private speech, which suggests that the difference between the IC 
and NIC groups with respect to overall private speech production is likely to have been 
driven by the specific group differences on this particular category of private speech.  
These results provide support for Vygotsky’s (1931/1986) claim that private 
speech evolves out of social speech, because presumably children with ICs have provided 
themselves with more opportunity to engage in social exchanges. The fact that the main 
effect of IC status was seen specifically for covert private speech – the most internalised 
form – suggests that having an IC is associated with accelerated development of private 
speech. As children mature, private speech becomes increasingly covert and is eventually 
internalised completely to form inner speech. The results of Study 3 show that children 
with ICs were more advanced in the process of internalisation of private speech 
compared with their NIC-group peers. It could be argued that the observed group 
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differences in private speech may be accounted for by the fact that IC children are likely 
to be more comfortable with speaking to their IC, and therefore have become more adept 
at speaking out loud during play periods. However, there were no IC-related differences 
in fantasy content, so this argument does not seem plausible.  
The findings of Study 3 replicate and extend existing research on relations 
between children’s IC status and their use of language. In line with previous studies, but 
at odds with Study 1’s findings (Roby & Kidd, 2008; Trionfi & Reese, 2009), no 
differences between the IC and NIC groups were found in children’s general verbal 
ability as assessed on the BPVS. Instead, a relation was found between IC status and 
children’s use of language. Roby and Kidd reported that IC-group children 
communicated critical information more effectively than their NIC-group counterparts 
during a referential communication task, and Trionfi and Reese found that having an IC 
related positively to narrative complexity in children’s accounts of personally 
experienced events. The results of Study 3 showed that having an IC is associated with 
children using more advanced forms of private speech to regulate their behaviour during 
free play.  
The findings presented in this chapter also extend previous research on private 
speech and creativity. Although Study 3 is the first to explore relations between 
children’s IC status and their private speech, Daugherty and colleagues (Daugherty, 
White, & Manning, 1994; White & Daugherty, 2009) investigated how 3- to 6-year-olds’ 
creativity related to their private speech. Creativity was assessed using the Torrance 
Creativity Test (Torrance, 1981) which measures children’s creative thinking across a 
range of verbal and non-verbal tasks, yielding scores for fluency, originality, and 
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imagination. Private speech was assessed during a separate spatial problem-solving task. 
Daugherty et al. (1994) and White and Daughterty (2009) reported that children’s scores 
for all three measures of creativity were positively associated with the two most 
sophisticated forms of private speech: “coping/reinforcing” private speech (comments 
that praised, encouraged, or reinforced behaviour relevant to completing the task) and 
“solving” private speech (comments to indicate that a particular behaviour or strategy 
was successful). Conversely, private speech that did not serve to facilitate task 
performance was negatively related with all three measures of creativity. Given that 
children with ICs are more highly imaginative than their NIC counterparts, the findings 
of Study 3 and those of Daugherty and colleagues highlight a positive association 
between imaginative creativity and the level of sophistication of private speech (both in 
the context of completing cognitively challenging tasks and during free play).     
In contrast to the positive association found between having an IC and the level of 
internalisation of private speech,  the results of Study 3 provide no support for the 
hypothesis that IC status will relate to the fantasy content of children’s private speech. In 
the Introduction to this chapter, we considered whether potential relations between IC 
status and children’s private speech would be best characterised in terms of the content of 
their private speech, or the degree to which they had internalised their private speech. The 
results reported in this chapter strongly suggest that IC status is related to the 
internalisation of private speech rather than the topics that children choose to talk about. 
A possible explanation for the null findings when looking at the fantasy content of 
children’s private speech lies in the fact that it was impossible to code the covert private 
speech comments for content, given that these covert comments consisted of verbal lip 
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movements and unintelligible whispering and muttering. Because IC-group children 
produced more covert private speech than their NIC counterparts, less is known about 
precisely what the children in the IC group were talking about. Consequently, it is not 
possible on the basis of the results of Study 3 to make firm conclusions about how IC 
status relates to the fantasy content of children’s private speech. Future research could 
address this issue by attempting to make high-quality recordings of children’s covert 
private speech. For example, children could wear personal microphones during the play 
session so that whispering and muttering could be recorded more clearly.  
Throughout this study it has been argued that having an IC provides children with 
an enriched social environment. With regard to relations with private speech, having an 
IC was proposed to give the child more numerous opportunities for engaging in social 
dialogue which, in line with Vygotsky’s theory, should facilitate the development of 
private speech. However, it could be that private speech is the driving force behind 
children’s creation of an IC. This opposing directional hypothesis provides an alternative 
way to explain the findings of Study 3.  
Children who are precocious in their private speech development may create an IC 
as an outlet for this self-directed speech. For example, overt private speech has a dialogic 
structure (e.g., Berk & Garvin, 1984; Kohlberg et al., 1968), with children using self-
answered questions and talking on behalf of toys. In addition, private speech and the 
ability to engage in internal dialogue have been linked to certain aspects of creativity 
(Fernyhough, 2009; White & Daugherty, 2009). Indeed, Vygotsky (1931/1987) stated, 
“the development of a child’s imagination, like the development of other higher mental 
functions, is linked in an essential way with the child’s speech” (p. 346). Furthermore, the 
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fact that early private speech is dialogic in nature means that it involves simultaneous 
accommodation of multiple perspectives on reality (Fernyhough, 2008, 2009). This 
interplay of perspectives could result in a child creating an IC as an outlet for a certain 
perspective or “inner voice.” The possibility that some children create an IC to personify 
the other half of this dialogue thus seems reasonable. 
Evidence that children with ICs are more prone to verbal hallucination-like 
experiences (Fernyhough et al., 2007; Pearson et al., 2001) is consistent with this 
proposal. As discussed in Chapter 1, when played voice-like ambiguous stimuli, children 
with ICs were found to be more likely than their NIC counterparts to report hearing 
specific words. It has been proposed that individual differences in the way in which 
private speech is internalised might account for why auditory verbal hallucinations are 
experienced in some individuals beyond childhood (Fernyhough, 2004). Fernyhough 
(2004) proposed two possible models attempting to explain auditory verbal hallucination 
using Vygotsky’s (1931/1997b) theory that inner speech is abbreviated as well as 
semantically transformed while being internalised via private speech. The first of these 
models is the disruption to internalisation model, where the normal internalisation 
process of private to inner speech is disturbed, resulting in inner speech that is not 
completely abbreviated and therefore retains many features of external social dialogue. 
The second is termed the re-expansion model. In this case, inner speech is fully 
internalised, but becomes temporarily re-expanded into dialogue that retains the give-
and-take structure of external dialogue. Both of these models account and allow for 
continuity in the experience of auditory verbal hallucinations between pathological and 
normal populations, although this article clearly favours the re-expansion model. This 
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theory could account for how certain children create their IC to account for their “inner 
voice,” and do in fact “hear” their ICs. Furthermore, on this premise, Fernhough and 
colleagues (2007) argue that experiencing auditory verbal hallucination-like experiences 
is part of being a typically developing child, and such hallucinations only become a 
potential sign of pathology if they continue into adolescence and adulthood. 
On the basis of this account, a child may create an IC in response to this voice-
hearing that is part of the typical process of internalising private speech, rather than the 
interaction with the IC facilitating private speech development or internalisation (Pearson 
et al., 2001). The fact that IC status was related specifically to the most sophisticated 
partially-internalised forms of private speech in Study 3 is in line with this argument. 
Thus, the children who engage in the most creative and imaginative ways with their 
developing inner speech will be those who create an IC, and precocity in private speech 
development may thus play a causal role in IC creation. It is of interest to add that one of 
the children in the thesis stated that their IC lived in their mouth. This could be indicative 
of the child understanding that their voice and the voice of the IC is one and the same. 
Future research could explore this possibility by detailed study of the longitudinal 
development of both private speech and ICs in early childhood. Exploring how the depth 
of IC relates to children’s private speech development will also be important in helping 
establish how these factors relate to one another. For example, one could investigate 
whether the “voices” of POs differ from those of ICs. Devising an interview where the 
child could explain how their IC speaks, and having the child engage in conversation 
with their IC would be helpful in addressing these issues.  
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There are other possible research questions that Study 3 brings to light. For 
example it would be of interest to know what types of private speech may steer a child 
toward IC creation. A second research question that may be of interest to future 
researchers is whether it is only private speech that is elicited in a free play situation, or if 
engagement in private speech in other contexts (e.g., during cognitive planning tasks) 
similarly relates to children’s IC status. Olszewski and Fuson (1982) investigated private 
speech in play settings, examining the different private speech that certain toys evoked, 
and White and Daugherty (2009) examined creativity and its links to self-regulatory 
private speech. However, no studies to date have examined private speech in reference to 
the creation of the IC. In-depth microgenetic studies observing how IC creation and 
children’s private speech in different contexts evolve over time may aid in answering 
these questions of how the context of private speech interacts with the IC creator.
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_____________________________________________________ 
Chapter 5  
Imaginary Companions: Conclusions, Discussions, and Future 
Directions 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
5.1  A Synopsis of the Three Studies Reported in this Thesis 
This thesis presented three studies that investigated how having an IC related to 
children’s performance in four different socio-cognitive domains: interior self-
knowledge, mentalistic representations of friends, private speech, and ToM. The first 
study examined whether children’s IC status related to their tendency to ascribe interior 
self-knowledge to themselves versus an adult authority figure, and to their performance 
on a battery of ToM tasks. Study 1 also investigated whether children’s interior self-
knowledge was related to their basic ToM understanding. Although Study 1 replicated 
Burton and Mitchell’s (2003) finding that children in general are more likely to attribute 
more interior self-knowledge to self than to an adult, the results of Study 1 showed that 
children with ICs were less likely than their NIC peers to attribute interior self-
knowledge to an adult, with a trend for IC-group children also to attribute more interior 
self-knowledge to themselves. Specifically, compared with their NIC counterparts, 
children with ICs were less likely to attribute knowledge to adults in relation to whether 
they felt ill or were dreaming, and were more likely to attribute knowledge to self about 
whether they were having fun or hungry. The performance of children in the IC group 
was at ceiling on these items, with all children attributing the maximum score to 
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themselves for knowledge about whether they were hungry or having fun. Exploratory 
analyses on the sub-group of children with an IC showed a non-significant trend for depth 
of IC characterisation to be positively associated with children’s tendency to ascribe 
interior self-knowledge to themselves.  
In contrast, children’s performance on the ToM battery was found to be unrelated 
to that on the self-knowledge task and to children’s IC status. The null findings on the 
relation between ToM and self-knowledge suggest that basic ToM competence may be 
necessary but not sufficient for grasping the complex understanding of how one has 
privileged access to one’s own internal states. The fact that IC status was unrelated to 
children’s ToM performance in Study 1 is in line with the null findings of Fernyhough et 
al. (2007), but at odds with Taylor and Carlson (1997) who reported that children with 
ICs performed better on ToM tasks than did their NIC peers. 
Although Taylor and Carlson’s (1997) findings that children’s IC status relates 
positively to their ToM performance were not replicated by any of the studies throughout 
this thesis, IC-group children in Study 1, but not Study 2, or 3, scored marginally higher 
(p =.05) on the standardised receptive verbal ability measure compared with their NIC 
counterparts. This finding is concordant with Taylor and Carlson’s findings that children 
in their high fantasy group obtained significantly higher scores on their receptive 
vocabulary measure than the low fantasy group. However, Taylor and Carlson 
statistically controlled for the children’s verbal ability to ensure that the difference in 
ToM between their two fantasy groups was not related to differences in verbal 
intelligence or age rather than fantasy. Furthermore, Taylor and Carlson’s fantasy group 
status was not only dependent upon a child’s IC status, but also other fantasy measures. 
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In other studies, receptive verbal ability has not been found to relate to IC status (e.g., 
Davis, 2006; Fernyhough et al., 2007; Manosevitz et al., 1977; Trionfi & Reese, 2009). A 
more detailed discussion of this inconsistency can be found in section 5.2.    
Study 2 examined whether having an IC related to children’s tendency 
spontaneously to describe their best friend with reference to mentalistic (rather than 
physical, behavioural, or general) characteristics. This study also included measures of 
children’s ToM performance at two time points (earlier to and concurrent with the friend 
descriptions) to investigate whether mentalistic descriptions related to children’s ToM 
performance, and to revisit the question of the relation between IC status and ToM in a 
larger sample of children. Children with ICs were more likely than their NIC peers to 
describe their best friend with reference to mentalistic characteristics both when 
mentalistic descriptions were assessed in terms of overall frequency scores, and in terms 
of dichotomous inclusion of at least one mentalistic characteristic. The relation between 
IC status and mentalistic friend descriptions was independent of children’s receptive 
verbal ability, gender, verbosity, and ToM performance, and of their mothers’ 
educational attainment. Describing a best friend in mentalistic terms was not related to 
children’s concurrent ToM performance (replicating the findings of Meins et al., 2006), 
although the regression analysis showed that previous ToM at 51 months predicted 
unique variance in children’s dichotomous inclusion of at least one mental-state 
description. Like the first study of this thesis, Study 2 failed to find an association 
between IC status and children’s ToM performance, again showing a non-replication of 
the Taylor and Carlson (1997) finding. 
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Study 3’s findings revealed an association between IC status and children’s 
engagement in private speech during free play. Controlling for gender, receptive verbal 
ability, and maternal education, children in the IC group produced more overall private 
speech during the task than did those in the NIC group. The results are in line with 
Vygotsky’s (1931/ 1986) notion that private speech originates from social speech. Further 
analyses using sub-categories of private speech suggested that IC status was related 
specifically to children’s engagement in covert, partially-internalised private speech, with 
this type of private speech being markedly more common in IC-group children compared 
with their NIC counterparts. These results add support to studies suggesting that having 
an IC is positively associated with language maturity (Bouldin et al., 2002; Roby & Kidd, 
2008). Unlike Study 1, Study 3 replicated previous findings that IC status was not related 
to children’s receptive verbal ability as assessed on a standardised measure (Davis, 2006; 
Fernyhough et al., 2007; Manosevitz et al., 1977; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Trionfi & 
Reese, 2009). 
All three studies found no relation between child gender and IC status. Past 
studies have found differences between gender and IC status (Pearson et al., 2001; 
Carlson & Taylor, 2005; Harter & Chao, 1992). The lack of significant results pertaining 
to child gender found in this thesis could be in line with Harter and Chao’s (1992) claim 
that the type of IC created may have more to do with gender differences in the type of IC 
created. These researchers reported that boys were more likely to create super-competent 
ICs possessing physical prowess, whereas girls created ICs whom they could nurture and 
care for. Although no statistical evidence for this is shown in this thesis, when looking at 
independence scores for ICs (Study 1), only boys possessed highly independent ICs. 
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Furthermore, the low numbers of children possessing ICs could have also hindered the 
possibility of being able to see a significant difference if there was in fact a difference in 
gender.   
This chapter will address the potential implications of the studies’ findings; first 
looking at the results across all three studies, and moving on to a discussion of causality, 
followed by the limitations of the three studies that need to be taken into account. Finally, 
future research possibilities will be expanded upon and conclusions will be drawn.    
5.2 Integration Across Empirical Studies 
For years researchers have been trying to understand children’s development and 
the behaviour that accompanies this development of the self and others as they begin to 
view the world as a place filled with separate individuals with minds of their own who 
have different psychological orientations toward both objects and situations in the world 
(Gopnik, 2009; Moore, 2007). How one comes to an understanding of themselves and 
others remains an integral question when examining children at any stage in their 
development of socialisation. 
It is interesting to look at these three IC studies in one thesis, because these studies 
focus on areas of self-other awareness that have not yet been investigated in reference to 
a child’s IC status. Taken together, the results of the three studies reported in this thesis 
begin to draw out a picture of the interrelations between children’s fantasy lives and their 
representations of self and others. Although the three studies all seem to point in the same 
direction, inconsistencies were found when investigating the between group differences 
in receptive verbal ability. Study 1 found that IC children scored marginally higher on 
receptive verbal abilities than their NIC counterparts, while studies 2, and 3 showed no 
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relationship. These inconsistencies could be the result of the differences in experimental 
design. For example, Study 1 was a 1 time data collection at the child’s school, whereas 
the data from Study 2, and 3 come from a larger longitudinal study. The children in Study 
1 were tested by an experimenter that they were not familiar with, while in Study 2 and 3 
children were familiar with the experimenters and the lab where they were tested. 
Furthermore, the inconsistencies may have been a result of power. Only 80 children 
participated in Study 1, while around 140 children were tested in Study 2 and 3. Further 
research into the relationship between receptive verbal abilities and children’s IC status 
may help in answering the questions as to why these inconsistencies were found.  
As a result of these studies, we are able to say that IC status relates to three 
different facets of social cognition, extending previous research that has only investigated 
IC status with reference to a narrow range of cognitive abilities (e.g., ToM). The studies 
reported here also explored the potential mechanisms via which children’s social 
interactions might impact on their understanding of self and others, highlighting 
internalisation of private speech as a candidate for explaining why certain children may 
invent an IC, and how a rich imaginative life might lead to greater understanding of one’s 
own and others’ internal states.  
 
5.3 Issues of Causation 
The three studies reported in this thesis show that IC status relates to children’s (a) 
interior self-knowledge, (b) mentalistic descriptions of best friends, and (c) level of 
internalisation of private speech. This section will set out three possible causal models in 
order to explore different developmental pathways that might account for the observed 
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findings. The first model is based on the argument that the child’s creation of an IC has a 
causal impact on the three domains of social cognition studied and therefore is the main 
driver of cognitive change. The second model is based on the assumption that the child’s 
internalisation of private speech plays a causal role in the child’s creation of an IC and is 
thus the primary driver of social-cognitive change in the domains studied here. The third 
model assumes that the parent’s interactional style acts as an underlying ‘third-factor’ 
relating to the likelihood of the creation of an IC and the child’s development across the 
domains of interior self-knowledge, mentalistic descriptions, and private speech.  
Model 1: Engagement with ICs as a driver of (social-)cognitive change 
 The first model, in which children’s engagement with their ICs has a positive 
causal influence on their social-cognitive development, is the model assumed in the 
majority of studies on children’s ICs (e.g., Roby & Kidd, 2008; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; 
Trionfi & Reese, 2009). Thus far, it has been argued that having an IC gives children 
practice in thinking about the world from another person’s perspective, and that this helps 
these children to appreciate their privileged access to their own internal states, and 
spontaneously to invoke cognitions and emotions when describing other people. A 
second possibility is that the IC acts as a child’s personal ZPD, foreshadowing those 
cognitive functions and social tools which the child will utilise in later development.    
Some examples of the effect that practice in the form of an IC has on a child’s 
understanding of minds can be found in ToM and mental state talk research. It has been 
argued that children’s interaction with their siblings affects their ToM performance and 
that this practice in the form of sibling interaction may be the cause of this improvement 
(Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). However, this literature on sibling interaction has 
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become very complex. When the original data set was re-analysed it was found that only 
older sibling interaction was positively associated with ToM performance (Ruffman, 
Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998), suggesting that the type of interaction between 
siblings is important to this development. This research paired with recent research which 
has also established that birth order can correlate with ToM ability, shows that the more 
siblings are able to interact, the better they become at understanding others’ minds 
(Farhadian, Abdullah, Mansor, Redzuan, Kumar, & Gazanizad, 2010). Family mental 
state talk and children’s exposure to feeling state conversations also contribute to 
children’s later understanding of minds (Dunn et al., 1991).  
 The above research is significant with regard to this thesis because it grounds the 
suggestion that children with ICs have the opportunity to engage in social practice above 
and beyond that of their peers since they do not need another person with whom to 
interact. The fact that the IC continually enables the child to interact not only in a 
physical sense (e.g., speaking with the IC, pulling up chairs for the IC) but also mentally 
(e.g., thinking about what the IC might want to do, or how the IC would feel) provides 
the child with more developed abilities to introspect as well as to hone their ability to 
think about others’ minds in the absence of an external stimulus. Evidence for such a 
social-cognitive practice effect through fantasy play can be found in Taylor and Carlson’s 
(1997) study showing an association between ToM and IC status. Taylor and Carlson 
found that children in their high fantasy group who impersonated characters without 
minds (machines) in their play (48% of their sample) had a tendency to score lower than 
children who impersonated living beings with minds. This was especially true for their 
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younger sample of 4-year-olds, thus showing that the practice derived (from 
impersonation) must be in the correct form.  
Alternatively, it could be that the creation of an IC relates to the understanding of 
self and other, not because of the practice effects that the IC provides, but because the IC 
enables a child to create their own ZPD. Vygotsky (1934/1998) defined the ZPD as the 
distance between the child’s actual developmental level determined by independent 
problem solving ability and their potential developmental level as determined through 
collaborative problem solving with an adult or more capable peer. One way of making 
sense of the role of ICs in this case is in terms of the child creating their own ‘assistant’ 
to aid in reaching goals that are slightly beyond their ability to reach alone. Many 
children in the three studies in this thesis reported that their IC was able to teach them 
things. Paradoxically, even though the child is truly alone, they will arguably be more 
likely to perform better on certain tasks because of the ZPD provided by interaction with 
the IC. If this view is correct, then children with ICs that are deeper and more competent 
would be expected to aid children more than ICs that are simply extensions of the child. 
This is because the child would have more opportunity for in-depth interactions and help 
with an IC that is more competent. 
 Some children report non-compliant ICs, although most ICs are compliant, and 
those that are non-compliant do not act contrary to the child’s desires in all situations 
(Taylor et al., 2007). Nonetheless, these ICs could still act as a ZPD even though they 
may not aid children directly by teaching them things. Non-compliant ICs are known to 
be more independent (Taylor et al., 2007). It is possible, then, that such independence 
could lead to children’s improved ability to understand everyday social conflict, as well 
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as aiding their ability to engage in negotiation. The non-compliant IC may not help the 
child directly with tasks, but, when engaging in argument, a non-compliant IC could aid 
the child in social situations where the child is negotiating between themselves, the IC, 
and a friend. This practice of negotiation with the IC could also simultaneously facilitate 
how these children contrast others’ opinions and arguments.  
 According to Vygotsky (1934/1978), when a child pretends to do something, they 
are already actively participating in their own development by beginning to sever the 
meaning of an object from a real object. For example, Vygotsky writes about a child 
wanting to ride a horse but not being able to, and so picking up a stick and pretending to 
ride a horse. In this sense a child’s action according to rules begins to be determined by 
ideas rather than the true object. Furthermore, in the absence of others’ thoughts, words, 
and opinions, a child with an IC creates thoughts, words, and opinions based upon 
previously known information about others’ minds and the internal life that emanates 
from their minds. This view concords with the present pattern of findings that children’s 
IC status correlated positively with self- and-other knowledge. 
 A related explanation for this pattern is that social-cognitive change is driven by 
children’s more general fantasy orientation. Fantasy predisposition is known to vary 
among children (Taylor, 1999), and children with ICs tend to initiate as well as 
participate in pretence significantly more than their NIC peers (Taylor et al., 1993). IC 
children have also been shown to have greater fantasy orientation (Bouldin & Pratt, 1999; 
Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Taylor & Carlson, 1997). It seems plausible then that a child’s 
ability and willingness to engage in pretence is what drives them to create an IC. Children 
may create these ICs because they have the desire to engage in fantasy play when their 
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peers are not present to partner them in this play. This theory is in line with Vygotsky’s 
(1934/1978) claim that children’s play mimics desire that cannot be realised and aids in 
symbolic understanding. Hence, if children with high fantasy orientation desire a friend, 
they are able to create a symbol for a friend and use their imagination to attain that goal. 
This would also account for why some children who are highly fantasy oriented (or are 
not first-born children) still do not create ICs, simply because they do not have a need or 
desire great enough to create the IC. For example, Harris (2000) argued that the ‘desire-
satisfaction’ view, with ICs being created to meet unfulfilled desires and emotional 
needs, does not hold water. In support of this argument, Harris highlighted (a) the lack of 
any strong relation between creating an IC and a dearth of real friends, and (b) the fact 
that some children create highly undesirable, frightening ICs such as imaginary monsters.  
It has been shown that children with high fantasy orientation show an advantage in 
ToM performance and mental state talk (Mitchell & Neal, 2005; Rakoczy et al., 2006; 
Schwebel et al., 1999), but these differences may not be independent of IC status. For 
example, Taylor and Carlson (1997) found no differences in ToM between their high and 
low fantasy groups, but did find that IC creation explained the unique variance in ToM 
even when age and verbal ability were controlled for. Thus, although high fantasy 
orientation could be the mechanism accounting for IC creation as well as better 
understanding of the self and others, this explanation is not well supported by the 
available evidence.  
 In considering Model 1, a potential anomaly worthy of further discussion is the 
fact that IC status was found to relate to children’s tendency to ascribe less knowledge 
about their own internal states to an adult (Study 1) and yet to focus more on internal 
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states when describing a best friend (Study 2). Establishing the mechanism that might 
account for these complex interconnections between how the child represents the internal 
states of self versus other leads to Model 2, which is based on the assumption that the 
development of children’s private speech causally determines their creation of an IC.  
 Model 2: Internalisation of private speech as a driver of (social-)cognitive change 
As discussed in section 5.3 above, children who are precocious in their private 
speech development may create an IC as an outlet for this self-directed speech. In related 
research, Fernyhough and Russell (1997) investigated whether private speech facilitated 
5-year-olds’ ability to distinguish their own ‘voice’ (i.e., one’s individual way of 
reflecting on the world) from those of others. In this study, private speech was assessed in 
a play session, after which the experimenter played a game with the children and 
recorded each child’s voice. A week later, the child participated in an individual testing 
session in which they were played recordings of themselves and other children, with the 
voices being presented in isolation (to assess recognition of basic auditory features) or 
with contextual cues (to assess recognition of ‘voice’). Fernyhough and Russell reported 
that private speech was unrelated to children’s ability to identify the recording of 
themselves on the basis of basic auditory features, but private speech was positively 
associated with children’s ability to distinguish their own ‘voice’ from those of others. 
The authors argued that their results pointed to private speech playing a role in children’s 
developing awareness that they are separate mental agents leading distinct existences to 
others both internally and externally. 
Fernyhough and Russell’s (1997) study also supports the idea that private speech, 
specifically partially internalised forms and inner speech (which is hypothesised to derive 
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from private speech), aids the individual in identifying aspects of the self such as 
attitudes, values, opinions, and beliefs. Morin (1993) described how this self–other 
understanding may arise because we take others’ perspectives into account in response to 
the imagined speech of others, thereby gaining an objective view of ourselves as well as 
others. Morin cited a child (David) engaging in private speech toward a group of 
imaginary people as an example of this type of perspective-taking. Morin explained that 
David’s responses to his own questions about the actions he was performing highlighted 
a process of acquisition of information that was initially triggered by the presence of 
others, but that came to take place as a self-dialogue. David answered the questions posed 
by the imaginary group about his behaviour, resulting in his ability to observe a possible 
objective version of himself and to acquire self-information, because in the private 
speech exchange he asked and answered a series of questions concentrating on both how 
other persons could interpret his behaviour and how he interpreted this behaviour. The 
ability to contrast these perspectives may provide the child with a better self-other 
awareness because of the practice of contrasting possible objective and subjective 
viewpoints. 
This view that the development and internalisation of private speech should be 
accompanied by an increase in self- versus other- awareness is in line with the results of 
the three studies reported in this thesis, given that IC status was related to performance on 
the interior self-knowledge and friend description tasks and to the level of internalisation 
of children’s private speech. In line with Model 2, this explanation suggests that 
engagement with an IC may be an outcome rather than a cause of private speech 
development.  
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Model 3: Parenting styles as contributing variables to the outcomes of IC creation 
and cognitive change 
Individual differences in parenting practices could underpin the observed relations 
among IC status, social-cognitive skills, and private speech. Parents who value pretence 
are more likely to elaborate on their children’s pretend themes. Parents have also been 
reported to facilitate longer episodes of fantasy play, while parents who do not see 
pretence as valuable to their children’s development tend to de-emphasise this aspect of 
their children’s play behaviour, redirecting the children toward different activities 
(Carlson, Taylor, & Levin, 1998; Haight & Miller, 1993; Haight, Parke, & Black, 1997). 
Furthermore, Carlson, Taylor, and Levin (1998) examined Mennonite teachers 
interviewing them about their attitudes of pretend play and their adherence to traditional 
Mennonite values, finding that teachers’ attitudes toward fantasy play correlated with the 
type of play that was displayed by the children in their class when playing in the school 
playground. Farver and Lee-Shin (2000) examined play behaviour in children observing 
the fantasy demonstrated by Korean children born in America while at school. These 
researchers compared these observations with parents’ self reports on their own beliefs 
about play as well as their assimilation into American culture. These researchers found 
that children of mothers who were more assimilated into American culture were not only 
more accepting and encouraging of their children’s creativity and play behaviour, but 
also that their children engaged in more play than the children of Korean mothers who 
were less assimilated and less accepting of fantasy play.  
However, there are some findings in Gleason’s (2005) investigation of parenting 
and its correlation with children’s IC status which are contrary to the proposal that 
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parenting style has an effect on play behaviour. Gleason devised a composite measure of 
parental attitude toward pretend play (incorporating both parental involvement and views 
about the significance of play in development) and found no relationship between how 
parents viewed imaginary play and whether their child had created an IC. Thus, parents 
of children with and without ICs saw their play similarly. Despite Gleason’s findings, the 
majority of studies show a  positive relation between parental attitude and their children’s 
play frequency (Haight & Miller, 1993). This relation suggests that IC creation could be 
underpinned by parental attitude. 
While parental attitude may influence the frequency and themes of their children’s 
play, parents’ treatment of their child as an independent being with thoughts and feelings 
of their own, so-called mind-mindedness, has been shown to correlate with children’s 
later ToM development (Meins et al., 2002). Mothers who are mind-minded are thought 
to provide their children with richer opportunities to learn about others’ inner states by 
appropriately commenting on and referring to their children’s inner states. Meins et al. 
(2002) found that mothers’ mind-mindedness as observed in a free play context at 6 
months independently predicted their children’s overall ToM performance on a battery of 
ToM tasks at 45 and 48 months. Other assessments of maternal mind-mindedness have 
also been found to relate positively to children’s subsequent ToM performance. Meins 
and Fernyhough (1999) found a positive relation between mothers’ tendency to attribute 
meaning to their 20-month-olds’ non-word utterances and their later ToM performance. 
Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, and Clark-Carter (1998) reported that children performed 
better on ToM tasks if their mothers had previously tended to focus on their mental and 
emotional charateristics when given an open-ended invitation to describe their child. 
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Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) found that a mother’s use of desire-state language 
while describing a picture when their child was 15-months-old was predictive of both 
child mental state language as well as performance on an emotion situation task 9 months 
later. These studies suggest that maternal mental state talk may not only facilitate child 
language but also their social understanding (Meins & Fernyhough, 1999; Meins et al., 
2002; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006).      
Finally, higher incidence and greater sophistication of private speech have been 
shown to correlate with authoritative parenting style (Behrend & Rosengren, 1992; 
Winsler et al., 2006). The authoritative parenting style encourages children to be 
independent, but still places limits on behaviour. It is characterised by a child-centred 
approach to parenting that is sensitive to the child’s feelings (Baumrind, 1967). Berk and 
Spuhl (1995) investigated 4- and 5-year-olds’ private speech while being assisted by their 
mother in a problem solving task using Lego. Findings indicated that a global index of 
authoritative parenting was a better predictor of private speech and task performance than 
microanalytic measures of parent scaffolding. Children with authoritative mothers 
showed more externalised, task-relevant private speech utterances at age 4, and more 
internalised private speech utterances at age 5. Winsler et al. (2006) also found that 
parents who were classified as authoritative (as assessed by a parenting practices 
questionnaire) were more likely to ignore and allow their 3- to 5-year-old children’s use 
of private speech, while Behrend and Rosengren (1992) found a relation between 
mothers’ scaffolding of their children and the amount of private speech that the children 
used during problem solving tasks. The positive relationship between authoritative 
parenting style and children’s use and internalisation of private speech suggests that 
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parenting style could underpin children’s private speech development (Behrend & 
Rosengren, 1992; Berk & Spuhl, 1995; Winsler et al., 2006).          
It could be that parental attitude and parenting style underpins whether or not a 
child creates an IC as well as their development of interior self-knowledge, mentalistic 
description of friends, and private speech. It could follow that more mind-minded parents 
are also more accepting and encouraging of their children’s fantasy and imagination play, 
conceivably influencing both a child’s ToM capacities and their proclivity to create ICs. 
Furthermore, it seems plausible that mind-minded mothers will be likely to adopt 
authoritative parenting styles. The studies reported in this thesis did not investigate 
parenting style, and thus cannot address these possibilities. However, the above suggests 
that it would be interesting in future studies to examine the relation between parenting 
style and beliefs in reference to children’s IC creation and their development of interior 
self-knowledge, mentalistic descriptions, and private speech. 
Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3: A comparison 
Considering the three models of causation presented above, Model 2 is best 
supported by the results of the three studies in this thesis. Model 2 is not only able to 
account for IC children’s self-knowledge ability in ascribing less knowledge about their 
internal states to an adult (Study 1), while explaining why IC children also focus more on 
internal states when describing their best friends (Study 2), but it also accounts for IC 
children’s more internalised private speech (Study 3). Model 2 has not only been 
reinforced by the results in this thesis, but it is also supported by past private speech 
literature (Fernyhough & Russell, 1997; Morin, 1993).  
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Both Model 1 and 3 are plausible causal models, however different variables would 
need to be investigated in order to establish their credibility. For example, although 
Model 1 is the model assumed in the majority of studies on children with ICs (Gleason & 
Hohman, 2006; Roby & Kidd, 2008; Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Trionfi & 
Reese, 2009), it cannot explain the results of this thesis as accurately as Model 2 in that 
IC children tended to understand the opacity of their own minds, while simultaneously 
focusing on others’ minds. Furthermore, if Model 1 was to be most accurate, it would 
need to explain why no relations were found between IC status and ToM (for more in 
depth discussion on this issue, see section 2.4). Future research on children’s ICs could 
incorporate ZPD studies (such as the one presented in section 5.4) to provide more 
evidence for Model 1. If children do in fact use ICs as personal helpers influencing their 
ZPD, this evidence would suggest that Model 1 is in fact more plausible than Model 2 or 
3.  
Model 3 is also not as well supported as Model 2. Although Model 3 can account 
for the results of all three studies alone, it must assume that all parents that value pretence 
are both mind-minded and authoritative in their parenting style. These issues prevent this 
third variable model of causation from being the strongest model for causal direction. In 
future research, parenting style and its correlates could be investigated, in order to further 
decide if Model 3 is a feasible model for this causal relation.  
 Although Model 2 presents a strong case for the causal direction of different 
developmental pathways that might account for the observed findings throughout the 
thesis, more evidence is needed in order to determine further whether private speech is in 
fact the driver of a child’s creation of an IC as well as their self-other awareness. Future 
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research on children with ICs would have to be carried out at earlier ages in order to 
determine whether ICs and private speech in pretend play begin to appear at different 
times. If IC children’s private speech became more developed at an earlier time than NIC 
children’s private speech, this evidence would further support Model 2. The earlier 
development in private speech would suggest that private speech is a driver of IC 
creation. 
5.4 Future Research  
In this section, future research that would aid in establishing which of the three 
models of causation is most able to explain the results of this thesis will be discussed. 
One research proposal will be laid out for each model of causation. Model 1’s proposal 
will encompass the question of a child’s IC acting as a self-created ZPD, examining how 
the creation of an IC may have a causal impact upon other domains of cognitive 
competence. The proposal for Model 2 will examine private speech development and the 
timing of IC creation, looking at private speech as a driver of IC creation, and thus social-
cognitive change. Model 3’s proposal will entail studying how parenting styles and 
attitude interlock, incorporating parental factors to determine whether parental attitude 
could underpin both IC creation as well as advancements in social-cognition. The 
information which could be gleaned from the three studies will aid in supporting or 
refuting the three models of causation. These three proposed studies will be discussed in 
reference to their specific designs, the interpretations of possible outcomes, and what this 
means to further IC research. 
In order to test Model 1’s assumption that IC creation aids children’s social-
cognitive development, future research could attempt an intervention study aimed at 
135 
encouraging NIC children to create an IC. If a child with NIC shows improvement on 
tasks after the encouraged creation of an IC, this could point to having an IC as the driver 
of this improvement. The evidence that NIC children could improve on tasks after 
creating an IC would add to the body of literature that asserts children gain knowledge 
about the world by comparing and contrasting their perspectives with that of their IC 
(e.g., Roby & Kidd, 2008; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Trionfi & Reese, 2009).  
It has been reported that if children are socially encouraged at home and at school 
to believe in a fantasy character, children are likely to accept their existence (Woolley et 
al., 2004). A recent study also suggests that imaginary characters can affect how children 
approach a task. Berring (2010) reported that children who believed that an invisible 
entity was in a room with them were just as likely to refrain from cheating at a game as 
children who were actually accompanied by a real human being. This study demonstrates 
that imagining an invisible person into existence can change children’s subsequent 
behaviour. 
A potential intervention study could incorporate three groups of children: IC 
children, NIC children who are not encouraged to create an IC, and NIC children who are 
encouraged to create an IC (EIC). Teachers and parents would be asked to encourage the 
EIC children to play with their newly created ICs. This encouragement would begin after 
a baseline visit from an experimenter, and continue for two months, a length of time 
comparable for a true IC to be considered as such (Svendsen, 1934). After two months, 
all of the children could be re-tested on tasks assessing self-knowledge, friend 
descriptions, or private speech to ascertain whether there are between-group differences 
in the performance of the EIC and NIC groups of children. If the EIC group children 
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perform significantly better than their NIC counterparts, this would provide evidence for 
IC creation having a causal effect on children’s social-cognitive development.  
Alternatively, future research could focus on establishing whether ICs provide 
children with a ZPD to scaffold task performance. IC-group children could be asked to 
perform a challenging task (e.g., constructing a model, or spatial coordination) in 
collaboration with their IC; NIC-group children could be instructed to imagine that 
someone else is there to help them with the task and to talk to them and ask them for 
guidance. This research could be laid out much like the studies performed by Doise, 
Mugny, and Perret-Clermont (1975). These researchers did not investigate ICs, but did 
examine changes in children’s ability to perform tasks while alone and  in social 
coordination. The findings of Doise et al.’s research showed that a dyad of children of the 
same ability could successfully perform a task of spatial coordination that they would not 
be capable of performing, working alone.  The extent to which engagement with the 
imaginary other provides children with task-relevant information or solutions to 
completing the task could be assessed. It could also be contrasted with results of real 
partners. Relations between the ability to use the imaginary other to scaffold task 
performance and children’s self-knowledge, mentalistic descriptions of friends, or private 
speech could then be investigated to explore the possibility that ICs are positively 
associated with children’s social-cognitive development because they provide the child 
with a ZPD. 
 In order to test Model 2 and the argument that private speech is the driver of IC 
creation and thus responsible for IC-related differences in social-cognitive performance, 
one could conduct a longitudinal study to examine the emergence of ICs in relation to 
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children’s private speech development. Collecting extensive private speech data across a 
range of naturalistic and laboratory contexts would be particularly interesting. Children 
could wear a microphone attached to their clothing to ensure that the content of 
whispering and muttering is audible, and could wear a lightweight headcam to film their 
activities. If children who are more developed in their private speech are found to be 
those who subsequently create an IC, this will support Model 2. It will also add to the 
literature that suggests children’s private speech content differs depending on child 
creativity (Daugherty, White, & Manning, 1994; White & Daugherty, 2009). If children’s 
private speech emergence and internalisation does not precede a child’s IC creation, this 
would support Model 1 rather than Model 2. 
Individual differences in parenting practices can explain IC-related differences in 
children’s social-cognitive development (Model 3) could be tested by assessing various 
aspects of parenting style and attitude and investigating whether the observed effects are 
maintained when parenting factors are controlled for. Parents could be assessed for 
parenting style and attitudes towards children’s play using standard questionnaires, and 
for mind-mindedness using a standard interview. If the observed main effects of IC status 
on children’s self-knowledge, mentalistic descriptions of friends, and private speech were 
independent of parenting factors, then this would suggest that Model 3 is not a good 
explanatory framework of the results of the studies reported here.  
5.5 Limitations  
The results of this thesis should be considered in light of certain limitations. The 
first limitation lay in the fact that only around 19% of the 80 children interviewed in 
Study 1 had a parentally-corroborated IC, while Studies 2 and 3 (which utilised much of 
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the same sample of children) found similar patterns. Approximately 20% of children in 
these two studies had parentally-corroborated ICs. Although the prevalence rates in the 
two studies are comfortably within the range of 10% (Bouldin & Pratt, 1999) to 65% 
(Taylor et al., 2004) reported in the literature, the relatively low numbers of children 
reporting ICs meant that heterogeneity within the IC group could not be explored with 
reference to the outcome variables, with the participants with invisible ICs and POs 
pooled to form a single IC group.  
Similarly, the analyses in Study 1 investigating how the depth of IC related to 
children’s interior self-knowledge were hampered by a lack of power. As discussed in 
earlier chapters, previous studies have used different justifications in order to examine 
POs separately from ICs (Bouldin, 2006; Gleason & Hohmann, 2006; Gleason, et al., 
2000), or to treat these entities as equivalent (Carlson & Taylor, 2005; Fernyhough et al., 
2007; Taylor et al., 2004). As with all studies on ICs, those reported here assigned 
children’s IC status on the basis of whether or not they reported having had an IC, 
although children were only included in the IC group if their parents confirmed the 
existence of the IC. Parental report has been shown to be an accurate indicator of IC 
status and studies have suggested that parents of IC children should provide a reliable 
testimony about their children’s fantasy play behaviour as well as their IC or PO 
(Gleason, 2004a). There was perfect agreement between child and parent report of IC 
status in this thesis concurring with Gleason’s (2004a) findings. In conjunction with 
confirmed parental report, it will be important for future research to concentrate on larger 
populations of children with ICs. This will increase the power of future studies as well as 
being able to examine these within group differences observed in IC children.    
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Another potential limitation derived from IC group heterogeneity, is that there 
could be considerable variation in the amount of time a child engaged with their IC. 
Furthermore, children in the IC groups in the three studies reported here were not 
homogenous in other ways. Some children would have had an IC in the past, whereas 
other children would still be actively engaged with their IC. Others may have had more 
than one IC at any one time, or might have had a succession of ICs. This variation could 
potentially affect the outcome variables because children that engage more often with 
their IC, or at different times in their development, would receive different amounts of 
practice in the social-cognitive domains that were investigated. Given the small numbers 
of children in the IC group, it was impossible to investigate whether these different 
subgroups of IC status differed in any way in their relations with the aspects of children’s 
social-cognitive development studied in this thesis. The results of the thesis showed the 
between group differences when investigating IC status, but it would be important to look 
at IC status in a more fine grained fashion. This more in depth look at when a child has 
created an IC and how much the child engages with that IC would aid in determining 
whether there are within group differences.     
In order to establish whether the precise type of IC or depth of IC relates to 
children’s understanding of self and others, future research should initially screen 
children and select them on the basis of type and depth of IC, the number of ICs reported, 
and the length of time children have actively engaged with their ICs. Longitudinal 
research would also be valuable in charting how ICs change and develop over time and 
establishing how such longitudinal changes related to children’s previous, concurrent, 
and future representations of self and other. To further investigate the potential 
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implications of the variation in the amount of time children were playing with their ICs, it 
would be beneficial to add a more detailed description of an IC to the parental 
questionnaire. The questionnaire used in this thesis pertains mostly to IC status, and  facts 
about the IC that might be interesting qualitatively, but it does not elaborate on questions 
about how long the child has had the friend, or how often the child plays with the friend. 
Svendsen’s (1934) original definition could be added and changed to lay terms. The 
questionnaire also could include a section that asks the parents to be more specific about 
their child’s IC play. It might be beneficial to ask if the parent ever witnesses how the 
child acts around the IC, and if the child ever exhibits behaviour that might be indicative 
of a more independent IC.     
Finally, the invariant order in the tests presented in each study could have been a 
potential limitation as it is known that in any testing situation order effects are possible 
(Breakwell, Hammond & Fife-Shaw, 2004). However, there are no strong grounds for 
concluding that performance on any particular task in each of the three studies reported 
here would obviously affect that on tasks completed subsequently. Typically IC studies 
have used an invariant order for testing (Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Taylor, 1999). 
Furthermore, it was important to keep the researcher blind to children’s IC status during 
the ToM and self-knowledge tasks used in Study 1, making it necessary for the ToM and 
self-knowledge inventory to be presented first. Even though tasks were presented in an 
invariant order, the self-knowledge questions were counterbalanced for child report and 
ToM stories were randomised. This was to prevent any effects within each measure.   
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5.6 Conclusions  
The aim of this thesis was to investigate whether having an IC relates to the way 
in which children represent themselves and others. In the past, research that focused on 
ICs examined the potential impact that the rich fantasy life accompanying ICs may have 
on subsequent development, but this was only with reference to a narrow range of 
cognitive abilities (e.g., ToM). The three studies in this thesis elaborate on the previous 
literature in order to explore other avenues of social-cognitive development.       
In looking at the results of the three studies performed in the thesis, the evidence 
provided by these studies points to IC status relating to the way in which children 
understand and represent both themselves and others in three different tasks. This has 
been seen in IC children’s tendency to use internal-state knowledge, by attributing less 
knowledge to adults than their NIC counterparts as seen in Study 1. It is also evident in 
their ability to spontaneously draw on others’ inner states to describe their friends and 
explain these friends’ behaviour as seen in Study 2, and the extent to which their private 
speech is more internalised than their NIC peers as seen in Study 3. In contrast, no IC-
related differences were observed in children’s performance on basic ToM tasks. This 
non-replication is surprising, but can be explained (section 2.4).   
This thesis has contributed to our understanding of how having an IC relates to 
young children’s representations of other people, their awareness of themselves, and their 
verbal regulation of their own behaviour. It is clear that ICs should no longer be thought 
of as something that parents should fear. Instead, research is beginning to highlight how 
ICs may aid their creators in their own development. However, several unanswered 
questions remain. At present, it is fair to say that although views of how ICs may 
142 
influence children’s development have changed dramatically compared with early 
notions that ICs were an indicator of pathology, we are only beginning to understand how 
this most vivid aspect of children’s imaginative life might impact on development.  
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Appendices 
_____________________________________________________ 
Appendix 1 Self-Knowledge Interview (Mitchell et al., 2006) 
 
Condition 1 where child is asked 1
st
 about self-knowledge (In condition 2, child is 
asked about adult self-knowledge 1
st
): 
 
1. Illness (child/child’s guardian) 
(a) People get ill sometimes. Do you get ill sometimes?  
(b) When you are ill what happens to you? How do you feel? 
(c) When you are ill how well do you know about your illness? 
(d) When you are ill how well does your mother (father) know about it? 
(e) When you are ill how does she (he) know if you are ill? 
 
2. Fun (child/child’s teacher) 
(a) People have fun sometimes. Do you have fun sometimes? 
(b) When you are having fun what happens to you? How do you feel? 
(c) When you are having fun how well do you now about your feeling that you are having 
fun? 
(d) When you are having fun how well does your teacher know about it? 
(e) When you are having fun how does she (he) know you are having fun? 
 
3. Dream (child/child’s guardian) 
(a) People sometimes have dreams while they are sleeping. People may have lots of 
dreams sometimes. Do you know when you are dreaming?  
(b) While you are dreaming what happens to you? How do you feel? 
(c) When you are dreaming how well do you know that you are dreaming? 
(d) When you are dreaming how well does your mother (father) know about it? 
(e) When you are dreaming how does your mother (father) know you are dreaming? 
 
4. Thinking (child/child’s teacher) 
(a) People sometimes think about one thing or many things. Some people think about 
what they want to eat at lunch time. Others think about how many will it be if you add 
one and to one, or why a rabbit is a rabbit but not a kangaroo. What do you think about 
sometimes?  
(b) What will it happen when you are thinking? How do you feel when you are thinking? 
(c) Is there ever a time when you are not thinking? 
(d) When you are thinking how well do you know you are thinking? 
(e)  When you are thinking how well does your teacher know you are thinking? 
(f)  When you are thinking how does your teacher know you are thinking? 
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5. Hunger (child/child’s guardian) 
(a) People sometimes get hungry. Do you get hungry sometimes? 
(b) What happens to you when you get hungry? How do you feel? 
(c) When you are hungry how well do you know when you are hungry? 
(d) When you are hungry how well does your mother (father) know if you are hungry? 
(e) When you are hungry how does she (he) know that you are hungry? 
 
6. Anger (child/child’s teacher) 
(a) People sometimes get angry. Do you get angry sometimes? 
(b) What happens to you when you get angry? How do you feel? 
(c) When you are angry how well do you know you are angry? 
(d) When you are angry how well does your teacher know if you are angry? 
(e) When you are angry how does she (he) know that you are angry? 
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Appendix 2 Theory of Mind Battery (Wellman & Liu, 2004; Hughes et al., 
2000) 
 
The order of story presentation were randomised: 
 
1. Diverse Beliefs  
 
Props: Toy figure of a girl (Sarah) 
 A4 sheet of paper with a garage and some bushes drawn 
 
Introduce child to the protagonist and make him (her) face the picture. 
Here’s Sarah. Sarah wants to find her cat. 
Her cat might be hiding in the bushes (said pointing to the picture), 
Or it might be hiding in the garage (said pointing to the picture). 
Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the garage? 
 
Child’s response: 
‘Bushes’: Well, that’s a good idea, but Sarah thinks her cat is in the garage. 
She thinks her cat is in the garage (said while pointing) 
‘Garage’: Well, that’s a good idea, but Sarah thinks her cat is in the bushes. 
She thinks her cat is in the bushes (said while pointing). 
 
Target question: 
So where will Sarah look for her cat? (brief pause) 
 
Child’s responds: 
 
(If the child does not respond, ask the following prompt)  
Will she look in the bushes or in the garage? (point to each one) 
 
Oh, look and now she’s found her cat! 
 
2. Knowledge Access  
 
Props: Toy figure of a girl (Ellie) 
 Non-descript box containing small toy 
 
Here’s a box. What do you think is inside the box? 
 (Child guesses and researcher opens box and shows child contents) 
Let’s see…it’s really a ball inside! (close the box) 
Okay, what is in the box? 
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Child responds: 
 
Ellie has never seen inside this box. (produce toy figure) Now, here comes Ellie. 
 
Target question: 
So, does Ellie know what is inside the box? 
 
Child responds: 
 
Reality/ Memory check question: 
Did Ellie see inside this box? 
 
3. Contents False Belief (1) 
 
Props: Toy figure of a boy (Jack) 
 Pringles (crisp) box containing a toy animal (e.g. Pig) 
 
Child is shown the Pringles box. 
Here’s a box of crisps. What do you think is inside the box? 
 
Child responds: 
 
Open the Pringles box and show the child the contents. 
Let’s see…can you tell me what is really inside the box?  
(making sure child responds correctly) Close the Pringles box and produce toy. 
Jack has never seen inside this box of crisps before. Now, here comes Jack. 
So, what does Jack think is inside the box? (brief pause) 
 
Child responds: 
 
(If the child does not respond, ask the following prompt)  
Does he think it’s crisps or a pig? 
 
Reality question: 
Okay, what is really inside the box? 
 
Child responds: 
 
Reality/ Memory check question: 
Did Jack see inside this box? 
 
Child responds: 
 
4. Explicit False Belief 
 
Props: Toy figure of a boy (Simon) 
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 A4 sheet of paper with a back-pack and a wardrobe drawn 
 
Introduce child to the protagonist and make him face the picture. 
Here’s Simon. Simon wants to find his gloves. 
His gloves might be in his back-pack (point to the picture), 
Or they might be in the wardrobe (point to the picture). 
 
Move the toy figure slightly to the side and say to the child: 
Simon’s gloves are really in his back-pack (point to the picture), 
But Simon thinks his gloves are in the wardrobe (point to the picture).  
 
Target question: 
So, where will Simon look for his gloves? (brief pause) 
 
Child responds: 
 
(if child does not respond, ask the following prompt) 
Will he look in his back-pack or in the wardrobe? 
 
Reality/ Memory check question: 
Where are Simon’s gloves really? (brief pause) 
 
Child responds: 
 
(If child does not respond, ask the following prompt while pointing to the pictures) 
Are they in his back-pack or in the wardrobe? 
 
5. Contents False Belief (2)  
 
Props: A Mini-eggs tube containing pencils 
 
Child is shown Mini-eggs tube. 
Here’s a Mini-eggs tube. What do you think is inside the Mini-eggs tube? 
 
Child responds: 
 
Open Mini-eggs tube and show child the contents. 
Let’s see…can you tell me what is really inside?  
(make sure child responds correctly) Close the Mini-eggs tube. 
 
Target question: 
Okay, before you saw inside the Mini-eggs tube, what did you think was in the tube? 
 
Child responds: 
 
(If child does not respond, ask the following prompt) 
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Do you think it was Mini-eggs or pencils? 
 
Reality/ Memory check question: 
What is really inside the tube? (Brief pause) 
 
Child responds: 
 
(If child does not respond, ask the following prompt) 
Is it Mini-eggs or pencils? 
 
6. Unexpected Transfer 
 
Props: Four illustrated sheets of A4 paper showing story material 
 
Show child the first sheet and point as appropriate. 
Now, let’s have a look at this story. 
This is Andy. Andy has an apple and a bag. 
This is Sally. Sally has a box. 
 
Turn page: 
Andy puts his apple in this bag to keep it safe and he goes outside to play. 
 
Turn page: 
While Andy is outside playing, Sally puts the apple in the box and then she goes outside 
to play. 
 
Turn page: 
Andy comes back because he wants to have a bit of his apple. 
 
Target question: 
Where will Andy look for his apple? (brief pause) 
 
Child responds: 
 
(If child does not respond, ask the following prompt) 
Will he look in the bag or in the box? 
 
Reality question: 
Where is the apple really? (brief pause) 
 
(If child does not respond, ask the following prompt) 
Is it in the bag or in the box? 
 
Child responds: 
 
Reality/ Memory check question: 
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Where did Andy put his apple first of all? 
 
(If child does not respond, ask the following prompt) 
Was it in the bag or in the box? 
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Appendix 3 Imaginary Companion Interview 
 
Researcher says to child: 
Now I am going to ask you some questions about friends. Some friends are real like the 
kids who live on your street, the ones you play with. And some friends are pretend 
friends. Pretend friends are ones that are make believe that you pretend are real. Do you 
understand?  
 
(Child should indicate here that they understand, if not the experimenter repeats the 
beginning definition)  
 
(1) Do you have a pretend friend?  
(2) Have you ever had a pretend friend? (If child answers no to first question but had a 
pretend friend previously) (2a) Do you remember _______? 
(3) What is (was) your friend’s name? 
(4) Is (was) your friend a toy like a stuffed animal or a doll, or is (was) it completely 
pretend? 
(5) Is it a boy or girl? (5a) Is it a person, an animal, or something else? 
(6) How old is your friend? 
(7) What does your friend look like? 
(8) What do you like about your friend? 
(9) What do you not like about your friend? 
(10) Where does your friend live? 
(11) Where does your friend sleep? 
(For previous pretend friends) (11a) What happened to_______? (11b) When did you 
stop playing with ______? (11c) Why did you stop playing with______? 
 
Activities section: 
(12) What do you usually do together? (12a) Do you play together, go on adventures, 
talk? (12b) What do you play together? (12c) What kind of adventures do you go on? 
(13) Who decides what you should play? / Who makes up the mischief, adventure? 
(if child responds that they decide, ask if the friend ever decides what they play) 
(14) Does he or she always play what you want to play? For Example, when you want to 
play Pokemon do they ever want to play something else instead? 
(15) Does your friend always do what you want him/her to do? Like when you’re playing 
Pokemon do they ever not follow the rules or pretend not do what you wanted them to. 
(16) Does your friend ever try to boss you around or make you do things that you do not 
want to do? 
 
Conversation section: 
(17) What do you talk about with…? 
(18) You know, friends get along most of the time, but sometimes they don’t get along. Do 
you ever have fights or argue with your friend? 
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(19) Can your friend tell you things you don’t know? (19a) Can they teach you things? 
Like if you’re talking about Pokemon can do they ever tell you something about Pokemon 
that you didn’t already know. 
(20) Do you ever tell … things that they don’t know? (20a) Do you teach them things? 
(21) Does your friend ever tell you about what (he’s) been up to? 
(22) Do you ever talk to… if something is bothering you? (22a) What do they say? 
 
Other Independence questions: 
(23) When do you usually meet up with…? 
(24) Who decides when you should meet up? 
(25) Does your pretend friend have his own friends, relatives and playmates? 
(26) Does your friend ever surprise you with things he or she says or does? 
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Appendix 4 Parental consent and Imaginary Companion Questionnaire 
 
Hello my name is Paige Davis and I am a PhD student at the University of Durham. I am 
beginning a research project on children with and without imaginary friends, and your 
child’s school has decided to take part. If your child participates in the project, he/she 
will have a 25-35 minute visit with me (Paige Davis) where they will be asked some 
questions about how much they know about what they are feeling and how other people 
are feeling. They will also be asked if they have an imaginary friend, and whether they 
can talk to that friend on a pretend telephone, and finally they will be given a short 
vocabulary game to play. 
 
Your child can participate whether they have an imaginary friend or not because 
it is important that I get to talk to children with and without imaginary friends. Some 
parents have questions about imaginary companions and I wanted to reassure you that 
from all of the research I have done thus far, imaginary friends are very normal for 
children to have and they can even be a positive sign of development.  
 
To ensure confidentiality your child will be given a number and their information 
will be stored securely. If you choose to consent for your child to take part, he or she will 
still be able to refuse to participate or withdraw from the games at any time. If you have 
any questions feel free to call or e-mail me. I would love to talk!  
My e-mail is paige.davis@durham.ac.uk  
 
Thank you again for your support!  
 
 
Paige Davis  
University of Durham 
UK 
 
 
Consent sheet: 
Is your child’s first language English? 
 
Have you read the project information sheet? 
 
Do you understand the child will be asked questions about how much they know about 
what they are feeling? 
 
Do you consent to the anonymous and confidential use of your child’s results for 
scientific purposes? 
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Do you understand that your child is free to withdraw him/herself from the study at any 
time, and will be immediately withdrawn in the unlikely event of showing any signs of 
distress? 
 
Do you understand that the study will take place in your child’s school during the month 
of April? 
 
Do you understand that you are to sign and can keep a copy of this consent form? 
 
Do you understand you are allowed to ask questions and discuss the study with Paige? 
 
Have you received enough information about the study? 
 
Have you completed the attached questionnaire on imaginary companions? 
 
I give my consent for my child to take part in this study 
 
 Signed____________________________________ Date______________ 
 
Child’s name (Block Letters)_____________________________________ 
 
Researcher (Paige Davis)________________________________________ 
 
 
Parental Questionnaire 
 
Does your child have an imaginary friend? 
 
 
What is the friend’s name? 
 
 
For how long has your child had the friend? 
 
 
Is the friend male or female? 
 
 
How old is the friend? 
 
 
Is this friend a toy or object (please specify) or completely imaginary? 
 
 
What do you understand the friend to look like? 
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What does your child like about the friend? 
 
 
Where does the friend live? 
 
 
Where does the friend sleep? 
 
 
Any further comments? 
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Appendix 5 A Brief Account of all Children’s Imaginary Companions and Personified 
Imaginary Companions and Personified Objects Presented in This Thesis 
Study 1: Self-knowledge 
 
Child # 2- Ragid is an IC that sleeps in a flower pot bed and is mischievous. Sometimes 
he doesn’t follow the rules and smashes his flower pot bed. This means that the child 
must clean up the mess. The child doesn’t like the trousers that Ragid wears, and Ragid 
sometimes surprises the child by falling into the bath with his clothes on and saying 
funny words.  
 
Child # 4- Laus and Calum are a pair of four year old ICs. Laus is a girl and Calum a boy. 
Laus doesn’t like boy’s games, but Calum does. The three sometimes pretend there is a 
ghost behind the curtains and run away together. The child must teach Laus and Calum 
how to play because they don’t go to school. The ICs get to choose what is played, 
because they are the visitors, and Laus is able to do cartwheels when the child can not 
accomplish this feat. The ICs made up another friend to play with when the child is not 
around named Emily, but the child has not met Emily.  
 
Child # 11- This PO’s name is Sam. Sam is a cuddly toy dog that sleeps with the child. 
Sam is eight years old and the child usually just meets up with him when he is going to 
sleep, because he sleeps in bed with the PO.  
 
Child # 18- Jessica is an IC that has blonde hair that reaches her hands and brown eyes. 
She wears a pink coat and has a green bag which the child likes. The child usually talks 
about chocolate with Jessica and plays with her in the afternoons. The child’s mother 
decides when they should meet up and the friend sometimes surprises the child. 
 
Child # 21- Monkey is a female PO that the child plays with. Monkey accompanies the 
child on holiday as well as playing that they are going on holiday. The child can teach 
things to Monkey that she does not know. Monkey has other playmates that she plays 
with when the child is not around.  
 
Child # 32- Bill is a tall, skinny, big IC that makes the child laugh. This IC is a kind IC 
because he never bosses the child around. The child can teach the IC things, but the IC 
cannot speak, so he cannot teach the child anything. The child takes Bill all over, but 
does not talk to Bill about things that might be bothering him, because “he’s not a real 
friend, he’s imaginary.” 
 
Child # 34- Harry is a fun IC with black hair. This child teaches Harry how to read hard 
words. They take turns deciding what to play when they meet up, and the IC has friends 
and relatives. 
 
Child # 43- Wiggly-woo is classified as a PO because Wiggly is the child’s finger. The 
child knows songs about Wiggly and plays with his little brother and Wiggly in the 
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bathtub. They talk about playing hide and seek and sometimes Wiggly brings the child 
presents. 
 
Child # 44- Jack is a naughty IC with blue hair and green football gloves. Jack lives in 
the child’s mouth and sleeps at home. Jack bosses the child around and sometimes chases 
the child. When they play, Jack is the owner and the child plays that he is a dog. When 
the two fight, the child’s hand goes through Jack’s tummy. Jack knows everything 
according to the child. 
 
Child # 47- Bun Bun is a 4 year old PO that shows his owner where to go, and likes 
Pringles crisps. Sometimes Bun Bun won’t let his owner get to the Pringles because he 
likes them so much. He argues about the crisps. Bun Bun plays with toys and things that 
he likes and the child does not decide what Bun Bun likes. Bun Bun also decides who 
should meet up and sometimes surprises the child, but the child can’t remember any 
examples.  
 
Child # 50- Sophie is a six year old IC with brown hair and blue eyes that only wears 
brown clothes. Sophie walks home with the child. Sophie doesn’t play what the child 
wants and says to go get her things. This IC can teach the child things and has friends of 
her own. 
 
Child # 51- Elizabeth is a four year old IC with freckles and brown hair. Child and IC 
take turns deciding what to play because they both like things that they both want to play. 
They speak about imagining things and the IC has relatives of her own. 
 
Child # 57- Mr. Nobody is an IC with the same birthday as his creator. When asked to 
help this IC doesn’t always want to help because he wants to do other things. Mr. Nobody 
can tell the child things and also teaches the child things as well. They do not bump into 
each other, so the child nor Mr. Nobody decides who meets whom. Mr. Nobody  has 100 
brothers and sisters and sometimes makes the child jump with surprise because he pops 
out of the ceiling when the child doesn’t expect him to be around. 
 
Child # 59- This child has created many ICs of all shapes and sizes, but doesn’t know 
their names. The ICs live in his attic and they pretend they fly with the child. IC 
sometimes doesn’t do what the child wants it to do. The child makes most of the 
decisions on when the ICs meet up with him, but some stay in the attic while he plays 
with others. 
 
Child # 62- Bailey is a PO that is described as being naughty sometimes. The child has to 
punish Bailey when he is bad and he doesn’t eat his tea. He has friends and relatives, but 
the child hates talking about his friends, so instead he talks about climbing trees and 
playing football with Bailey. 
Study 2: Friend Description 
 
Child # 12- This IC lives and sleeps in the child’s house. 
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Child # 22- This child’s IC has had many different names and forms and has been in 
existence since the child was in nursery. One of the ICs Amy, bosses the child about.  
 
Child # 33- This IC is a granny named Yellow Granny. Yellow Granny goes places, does 
things with the child, and lives in a castle. She always goes home before bedtime. 
 
Child # 50- This child has many ICs named after friends from school. 
 
Child # 63-Giraffey is a PO that has a personality like the child’s brother. Giraffey is 
always doing exciting things. Giraffey lives in the child’s house in a bed that the child’s 
father made with covers that the child’s mother made.  
 
Child # 68-Mo is a mischievous IC that is responsible for some of the naughty things that 
the child does. He joins in make believe stories. The IC is sometimes told off for being 
naughty and usually is around when the child is in the bath or on the loo.  
  
Child # 72-Sid and Ghost are a team of PO and IC respectively. The child plays with Sid 
and talks with Ghost.  
 
Child # 95- Ailiyah sometimes is a little girl and other times is a Mammy IC. The IC does 
what the child tells her to do.  
 
Child # 101- This IC, Casey, has long blond hair and is the same age as the child.  
 
Child # 105- Kitty is a PO that lives in the child’s bedroom and is sometimes rude; while 
Kitty is rude, the child’s IC is never rude and joins in meals and play. 
 
Child # 106- Bear is a teddy that is an old, wise, friend. The child can tell Bear 
everything and Bear is dependable. If the child is lonely or upset Bear is a good ear. 
 
Child # 107- Haley is an IC with brown hair that the child plays with and blames 
wrongdoings on. 
 
Child # 124- This child has an imaginary family that consists of a mum, dad, brothers, 
and sisters. The family goes to lots of different places like Australia and recently the 
family moved from Bilingham to Australia. They live in their own house, but will move 
in if their house has a fire.  
 
Child # 144- Sid is a PO that is cream with brown ears and patches. The child cuddles 
him when tired and uses the toy for comfort. 
 
Child # 146- This child’s IC Tim is very naughty and makes the child laugh. Tim lives in 
the child’s room at the child’s house. 
 
Child # 148- This child has many POs Teddy/ and dog toys live and sleep in the child’s 
house.  
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Child # 151- This child’s PO is from a television programme. The PO’s name is Dora and 
she is a little girl that seems to be able to do everything. 
 
Child # 155- This child often pretends to play with her real friends when they are not 
there. She sometimes plays school with these ICs. 
 
Child # 157- Alice is an IC that is a little girl. She is usually seen in an old fashioned 
dress with long hair. Alice plays with the child and also is blamed for some of her 
actions. Alice lives different places at different times. 
 
Child # 160- This child has a PO named Abagail who is a young baby doll and a good 
friend.  
 
Child # 167- Macca is an IC that is an orange and purple person that walks on two feet 
and that only the child can see. The child says Macca makes him do naughty things and 
Macca lives at 26 Lemon Road.  
 
Child # 168- Pippin is a small brown and black haired dog. The child bosses this PO 
about and the dog is naughty sometimes. 
 
Child # 172- Becky is an IC that has a white face and blond gingery hair. Becky shares 
the same interests as the child.  
 
Child # 176- Ebby is an IC that is the same age as the child and can change to fit the 
circumstances of the game that is being played. The IC asks many questions and is 
sometimes blamed for things.  
 
Child # 177- This child has a hamster that rides in a hamster wheel as an IC. The hamster 
lives in space. 
 
Child # 178- This PO is a baby doll who is squishy and whose birthday often coincides 
with family members. The doll comes on picnics with the family and also weekends 
away. 
 
Child # 200- Gingerbread man is an IC that is sometimes nice and other times nasty. The 
gingerbread man lives at Tesco. 
 
Child # 218-Ragin is a dark skinned IC that is kind. He has a brother named Ragcom and 
they live in the opera house. They used to live in an empty box that the child’s brother 
decorated in the child’s bedroom. 
 
Child # 227- This child has an IC named Fritty who is a bird. 
 
Child # 232- Ben and Blue are teddies that live in the child’s bedroom and are cuddly.  
 
191 
Child # 235- Sleepy Bear is a toy white soft polar bear that is always there and sleeps 
with the child.  
 
Study 3: Private Speech 
 
All children that participated in study 2 also participated in study 3 with the exception of 
children 107, and 200. The children below only participated in study 3.  
 
Child # 85- Peep Peep is a male IC who is sometimes 3-years-old and can be up to 100-
years-old. Peep Peep is always around and is similar to the child’s friends. When the 
child doesn’t have an explanation for something he will say, “Peep Peep did it.” 
 
Child # 141- Sam is an IC that is 7 years old and plays the same games as the child does 
when alone. 
 
Child # 189- This child has an IC named Benny and also plays with mice ICs. The mice 
come from “mouseland.” 
 
Child # 204- Harvey is an IC who mirrors the child’s real cousin. This IC looks like the 
cousin, but is naughty so that he gets the blame if things go wrong. 
 
Child # 225- This child has a PO that is a dog. The dog is a tea towel with a lead that the 
child plays and talks with.   
 
Child # 234- Polo is a polar bear teddy that stays with the child and sleeps with the child. 
 
 
